195. Telegram 236 from London, July 121
Ban rpt Ban From Harriman. In afternoon meeting between US and UK teams discussion centered on matters to be raised in Moscow other than test ban.
Harriman referred to his conversations with Macmillan and Home, stating had been agreed make test ban first order of business, with nondissemination and NAP to follow in that sequence.
Re nondissemination, Hailsham asked for US views re form of and conditions for agreement this subject.
We said US attached no particular importance to form, but with respect contents of agreement that might affect MLF stressed importance consultation with FRG. Also indicated we would explain to Sovs that MLF would not, in our view, violate principle of nondissemination.
UK pointed out MLF still only a concept not yet agreed to by all concerned, and therefore was not an existing entity to be given up in return for nondissemination agreement.
It was agreed if Sovs made MLF an issue, US and UK should not change position in Moscow but go back to their capitals.
Re NAP US said we could explore and discuss matter with Sovs but make no commitments without discussions with our NATO partners, particularly Germany. In discussions with Soviets we should indicate [Typeset Page 534] we cannot accept ratification of division of Germany or reduce in any way our position in Berlin. In fact we should attempt to improve latter. A nonaggression arrangement could take one of several forms but since we would be merely exploring, we need not discuss various mechanisms now. It should prove possible to avoid problem of recognition of East German regime.
We said in view of Berlin situation, where we might be compelled use force to protect our rights against Soviet encroachments, we must be careful re language on use of force.
[Facsimile Page 2]UK said do not attach too much importance to recognition through form of arrangement but felt provision for consultation would pose substantial problems in this connection.
We hoped keep NAP separated from test ban. UK thought we should use argument any test ban agreement between US, UK and USSR should not be subject to veto by fourth parties, which would be case if connected with NAP.
We thought it important not to let Soviets conclude we so keen for test ban we would make concessions on NAP. UK pointed out US/UK not in position deliver NAP by selves.
It was agreed any NAP must include guarantee of Berlin access.
We concluded NAP discussion by saying we would explore and discuss problem with Soviets but make no commitment without consulting our Allies.
Referring to Spaak-Khrushchev conversation, we said we prepared explore surprise attack measures as far as Sovs prepared do so. Exploration would be in general terms along lines US working paper on this subject. It was agreed staff would prepare list of positions in this area and Soviet reactions to them in negotiations thus far.
Hailsham raised question duration Moscow talks, expressing fear lest discussion surprise attack measures unduly prolong them. Harriman thought we would stay in Moscow week or ten days. Surprise attack measures could be discussed and agreed upon in terms of general principles with specifics to be referred possibly to Geneva. UK agreed.
We said might wish also explore possibility of agreement not place bombs in orbit, to which UK observed they could only applaud.
As further measure which might come up in Moscow, we mentioned cut-off production fissionable materials for weapons purposes. UK agreed but stressed their agreement dependent on proviso US-UK barter arrangement would be taken into account.
If Soviets indicated desire reduce military expenditures, Harriman said we prepared look into possibility Separable First Stage involving reduction strategic delivery vehicles, but purely on exploratory basis since anything more would require specific authority from Washington.
- Harriman’s continuing discussions with UK colleagues on Moscow agenda. Secret. 2 pp. Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman.↩