239. Memorandum from Gen. Lemnitzer to McNamara, August 71
SUBJECT
- Program Package I
I refer to your memorandum of 20 July 1961, in which you requested my recommendations on all major programs included in Central War Offensive Forces, Program Package I. I refer further to our discussion on 4 August 1961, during which I expressed my views on these programs. My views are confirmed as follows:
1. MINUTEMAN (Hardened and Dispersed)—The MINUTEMAN (H&D) system has great potential for rapid quantitative expansion. The retention of a production base to maintain this potential is important. However, in view of the substantial numbers of other important systems which make up the essential mix of delivery capability in Program Package I, I recommend procurement of no more than 300 additional MINUTEMAN (H&D) in FY 63. Decision as to the ultimate number of MINUTEMAN need not and should not be made at this time.
2. POLARIS—I am particularly impressed by the comparatively high reliability, low level of vulnerability, and versatile retargeting capability of the POLARIS system. I recommend further procurement at a rate of 6 additional FBM submarines per year. Decision on the end number required should be deferred at this time.
3. SKYBOLT (GAM–87)—In my view, the degree of invulnerability possessed by airborne B–52H/SKYBOLT aircraft plus the ability to attack from multiple directions without penetration of Soviet defenses justifies production of this system. This view is based, however, upon three assumptions, the validity of which I have not yet confirmed:
a. SKYBOLT is now technically ready for production.
b. Design criteria will be met.
c. Can be operational by 1965.
Provided these assumptions are valid, I recommend procurement for 7 squadrons.
[Facsimile Page 2] [Typeset Page 804]4. MINUTEMAN (Mobile)—During the mid-1960’s, it appears to me that mobility will continue to be a most important factor in reducing vulnerability. I recommend procurement of 1 squadron, 10 trains, to provide a base of operational experience should additional mobile MINUTEMAN prove to be necessary.
5. KC–135—Based upon currently available information, a total requirement for 38 squadrons appears to be justified; this number to be adjusted pending outcome of Air Force study of the relationship of KC–135 aircraft to the SKYBOLT system.
6. 465–L Command and Control—I recommend research and development funding at this time. This system should receive further consideration following Air Force study of a survivable command and control system.
7. Airborne alert—In that deficit funding is now authorized, it appears there is no need for further decision at this time.
8. B–47 phase out—In view of the current and foreseeable world situation I consider it unwise to reduce the B–47 force in FY 1963, as is now programmed. Accordingly, I recommend retention of the 13 wing, 52 squadron force level through FY 1963. Subsequent B–47 phase out should be reassessed in one year.
9. TITAN II—TITAN II is the only quickly responsive missile system capable of delivering 6000 pound payloads. As such TITAN II provides versatility of a sort possessed by no other missile system currently being considered. I recommend procurement of two additional squadrons.
10. B–52H—I recommend no further B–52 procurement beyond the 14 wing force now approved.
11. ATLAS, JUPITER, and THOR phase out—The major expenditures for these systems have already been made. These are weapon systems which require Soviet targeting and have a considerable capability. [Facsimile Page 3] Further, JUPITER and THOR can be retained at minimum cost in U.S. manpower. I recommend decision to phase out these systems be deferred another year.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JCS recommendations on “Central War Offensive Forces, Program Package I.” Top Secret. 3 pp. National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, JMF 7000 General (6 May 61), Sec. 3.↩