Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

101. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 22, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of the Committee of Principals¹

PARTICIPANTS

• (See Tab A)²

The discussion was preceded by a briefing given by Dr. Scoville on the results of the analyses of the recent Soviet nuclear weapon test series.

Following the briefing Secretary Rusk asked Chairman Seaborg if he would care to evaluate the relative position of the US and the USSR in the nuclear weapons field in the light of the Soviet nuclear tests. Chairman Seaborg replied that it was almost impossible to give a meaningful answer to this question since there were so many factors that entered into the equation. In certain aspects of thermonuclear technology the Soviets seem to have caught up with and perhaps even surpassed the United States. The situation with respect to tactical weapons was not known. Dr. Wiesner added that it was certainly clear that the Soviet Union had improved its effective stockpiles by the recent series. Chairman Seaborg agreed and went on to ask Dr. Scoville if he would give the meeting an estimate of the length of time that the Soviet Union had been preparing for its recent series of tests. Dr. Scoville replied that the Soviet Union had probably been preparing the logistics for the series since the spring of 1961. The heavy build-up in the north probably had not begun until July 1961. Obviously design work had been vigorously prosecuted ever since 1958.

Ambassador Dean asked what the effect would be on nuclear weapons development work in the United States if the Kennedy-Macmillan offer to refrain from tests in the atmosphere were renewed. Chairman Seaborg said that it would be hard to conduct nuclear tests effectively and with sufficient speed underground and that the United States would not be ready for a test in outer space for another two years. The fact that a nuclear test ban treaty would not prevent preparations for another series of Soviet tests was the most worrisome thing, however. After another several years of preparations the Soviet Union might again start to test. Chairman Seaborg said he would be willing to freeze weapons technology at the present state in the US and USSR but he saw no clear solution to the danger of preparations for another series being carried out in the Soviet Union during the early years of the treaty. Dr. Wiesner summed up by stating that without atmospheric tests the United States could not redress everything that the Soviet Union had accomplished in its recent series but that Chairman Seaborg was also saying that this did not worry him too much.

Ambassador Dean asked whether it was not true that the United States had been experiencing difficulties in its underground testing. Chairman Seaborg replied that underground testing had been much slower than expected and that diagnostics had been much inferior. Dr. Wiesner asked whether this situation might improve to which Dr. Seaborg replied that he assumed it would.

Secretary Rusk asked whether there was any objection to the proposition that the United States should not repeat the Kennedy-Macmillan offer for an atmospheric ban without international controls and that if the Soviet Union made the offer the United States would not accept it. There was no disagreement. Secretary Rusk then said that so far the United States position had been based on the October 11 decision³ that a nuclear test ban treaty was still in the United States interest. Everything we had been doing was based on that assumption. Secretary Rusk thought the question should be raised now as to whether the United States would sign the US-UK draft treaty if the Soviet Union said next week that they would sign it. Mr. Bundy asked whether there were things which could be added to the treaty to prevent the kind of preparations to which Chairman Seaborg was drawing the meeting’s attention. It was felt that there was nothing which could be added to the treaty to cover this point.

Mr. Foster said that he had envisaged Ambassador Dean’s asking the Soviet delegation to respond to the latest United States proposals to which no satisfactory answer had yet been given. He saw no need to hurry the negotiations and this lack of haste would be encouraged by the fact that the United Nations Secretariat would not be able to provide the kind of service which would permit fast work in the conference. Mr. Foster also noted that on November 28 there would be a meeting of the committee established by the NSC to look into the question of nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The results of the meeting would be important in determining whether the United States would be prepared to accept in the future a test ban treaty of the kind previously advanced by us. Secretary Rusk said he believed the situation had now changed and that whereas the United States could have signed a test ban treaty immediately we were now in a position of not having had adequate consultation with Congress, and were consequently without assurance that Congress would be ready to ratify the treaty and provide funds for its implementation. Secretary Rusk therefore felt that Ambassador Dean could not be instructed to sign the draft treaty⁴ until more work had been done with Congress. Mr. Foster agreed with the assessment.

Mr. Foster then asked Dr. Scoville whether it was a fact that the more that was learned about the Soviet tests the better the tests appeared. Dr. Scoville said that the first tests which were analyzed showed only moderate improvements in Soviet technology but that the series later blossomed out into something more significant.

Secretary Rusk enquired as to what, if anything, took effect when the treaty was signed, to which Ambassador Dean replied that each of the three proposed signatory states had said they would not conduct tests underground, below the 4.75 threshold, from the date of signature for a limited period of time. The treaty itself, of course, would not come into force until it was ratified. Secretary Nitze asked whether it would not be well to consider removing completely the moratorium agreement on shots below 4.75. Mr. Foster stated that the United States had strongly supported a test ban treaty as the beginning of a process leading to disarmament but now it appears that limitations on tests might not be in our best interest; on the other hand, a change in position would undoubtedly have the most serious consequences. Mr. Foster wondered if it would not be possible to avoid taking a final decision on signing a treaty until the committee appointed by the NSC had a chance to begin its work and until we had seen what the Soviet Union’s position was going to be in the test ban conference. Mr. Bohlen said that the Soviet note accepting the resumption of negotiations implied that the Soviet Union was not prepared to sign a treaty right away since it talked about events that would happen during the negotiations. Secretary Nitze said that to him there appeared to be a clear intent in the Soviet note to establish a moratorium on nuclear tests during the negotiations. Secretary Rusk replied that there should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that we would not accept an unpoliced moratorium during the negotiations. The Secretary also said that Ambassador Dean should describe in no uncertain terms how the Soviet breaking of the moratorium had affected the negotiating situation.

Ambassador Dean then enquired whether it would be possible to announce the total number of Soviet shots in the recent series. Dr. Scoville replied that something like “almost fifty” could be said but not the precise number.

Mr. Foster asked whether there should be a backgrounder for the press in order to give them some information about our attitude toward the resumption of negotiations.

Mr. Nitze asked whether a revised approach to the treaty was not necessary and Chairman Seaborg said that perhaps the United States should say it wishes to amend the treaty so as to prevent preparations for testing from being carried out. Mr. Stelle suggested that the answer to this was simply to prepare for testing ourselves. Chairman Seaborg felt this was not a feasible course of action for the United States and Mr. Bundy agreed that it would be difficult for the United States to prepare to do something which it had agreed in a treaty not to do.

Dr. Wiesner said he felt that the key issue was not whether the United States was equivalent to the Soviet Union in every aspect of nuclear weapon technology but whether the United States is missing any of the things it should have for its security. Mr. Cleveland said that the United States position had been based on the understanding that the United States was so far ahead in nuclear weapon technology that it could sign a treaty to end tests. If this situation had changed perhaps some new balloon should be floated. Chairman Seaborg said he felt that the problem was would the United States be ahead if the Soviet Union once more prepared and conducted a large test series. Mr. Scoville said he felt the Soviet Union had tested everything it had and that it would take at least 6 or 9 months before they would be ready to test anything else.

As to the backgrounder for the press, Secretary Rusk said that a high level backgrounder did not appear necessary, and that the press officers could make the necessary points known to the press in the usual way.

Mr. Cleveland observed that in face of the new factors that had come to light, such as the need to inspect preparations, the United States might have to move in the direction of combining the test talks with disarmament.

Dr. Wiesner said that when the question of the nuclear test negotiations was discussed with the President he should be advised that there are many dimensions to the problem and that there are many things which we could do to off-set any imbalance.

The meeting was adjourned at 6:25 p.m.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Draftedby Goodby and approved in S on December 4.
1. In a November 22 briefing memorandum to Rusk, Foster stated that the purpose of the Principals’ meeting was to discuss the situation arising from the Soviet acceptance, in a November 21 note, of the U.S. proposal, set forth in a note of November 13 following conclusion of the General Assembly debate on the nuclear test question, to resume the recessed Geneva test ban conference. (Ibid., Central Files, 397.5611-GE/11-2261) For texts of the notes, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 594 and 636-637, respectively. The conference resumed on November 28.
2. Not printed. Among the 28 participants were Nitze (representing McNamara), Lemnitzer, and Allen Dulles.
3. See Document 83.
4. Apparent reference to the April 18 U.S.-U.K. draft; see footnote 2, Document 8.