Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

207. Memorandum from Ball to President Kennedy, July 22¹

July 22, 1963

SUBJECT

• Proposed Nuclear Offer to De Gaulle

An offer of nuclear assistance to General De Gaulle to induce him to sign a test-ban agreement would, in my judgment, be generally interpreted as a departure from our announced policy of discouraging independent national deterrents. You stated this policy eloquently to the European people in your Frankfurt speech.

To depart from a policy of this importance is a major step with far-reaching implications. Before you finally decide on this new course, I urge that the decision be thoroughly examined and tested against all possible consequences. I am encouraged in venturing this admonition by the views that David Bruce has put forward in his telegram this afternoon (Deptel 491 of the Mum series). Bruce vigorously argues against a nuclear offer to De Gaulle.

Whether or not General De Gaulle would accept an offer from us if we decide to make one is a matter of speculation. It would, I think, depend to a considerable extent upon the conditions that we attach. But, without regard to the General’s reaction, the mere fact of our making such an offer would itself raise serious problems in our relations with other nations.

I foresee so many difficulties in the new line of policy we are considering that I feel obliged to call to your attention some of the implications as I perceive them.

This memorandum will consider three questions:

First: Is it desirable to make a nuclear offer to De Gaulle?

Second: If so, what should be the form and conditions of that offer?

Third: What should be the timing of our offer?

I.

SHOULD WE MAKE AN OFFER TO DE GAULLE

A. Arguments in Favor

The arguments that have been advanced in favor of offering nuclear technology to the General are, as I understand them, the following:

1. We can hope to persuade General De Gaulle to sign the test ban only if we give him the technology he would otherwise derive from testing. If we do not do so, he will refuse to sign the treaty, continue to test, and thus give the Soviet Union an excuse for withdrawing from the agreement.

2. The French have been working on a nuclear deterrent since 1955. It would be unfair for us to seek to prevent them from perfecting their deterrent through testing, especially since we have helped the British.

3. Khrushchev already recognizes France as a nuclear power, and since he has not shown interest in a non-dissemination agreement, he can hardly complain if we help the French gain greater nuclear competence.

4. We have already crossed the line of showing our willingness to help France by offering De Gaulle the same deal that we offered the British after Nassau.

Even stated in this partial and elliptical form, these arguments have weight, and they should not be casually dismissed. If this was all there were to it, we would seem well justified in making a nuclear offer to France. But a decision of this gravity must be balanced against the totality of its consequences, and if that exercise were carefully undertaken I am confident that the dangers and disadvantages would show themselves as substantially outweighing any possible benefits.

B. Arguments Against Making Offer

1. It is wrong to assume that continued French testing would necessarily disrupt the test-ban treaty.

There is little basis for believing that, if, after a test ban is signed, De Gaulle were to set off a nuclear explosion, the Soviet Union would withdraw from the test-ban agreement. Such a contention assumes that the Soviet Union does not want the agreement in the first place and, once it was signed, would seize the first excuse to abrogate it. But the impression of Averell Harriman and the others in Moscow is quite the contrary. They feel that the Soviet Union very much wants the test-ban agreement.

I recognize that it is hazardous to try to assess Khrushchev’s motivations. There is, however, reason to believe that he has two purposes in mind:

1. He genuinely wants to prevent nuclear dissemination, presumably because he wants to keep the deterrent out of Chinese and German hands.

2. He would like to use the test ban as a means of mobilizing sentiment against the Chinese, particularly in the LDC’s where he is engaging in an internecine struggle for control of the national Communist parties.

If these are, in fact, the Soviet Union’s motives, there is no particular reason to think that Khrushchev would opt out of the agreement simply because France tested. One has to consider the world climate in which such a test would occur. If, as seems probable, almost all the nations of the world will promptly sign the test-ban agreement, the French action would be likely to induce a widespread and hostile outcry. No doubt the Soviet Union would play a leading role in the jeering section, but I think it highly doubtful that it would abandon the advantages of appearing on the side of peace by destroying the agreement.

After all the USSR would have great difficulty in persuading the world that the French bomb tests were of a nature that “jeopardized the supreme interests of its country”, as the present draft treaty specifies. And Mr. Khrushchev has made it perfectly clear that a French bomb holds no terrors for him (as a German bomb might).

Nor do I think that a French bomb test would bring public censure on the United States or the other nations of the Western alliance. The rotten eggs would fall, with considerable precision, on France—particularly if we continue to make clear that we oppose the spread of national nuclear deterrent.

2. Our offer to help France would create difficulties with the USSR.

But if the Soviet Union would probably accept a French bomb test without destroying the treaty, I do not believe it would stand still while we provided France with the technology that testing would otherwise provide. I think we could expect vehement charges of bad faith, and that these charges would find wide credibility around the world.

Moreover—and this is of great importance—our assistance to France would almost certainly increase Chinese pressure for similar assistance from the USSR. If a principal object of the test ban treaty is to frustrate China’s ambitions to become a nuclear power, we would seem to be running the wrong way with the ball.

3. An offer to De Gaulle would create a potentially dangerous problem in our relations with West Germany.

The most serious hazards that might flow from our helping De Gaulle—or from our even offering to help him—would be in connection with our relations with Germany. Over the years ahead, Germany will provide the focus of danger for our European policy. As I have written to you before, the clearest lesson of the between-wars period is that the Germans can become dangerous if they are (1) isolated, and (2) given a sense of grievance.

In helping the French, we would be in the position of assisting De Gaulle’s clearly announced ambition to gain a preferred status for France in Europe and the Atlantic world. At the same time, by expecting them to sign the bomb-test treaty we would be asking the Germans to join in a self-denying ordinance condemning them to a permanent non-nuclear status—in other words, to a status of permanent discrimination.

The Germans would be unlikely to derive much comfort from the argument that De Gaulle would put his deterrent force at the service of the West. In view of his past relations with NATO, this is not very persuasive.

The risk of an offer to De Gaulle at this time is, of course, magnified by the fact that, with the departure of the Chancellor in October, Germany is moving into a new and much less certain political era. The spectacle of the French military and French scientists working with Americans on an exclusive basis could be a festering source of grievance that might get worse over time. For I think it quite unrealistic to assume that, if we provide France with limited technology in order to enable the French to avoid bomb tests, we will abruptly cut off our nuclear cooperative relationships with France immediately thereafter. Much more likely, we will be inaugurating a nuclear relationship not unlike that which we presently have with Great Britain. Over the years I think this will become increasingly less tolerable to the Germans.

4. It would cause dismay and reassessment in other member countries of the Alliance.

For the other Western Europeans, as well as for the Germans, our offer to assist De Gaulle with nuclear technology at this time would, I think, tend to undo much of the achievement of your European trip.

Many of our European allies would interpret such a move as indicating that we did not mean what we said when we spoke out against national nuclear deterrents. They would regard it as proving that the General had adopted the right tactics in his treatment of America, that we are susceptible to blackmail, and that the most effective way to deal with the Anglo-Saxons is to be beastly to them.

No matter how carefully we explained our action, I fear it would be regarded in Europe as a sign that the United States was turning away from its policy of partnership with a united Europe in favor of bilateral deals with the man who has done the most to disrupt progress toward European unity.

These reactions could be expected not merely from Germany, but from Italy and the Benelux. In fact, I think we should take a careful reading as to the possible effect on the policies of the new Italian Government during this highly critical period.

5. It would harm our position with the LDCs and the rest of the world.

If, at the time of signing the test-ban agreement, we simultaneously assist an ex-colonial power in its efforts to enter the nuclear club, we will destroy a part of the moral advantage we might otherwise obtain from the test ban. In fact, our action is likely to be misunderstood and resented particularly by the less developed countries who will see some hypocrisy in our seeking a test ban in order to halt nuclear proliferation while at the same time assisting another nation to achieve nuclear capability.

6. Harmful consequences will flow from the offer, whether or not it is accepted.

In making a nuclear offer to De Gaulle we risk considerable damage to a variety of vital interests—whether or not the General buys what we offer. The more fact of our tendering assistance—taking into account that the Soviets presumably do not wish to be pressured into making a similar offer to the CHICOMS—will indicate that the Western white nations are willing to share the bomb with other Western white nations—but not with people of different color. The CHICOMS would be likely to make a propaganda field day out of this.

7. It is not in our national interest to encourage a French deterrent.

Nevertheless—in spite of all of these dangers—I think we could afford to absorb the discontent of the rest of the world with our nuclear offer if it were clearly in our interest that France should become an effective nuclear power. It seems to me, however, that the facts are quite the contrary.

Why, after all, is General De Gaulle interested in having nuclear weapons? He has made it crystal clear that he regards a nuclear weapons system not as something to be placed at the service of the West but as an instrument of specifically national interest. He does not think of a French national deterrent as a supplemental force to be used alongside the American force; he sees it rather as a force he can employ in the event that the United States chooses not to use its force when he thinks French interests require it. He has recognized quite candidly that, as a supplement to the American force, the force de frappe is unnecessary, but he wants to be able to enforce French policy in the event that French policy is contrary to our own. In other words, he desires an independent force primarily for the purpose of being able to frustrate American policy when he choses to do so.

Under these circumstances we cannot expect that De Gaulle will be prepared to put his nuclear force in NATO even to the extent to which we and the British have committed our nuclear forces. The General has made clear that he regards NATO as an American creature, and, even if he were to agree to the Nassau formula, he could be counted upon to give a peculiarly Gaullist interpretation to the phrase “supreme national interest”. Can anyone doubt that he would withdraw that force whenever it suited his special purposes, as he has already withdrawn the French fleet or as he withdrew most of the French army to serve in Algeria?

But if it is against our national interest for De Gaulle to have an independent deterrent, it is even more clearly against our national interest for us to help him achieve it. As David Bruce has pointed out with great clarity in his telegram, there are compelling reasons for us not to hasten the day of De Gaulle’s becoming even a minor nuclear power. And the more the General is faced with delay and mounting cost, the more will be the pressures on him to play a cooperative role in the Alliance.

There is, moreover, a further reason favoring delay. If we do not help the French now, I think it likely that, if and when the British Labor Party comes to power next year, they will begin to phase out the British deterrent, which could relieve the ultimate pressures for nuclear capability in other countries. But they will probably not feel able to do so if we are actively helping France.

WHAT SHOULD BE THE CONDITIONS OF A NUCLEAR OFFER?

If—in spite of the foregoing considerations—it is decided that the U.S. should make a nuclear offer to De Gaulle, I think it essential that you make clear from the outset that the offer is not for the purpose of facilitating De Gaulle’s ambition to achieve a nuclear capability he is free to use at will for his own special national interests. At the minimum the offer should be unequivocally conditioned on at least as firm terms of assignment as were employed with respect to the British Polaris.

The present draft of the proposed letter to General De Gaulle does not make this point clear. It provides merely that we “would be willing to explore alternative means by which the necessary technical information could be made available for your program.”

De Gaulle has repeatedly emphasized that he is not interested in building up NATO, and he has already rejected the Nassau deal. Under these circumstances it would not be unreasonable for him to interpret this language as suggesting that, at long last, we were ready to help him develop his program on the terms in which he has conceived it—as a specifically French deterrent.

Under these circumstances I think it likely that, if we do not make ourselves clear and precise from the outset, he will feel—or at least pretend to feel—when he learns our true intention, that the perfidious Anglo-Saxons have tried to do him in again.

There is another serious danger in not making clear at the outset what we have in mind. I would assume that, at the time a message is sent to De Gaulle, you will simultaneously be in touch with Adenauer—and probably with Spaak, the Italians, and the Dutch. In order to justify our nuclear offer to France, we must emphasize to them from the very beginning that our technology will be provided only on the condition that De Gaulle puts his force at the service of the West through NATO. Yet you cannot say this to the others without at the same time saying it to De Gaulle.

Under the circumstances, I think it essential—if it is decided to go ahead—that we make quite clear in the initial letter the general conditions we have in mind. It would be far better to have De Gaulle reject the offer out of hand, than to upset our other partners by leading them to suspect that we might be prepared to help him on his own terms.

III

WHAT SHOULD BE THE TIMING?

The present draft letter to De Gaulle has been prepared on the assumption that it would be promptly sent so as to reach the General prior to the conclusion both of the test-ban treaty and of his press conference on the 29th. The apparent assumption is that De Gaulle, in conducting his press conference, might thus be led to tone down any denunciatory language directed at the test-ban treaty.

I would not pretend to know whether an approach to De Gaulle during the coming week might persuade him to change his tune on July 29. He has already made clear to the world that he intends to continue testing in order to perfect his independent national deterrent, and he is unlikely to change that line until a bargain is in hand—although an approach now might induce him to lower his voice.

But I think there are good reasons why we should not be too hasty.

If we make clear in our initial letter that we expect the General, as a quid pro quo, to assign the force de frappe to NATO, we shall be more likely than not to receive a negative reply, and it is possible that De Gaulle would tee off on this offer in his press conference as he teed off on the Nassau offer on January 14.

On the other hand, if we send him the type of “come-on” letter now suggested, we may evoke a blander reaction on July 29, but we run the risk of a more violent attack when De Gaulle finds out what we are really up to.

Timing is important not merely in relation to the world effect of a test-ban treaty but also in relation to the process of Senatorial ratification. In this connection we should consider whether it is better to risk a rejection of the treaty on July 29 or a more angry attack a week or two later after De Gaulle has ascertained the conditions we have in mind. In any event, I doubt if it would be possible to postpone all reaction from the General until after ratification was completed.

As between the alternatives of an immediate ambiguous approach that might blunt the edge of De Gaulle’s words on the 29th and a franker disclosure of what we have in mind, I should certainly recommend the latter. But I do not believe that an immediate approach in either form is a good idea. I would, instead, prefer David Bruce’s suggestion that we merely inform De Gaulle at this point what we propose to do in Moscow, withholding any suggestion that we might meet his needs for technology. The General would no doubt speak his mind on July 29, but I do not think that his rejection of the treaty would come as much of a surprise to the world.

Meanwhile, other voices will be heard. I think, in fact, we can look forward to a rising pitch of gratification as the world waits for the conclusion of the treaty, and immediately after the treaty is concluded I think we can expect most of the nations of the world to queue up in order to establish their peaceful intentions by becoming early signers. In such an environment of expectation a dissenting French voice will lose its resonance in the manner of the Cuckoo’s as Spring wears on. And it will become increasingly difficult for De Gaulle to maintain his obduracy—particularly since he is likely to be under substantial pressure from the African members of the French Community as well as from his European neighbors.

At that time—hopefully—we might find a feasible occasion for organizing our other European allies in a common approach to the problem of the French deterrent. Certainly it would be far better to work toward this objective than to try to capture the Gaullist citadel with only our Anglo-Saxon partner to keep us company.

George W. Ball

1. Proposed offer of nuclear assistance to de Gaulle. Secret. 12 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–8.