Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

112. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Bermuda, December 22, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PERTAINING TO NUCLEAR MATTERS

PRESENT

• United States:
  • The President
  • The Secretary of State
  • Dr. Seaborg
  • Mr. Brown
  • Ambassador Bruce
  • Mr. Bundy
• United Kingdom:
  • The Prime Minister
  • The Foreign Secretary
  • Mr. de Zulueta
  • Ambassador Ormsby Gore
  • Sir William Penny

The Prime Minister asked whether the Christmas Island group had reported. The experts replied that the advance party had given its report. The Prime Minister asked how long a time would be needed for preparations. Mr. Brown answered that they must start in early January in order to be ready for testing between April and the first of July.

The Prime Minister asked about underground testing. Dr. Seaborg replied that underground testing could usefully be done at levels up to 100 KT and that the United States would expect to continue with underground testing even if atmospheric testing should be decided on. The Prime Minister asked whether underground testing could be detected. Dr. Seaborg replied that we could certainly expect to detect Soviet tests at the level of 20 KTs but that detection would be less certain at lower levels, down to a point which could not be definitely stated, at which detection would not be possible.

The Prime Minister said that what worried him was that the Soviets had negotiated when they were behind, although they were preparing tests. He said there was a theory that the U-2 really did give them a shock because they did not know how much we could learn from such photography. Now we are even, and the question was how to prevent them from further testing. If they did any in the atmosphere, the tests could be detected. Now we have a situation that may be decisive. (The Prime Minister remarked that the British played only a small part in this situation, through having convenient facilities.) He asked whether we could make a new try toward some agreement. Here he remarked that he must have Cabinet consent to any decision on these matters. He thought it might be possible, with no real delay, to embark upon an attempt to break through. On one side was Berlin, which could be settled if people wanted to settle it. On the other side was this problem which might involve twenty-five years of terrible effort in a travesty of the purposes of human life.

The Prime Minister then read a draft paper¹ proposing in essence that a new effort should be made to spare future generations these costs and dangers, even though on a fair assessment it was agreed that the United States should make all necessary preparations and that Christmas Island should be used in such preparations. The paper proposed that the final decision should be postponed until this effort had been made. What the Prime Minister hoped for was that this effort might have its effect both in Berlin and on disarmament. He hoped for a new phase of understanding. He believed it might be possible to summon Khrushchev to a meeting for such purposes and that we could thus get a great moral advantage.

The President said that he could not believe that the Soviets would give us such a propaganda advantage. If we embark on such new discussions, it would delay us another year. We would not have a better case a year from now, and what could we expect the Soviets to agree to in such a period? He agreed that we should have had an agreement before, and that the problems of underground testing had been greatly exaggerated, but now the Soviets had tested and could prepare secret tests again, while we on our side could not stay in the posture of real preparedness.

There followed a discussion of the disarmament proposals of the United States and of the optimum time for the proposed new test series. Dr. Seaborg stated that if this were the last series, and if we knew it, and if we knew that it would happen, we would go somewhat later.

The President restated the position as he saw it: we must decide to test, but we could couple the decision with a restatement of our purposes of disarmament. He thought we should not announce a decision now but only that we were making preparations. The Prime Minister wanted to make it clear that we would make a new and real effort for disarmament. If real progress could be made we would not test. We should only have to defend our preparations, on the first round; the President agreed to this last point. The Prime Minister teased the scientists about their destructive powers, but in reply to their remonstrances he said that they were really only “the innocent victims of the folly of politicians.”

The President asked the Prime Minister if he could agree on Christmas Island with an understanding that tests would occur if the situation did not change. The Prime Minister replied that he wished to think of the two countries as partners in this. Whether testing occurred on Christmas Island or not, we were in it together and Britain would have to back up the United States. But could we not announce our plans so that they would be less a threat than a hope. The President said we could do this as long as we did not use any words that would trap us.

The Prime Minister repeated his hope that we could “summon this fellow.” After all, on paper the disarmament plans were close together, and historians looking back from the distant future may wonder why it had been so hard to reach an agreement.

The Secretary of State thought it was extremely important not to think of our testing as opening a new chapter. It was the Soviet tests which opened the new chapter.

The Prime Minister said that a great deal depended on what the Soviet Union really wanted in the nuclear field. He thought that these tests had occurred because Khrushchev was frightened.

Lord Home asked if the President really intended to link the testing decision to Berlin. The President replied in the affirmative. If a really good settlement could be achieved on Berlin, he believed—as a private matter, not for publication—that it would be easier to make a decision not to test. The Secretary of State emphasized that these two propositions would never be linked formally with the Soviets.

Lord Home asked again if we could not summon the Soviet leaders to a disarmament meeting.

The Prime Minister asked if there were really a grave problem of keeping teams together. Secretary Rusk restated the American view quite simply. The Soviet Union can agree not to test and still prepare in secret for a new series. The United States cannot; no democracy could take that course. Dr. Seaborg remarked that we had been accused of preparing even when we were not, and now any such course would be doubly difficult.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore remarked that we could say that we now have an absolute justification for testing and mean to prepare, but before we execute tests we will make a further great effort. The Prime Minister said that there must be a private agreement, subject to Cabinet understanding, and that meanwhile a simple public statement should be made. The President asked Ambassador Bruce to work with Ambassador Ormsby Gore and the technical experts in preparing such a statement. It was later decided not to reach a private agreement at this time; the Prime Minister instead gave the President a letter explaining his intentions.² Meanwhile the technical experts did reach a tentative agreement ad referendum, on rules for the use of Christmas Island.

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, UK. Top Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text, which is on White House stationery. According to the President’s Appointment Book, the meeting was held at Government House. (Kennedy Library)
1. Not found.
2. In his letter of December 22, Macmillan stated that the experts should agree on the terms of a formal agreement for the use of Christmas Island, that the matter would be subject to a decision of the British Cabinet, and that “it would be unreasonable for the British Government, should it approve in principle of the use of Christmas Island, to be in a position to disapprove the tests if you and I feel ourselves unable to reach agreement.” He did not think the “decision should rely only upon the state of the world at the time, as if this was something that could not be changed by human effort. I should like to feel that we had done everything possible to control events and not merely to follow them.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan-Kennedy 1960-1961)