Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

336. Memorandum from Schaetzel to Kitchen, July 24¹

July 24, 1963

SUBJECT

• Balance of Payments and Force Withdrawal

In anticipation of the meeting with Secretary McNamara on Friday, I’d like to set down a few observations which arise out of the President’s new request. If the major thrust of the President’s recent request of Defense is to accelerate the present program then this is something that we may be able to work out without damage. If on the other hand it is a demand for more far-reaching reductions it seems to me that the following considerations should be borne in mind and that they must condition our judgment regarding cutbacks going beyond those presently under consideration.

We could not be moving into a more difficult period as far as European strategic thinking is concerned. De Gaulle’s “nationalization” of French forces, French allusions to the reorganization of NATO, the unilateral withdrawal of the four Belgian battalions, the obscurity and internal contradictions of British defense policy, to say nothing of their imminent elections, all these elements add up to a highly combustible situation. A further factor is the cumulative effect of what the Europeans refer to as the abrupt shifts in US strategic doctrine. Finally, the test suspension treaty and discussions of a non-aggression pact unquestionably will be seized upon in Europe as rationalization for failures to reach agreed force levels or in fact to justify cutbacks from present levels of performance.

In sum, I am baffled by how we combine the following policy objectives: A greater European contribution to a flexible strategy including additional conventional European forces, initiate steps toward a détente with the Soviet Union, and, at the same time, move unilaterally toward significant cutbacks in our present commitments and drift back toward the plate glass doctrine.

A crash cutback program going beyond the carefully prepared and well-thought through Defense program, would seem to me to offer unacceptable risks of unraveling all we have been trying to do with NATO over the last ten years.

Ideally we ought to have Finletter here for the McNamara-Rusk meeting. I intend to suggest to the Secretary the possibility of Finletter accompanying McNamara to Bonn.

1. “Balance of Payments and Force Withdrawal.” Secret. 2 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–8 US/NATO.