Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

403. Memorandum from Komer to President Kennedy, January 17¹

January 17, 1962

SUBJECT

• Report on Long-Range MAP Guidelines

Attached report by the Military Assistance Steering Group is the first major effort in your Administration to reshape our military aid program, both to complement the AID turnaround and to make MAP itself more responsive to the needs of the Sixties. While this process will inevitably be lengthy, we can now put up to you certain tentative decisions which could have a decisive influence on program direction from here on.

The Steering Group, set up by Rusk and McNamara for this purpose, focussed on six key client states—Korea, the GRC, Pakistan, Iran, Greece, and Turkey—which absorb about 50% of MAP outlays. For over a decade in most cases the bulk of our aid to them has gone to equip and maintain large forces well beyond their own capabilities to support. All are in the underdeveloped category, with insatiable needs for development aid as well.

While the Steering Group sees a continued need for large MAP programs to help deter Bloc aggression against these countries, it questions whether so large a proportion of available US (and local) resources should continue to go for this purpose instead of for meeting other pressing needs. On the principle that total US aid to any country must be designed for the best overall impact, it proposes a gradual reduction in planned MAP outlays of well over $1 billion during the next five years (Table at Tab I). It argues that, although overt Bloc aggression remains a major threat to the six countries, the greatest threat they are likely to face is that of indirect aggression.

To meet this threat, the Steering Group proposes that we push the new AID concept of economic development with self-help as the main thrust of US aid policy in the Sixties (together with greater emphasis on internal security programs). It sees us as still putting too much money into MAP programs designed primarily to meet Korea-style aggression, and which in such respects as their local budgetary impact compete with our efforts to get local sights fixed more firmly on well-planned growth.

Therefore, it urges that a substantial portion of MAP be redirected into AID programs or re-programmed to other higher priority areas than those to which the bulk of it now flows (e.g. Southeast Asia instead of Korea). As you put it in the State of the Union message, AID is “reorienting our foreign assistance to emphasize . . . more economic aid instead of military. . . .” The Steering Group Report is a vehicle to this end.

The exercise has already had considerable impact. It helped stimulate DOD to defer some $80–85 million from FY 1962 and influenced the setting of the FY 1963 budget mark at $1.5 billion, which has led DOD to cut over $125 million from the six programs. However, it has also generated adverse reactions. Many of these are the usual bureaucratic defenses of those wedded to a program of fifteen years standing (the JCS, for example, refused to take the exercise seriously); others bear on timing and flexibility.

1. Admittedly MAP reductions would entail at least marginally greater military risks, despite the Bloc’s apparent preference for indirect aggression and civil war instead of risky Korea-style attacks.

But the Steering Group is far from “dismantling” the MAP; at minimum it proposes a tidy $3.9 billion for the six in FY 1962/67, only about $1 billion below the comparable 1955/61 level. Moreover, it argues that it is US deterrent power, not local forces, which chiefly deters the Bloc. None of these local forces could halt major aggression unaided. In any case we cannot look only at military risks. Other acute threats confront us in the six countries; where we cannot insure fully against all of them, we must make some hard choices.

2. Even so, is now a good time to start cutting MAP? The JCS say flatly that this is no time to make, or even plan reductions. With crises in Berlin and Southeast Asia, big cuts now might give the wrong signal to friends as well as enemies. Greece and Turkey in particular are now participating in the build-up of NATO readiness. Even in a period of relative tranquillity it would be difficult to sell a turnaround to countries whose force build-ups we’ve encouraged, particularly until how much compensatory economic aid we’re prepared to give becomes more clear.

The Steering Group itself recognizes the force of these considerations; it emphasizes the importance of starting now on a long term shift in direction rather than going for large, immediate cuts. There will never be a “good” time to start a turnaround, but several techniques can be used to cushion the impact—spreading it out over several years, re-emphasizing the key deterrent role of growing US forces, pointing to increased AID programs as indicating no diminution of US interest.

3. However desirable in theory, can we really shift resources from MAP to AID? Aside from the political repercussions it might create in recipient countries, could they absorb more economic aid? Despite their insatiable appetites, none of them except Pakistan has yet developed enough viable projects which meet AID criteria. But this situation is changing. And unless we can convince our own ambassadors that they can in fact get more economic aid in lieu of military they will have little incentive to recommend MAP cuts. Others argue that MAP and AID funds are not really fungible, in view of Congressional attitudes. But a strong Administration lead, plus such devices as transfer provisions, could accomplish a great deal.

ISSUES FOR NSC DISCUSSION. Despite the above reservations, most senior officials (except the JCS) applaud in principle some gradual reductions in MAP. But they disagree over where, how fast, and how much. The Steering Group six-country ceilings are only a first cut at the problem—some need further refinement and fleshing out before firm decisions can be made. The central questions at this point are: (a) how much of a general push you wish to give to a MAP turn-around—this will have major impact on how seriously the agencies take such follow-on studies; and (b) what specific if tentative guidelines you favor for Korea, Iran, Greece, and Turkey on which there are split views.

The draft NSC Record of Action (Tab II) reflects the position which we recommend you take on the major issues which we expect to arise:

A. Should we articulate a general policy of primary US emphasis on development during the Sixties, with implicit recognition that there should be some shifts from MAP to AID (para. 2)? Such a general statement of your intent would set the tone of subsequent country reviews. However, some like George McGhee (who favors most country cuts) hold to the old Draper Committee philosophy that military and economic aid are really separate programs which don’t compete with each other and should be handled separately (his personal views at Tab III). He may raise this issue by suggesting we drop para. 2.

But few go as far as McGhee. The dollars come out of the same US pocket, and the size of the six countries’ own military budgets directly affects their ability to devote resources to nation-building. For example, the DOD FY 1962/67 Plan would require local military outlays of some $5.2 billion, a rise of some $1.2 billion from FY 1956/61 levels (this in addition to almost $1.5 billion in some form of US supporting assistance).

B. Korea (para. 5c). By far our largest MAP program, it epitomizes our dilemma. Since 1953 we’ve spent billions in Korea, largely to maintain 600,000 man ROK forces (on top of major US deployments) against a renewed attack. [text not declassified]

State and AID are much in favor, but DOD, which has for years opposed such changes, argues rightly that more study is needed (including the possibility of cutting US forces rather than ROK). NSC Action calls for prompt study, but asks you to lean in Steering Group direction to make it a serious one. DOD and probably JCS will want to be heard.

C. [text not declassified]

D. Greece and Turkey (para. 5e). Here our dilemma is that, while both are not only unable to carry alone their present forces but badly need aid for accelerated economic developments, both are NATO members most willing to shoulder military burdens. At a minimum we should defer action until Berlin crisis has died down. Even then State and Defense are reluctant to cut MAP even modestly as the Steering Group proposes (its ceiling of $80 million annually for Greece is only $5 million above 1956/61 level, while proposed $134 million annually for Turkey is only $34 million below 1956/61 delivery level. We propose restudy of alternative programs for your post-Berlin decision. State and Defense will probably agree.

RECOMMENDATION: I believe that all agencies, after voicing their concerns, will go along with draft Record of Action (since it in effect postpones the key decisions pending further studies). Therefore, I urge that, if you approve it, you emphasize your determination to reduce MAP and switch more resources into development even if willing to reserve final judgment on Korea, Iran, Greece, and Turkey. Mac Bundy suggests that if you prefer to do so, you can well reserve decision on any point until after further consideration with the Secretaries of State and Defense. On the other hand, if your judgment is clear, a quick decision in the meeting will make an immediate impact on all.

R.W. Komer

1. “Report on Long-Range MAP Guidelines.” Secret. 5 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 496, Box 313.