Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

202. Telegram 211 from Moscow, July 18¹

Moscow, July 18, 1963, noon

At Soviet request, Thursday’s session started at 4:30 p.m. instead of usual 3 p.m. In addition to Harriman there were present on US side Kohler, Kaysen, Fisher, Tyler, McNaughton, Long, Akalovsky and Cash. Harriman gave Gromyko text of President press statement of July 17 on current talks, which Gromyko said he had already read in Russian. He felt it reflected “guarded optimism.” Harriman observed that when President makes public statements on matters of this kind he addresses himself primarily to the US Senate where he had to get sixty-seven votes. Harriman noted drafting committee had made some progress on preamble of test ban agreement but we still had some difficulty with paragraphs 2 and 3. Suggested dropping second paragraph of preamble.

Gromyko, changing subject, said he wished to say a few words on NAP. He expressed his apprehension that not all participants in present meetings were aware of importance of subject or of significance which Soviet Union attaches to it in connection with these talks. Soviet evaluation of its importance stemmed from statement made July 2 by Khrushchev in Berlin. Khrushchev had repeated this statement to Western representatives when they had met with him here in Moscow. Gromyko said he had also done his best to emphasize importance his government attaches to NAP which would be of benefit for all peoples and would favorably influence international situation. He could not of course agree that provisions which referred to an entirely different subject, i.e.: free access to Berlin, should be added to NAP text. Said he believed this was so evident that he felt “somehow embarrassed” to have to talk about this at any length. He said these matters so different that impossible raise them in same document or make one dependent on other. To say NAP contingent on clause re free access to Berlin, which part of German peace treaty problem, only complicated matter. He felt that in this exchange of views, the three powers should make every effort to make progress on both test ban and NAP which should be signed simultaneously, and said wished stress simultaneous this would have a very favorable effect on the whole international situation. He wished again to express hope that Western representatives would adopt more sober approach in evaluating importance of NAP, and be more objective in evaluating Soviet proposals. He asked whether Western representatives had any additional considerations to add to what was said yesterday.

Harriman said that Khrushchev vs Berlin speech had been certainly noted by US. He supposed that Gromyko had read statements which had been made by US and UK leaders in several capitals that on any nonaggression agreement affecting NATO we intended to consult with our allies and supposed the Soviet Government would be doing the same. He said we were on record internationally that we are not rpt not authorized negotiate on behalf our allies. We were here to listen, explore, and report back, with view of obtaining views our allies. We were prepared to take note of our discussions this subject by some language in a communiqué, and could do nothing beyond this. We could not get authority from thirteen other member states to negotiate for them. He was aware of the importance which the Soviet Union attached to NAP, and had taken note of this.

Hailsham said UK Del had noted and was aware of importance Soviet Union attaches to question of NAP. His government had noted the Khrushchev speech as well as what he had said at meeting earlier this week, also what Gromyko had said on subject. All this had been passed on to London. However we are here to negotiate test ban agreement and do not have authority negotiate on behalf allies. Have in fact promised not to do so. If we did it would make it less rather than more likely that we would eventually get their acceptance. Said he certainly went along with what Harriman had said and would not fail inform British Government of Soviet views. Could whole-heartedly accept Harriman’s suggestion re communiqué.

II

Gromyko responded we would evidently have to continue discussion this subject at the next or one of the next meetings because the Soviet Government does attach great importance to this matter.

Harriman said would be well for Soviets understand why US and UK Dels instructed as they are. Had come in accordance with communications between Khrushchev, President and Prime Minister concerning test ban, not on NAP. First had heard of Soviet wish connect TB with NAP was in Khrushchev July 2 speech. Ready discuss and make progress with test ban. Soviet Union has of course full right take up other matters but we unable do more than record fact been discussed and indicate in friendly spirit would raise matter with our allies.

At this point Gromyko turned abruptly from NAP and asked if Harriman had views re article re withdrawal. Inquired if by chance Harriman could now agree not include such clause. Harriman said not only unable change position but Washington had advised withdrawal clause absolutely essential to obtain Senate ratification. If clause not included Senate would adopt reservation which would cause Soviet Union more difficulty than withdrawal clause. Since “withdrawal” apparently has unpleasant connotations for Soviet Union, could refer this clause as “duration” rather than “withdrawal” clause. Harriman’s earnest hope was Soviets could accept language along proposed lines.

Gromyko said amendment changed little in clause. Regretted US should still feel necessary include such provision. However, Soviets could perhaps provide language for this article to meet US position. Said proceeding on understanding that peaceful uses clause dropped. At this point read text Soviet version withdrawal clause which sent separately. Gromyko stated hoped this text would prove acceptable to all as Soviets had put forward in attempt facilitate agreement. Felt lack reference to “violators” helpful, as not casting doubts on anybody’s intentions. Right of withdrawal simply exercise of every state’s sovereignty. Had also taken into account US-UK expression of need for advance notice. As text might require additional study, discussion of it might be postponed until tomorrow.

Harriman said at first blush Soviet proposal seemed very interesting. However wished reserve formal comment until further study and Washington’s reaction which would be sought soonest. Re Gromyko’s understanding peaceful uses clause dropped, said would cover this point after receipt Washington reaction.

Hailsham said grateful for Soviet spirit of accommodation and would refer text London for earliest possible comment.

In response Hailsham question concerning preamble, Gromyko said felt not so bad and would certainly wish retain reference to “general and complete disarmament.” Did not understand why such general reference was problem as went no further than UN resolution. Would ask Harriman reconsider.

Harriman said general and complete disarmament usually linked with “peaceful settlement of disputes.” Had been discussed long and agreement reached. Would not now like undo. Our version seems quite harmless and would be more satisfactory to US. Hoped Gromyko might agree. Phrase “all kinds of weapons” includes nuclear weapons and therefore unnecessary single out nukes.

Returning abruptly to NAP, Gromyko said raising matter again because felt there was insufficient awareness importance Soviets attach this matter. If US and UK could make step forward and conclude NAP would improve whole international situation. Could see no reason for restraint. Understood consultation necessary but wished know attitude US and UK Governments.

Harriman expressed full understanding importance Soviets attach this matter and stated this why had suggested treatment in communiqué after agreement to Soviet proposal on press statement (which sent separately) was agreed meet 3 PM tomorrow. Drafting committee meeting 11 AM.

Kohler

1. Meeting with Gromyko: Discussion centered on Kennedy’s July 17 statement, Khrushchev’s July 2 statement and the importance to Soviets of non-aggression pact. Secret. 4 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–3 USSR (MO).