Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

10. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, March 25, 1961, 3 p.m.

2626. Lunch with Gromyko. I had lunch with Gromyko alone on Friday, March 24, at his request. He asked for a meeting with the President, explaining that he had planned to return to the Soviet Union on Saturday, March 25, but would stay over a few days. He reminded me that he had suggested such a meeting during his talk with Secretary Rusk on March 18¹ and had received no reply. I promised to arrange a meeting if possible and asked him when he wanted it. His response was as soon as possible.²

I asked about his reaction to the President’s TV program and proposals on Laos,³ and he replied that the Soviet Government wanted a neutral and independent Laos and that he was hopeful that a solution was possible.

I submitted our last draft resolution on disarmament.⁴ He said he wanted me to tell the President that they had taken our views very seriously and appreciated our difficulties and were studying the situation. But the resolution was unsatisfactory; they could not accept the proposal for an additional 3 neutrals (India, Mexico and one unnamed) to be added to the committee as chairman and vice chairmen respectively. They would have to insist that the neutrals be added with equal rights to participation in all respects. In view of the fact that we could make no other suggestions besides the Disarmament Commission itself, perhaps any further discussion of the paragraph on principles was unnecessary.

After further discussion we agreed that in these circumstances the best thing to do would be to have no resolution, announce that we had agreed to resume negotiations by the end of July and meanwhile would have some bilateral talks in June and July on disarmament, including the composition of the forum, and recommend that all pending resolutions be deferred until the next GA. He agreed to my suggestion that perhaps any reference to bilateral talks on the subject of the composition of the forum might be omitted, and he preferred to make a statement before Committee I instead of issuing a joint communiqué. I asked him to draft what he had in mind saying. This draft was transmitted to the Department by telegram today.⁵ He said that any statement I cared to make would be satisfactory with him. He thought a reference to deferring pending resolutions might be desirable to avoid possibility of committee consideration of any other items proposed by other countries.

In the course of our conversation he said he had a message from Mr. K. to deliver to the President orally. We discussed Soviet-US difficulties, and he complained that the Soviet Union had been misunderstood following the war and charged improperly with designs on the independence of Europe. On disarmament, he said in the USSR there has been a feeling that “some influential circles” in the US continued to be suspicious of the USSR. Until that dissipated, mutual trust was impossible. He wished that the US would believe in their sincere anxiety for general and complete disarmament under international control, and a disarmed world. He repeated that in Moscow they felt that influential circles in the US did not want disarmament, and implied that this suspicion about our sincerity was extensive.

As to Berlin, again he emphasized its importance and expressed the fear that there was some under-estimation of its importance in the US.

On the Congo, he said he regretted that we were so far apart. He said the Soviet Union wanted nothing—no investments, no land—and felt the Congo should be independent. The Soviet Union was indignant about Lumumba’s murder. He said he had known Lumumba personally and he was a clever man.

Stevenson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-2561. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Moscow.
1. A memorandum of this conversation drafted by Alexander Akalovsky, Officer in Charge of General Disarmament Negotiations at ACDA, is ibid., 611.61/3-1861. It is printed in vol. V, Document 33. Nusup 1095 to Geneva, March 20, contains an extract of this conversation pertaining to disarmament. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/3-2061) See the Supplement.
2. Kennedy met with Gromyko and other officials on March 27; see vol. V, Document 36.
3. For text of the President’s remarks on Laos at a news conference held March 23, see Department of State Bulletin, April 17, 1961, p. 543.
4. Text not found. According to telegram 2615 from USUN, March 24, the text was similar to that transmitted in telegram 2588 from USUN, March 22, except that the United States was willing to accept the addition of three rather than two “neutral” powers to the former 10-nation Disarmament Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-2461 and 600.0012/3-2261, respectively) Documentation on U.S. efforts to reach a compromise with the Soviet Union on its proposal made in September 1960, one of a series of “troika” initiatives, to expand the 10-nation Committee to 15 by adding 5 neutral nations is ibid., 600.0012 for February and March 1961.
5. Telegram 2622 from USUN, March 25. (Ibid., 600.0012/3-2561)