Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

149. Memorandum from Gen. Taylor to McNamara, November 10¹

JCSM–877–62

November 10, 1962

SUBJECT

• Nuclear-Free or Missile-Free Zones (U)

1. In a memorandum, dated 25 October 1962, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) requested the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the military impact of a US initiative to propose nuclear-free or missile-free zones in various areas of the world. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding proposals for nuclear-free or missile-free zones in Latin America and Africa were submitted in JCSM–828–62, dated 26 October 1962, subject as above. This memorandum provides their views on proposals for such zones anywhere in the world.

2. In assessing the military impact of the establishment of a nuclear-free or missile-free zone, it is of paramount importance to recognize the basic difference between the strategic posture of US military forces and that of Soviet forces.

a. With two exceptions (discussed below), the Soviet strategic striking forces are confined to the geographical limits of the Soviet Union. This concentration of strategic striking power in the Soviet heartland is not a posture adopted by free choice; rather it is a posture forced on the Soviet Union by two prevailing conditions: first, a lack of bases or base rights anywhere in the world beyond the perimeter of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and second, Soviet distrust of both Communist China and certain of the European satellites. The two exceptions noted above are the Soviet missile and bomber forces now in Cuba and the Soviet missile submarine force. The threat in Cuba, it now appears, is about to be liquidated. The Soviet missile submarine force, deployed in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, is at present a relatively minor threat, although in time it probably will assume greater proportions. Even these missile submarines, however, are obliged to operate from bases in the Soviet Union itself.

b. The strategic posture of US military forces is markedly different. The United States is not a continental but a world-wide power. US strategic striking forces are based, not only in the United States, but around the entire periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. There are US nuclear striking forces, of one kind or another, deployed in Alaska, the Atlantic Ocean, Western Europe, the Mediterranean Sea, North Africa, the Middle East, Guam, and the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, there are many other locations where the United States has, or could obtain in an emergency, base rights for the operation, support, or staging of nuclear striking forces.

3. Two highly important advantages are achieved by the United States in having its strategic striking forces deployed world-wide. First, in the matters of strike-timing (time from launch to target) and resultant warning times, the United States has a great advantage over the Soviet Union. Second, in the matter of targeting complexities, the Soviet Union, faced with a world-wide system of priority targets, is at a distinct disadvantage.

4. Application of a nuclear-free concept in any part of the world (other than the homelands of the United States and the Soviet Union) would work to the disadvantage of the United States. We would be forced to pull back our nuclear striking forces from the area involved, and we would have to relinquish base rights for the operation, support, or staging of nuclear striking forces. The Soviet Union on its part would have to sacrifice nothing.

5. If the nuclear-free concept were extended to one part of the world after another, eventually the United States would be forced into the necessity of maintaining all of its land-based nuclear striking forces in the continental United States. With less area in which to disperse (and with other factors being equal), these forces would then be more vulnerable than those of the Soviet Union. This would be a disastrous reversal of the situation existing today.

6. In connection with the preceding paragraph it is pertinent to note that, as Soviet nuclear capabilities grow during the years ahead, the question of relative vulnerability will become increasingly important in assessing whether or not the United States retains a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. If we do not retain an advantage, our national objectives for general, limited, and cold war will have to be radically altered.

7. In addition to impairing the effectiveness of US strategic striking forces, establishment of either a nuclear-free zone or a missile-free zone would gravely affect the tactical capabilities of US forces. Conventional land power has thus far been the principal instrument of Communist aggression; both the Soviet Union and Communist China continue to maintain large armies. One vital counterpoise against this might is the ability of US ground, sea, and air forces to employ tactical nuclear weapons, including missiles. A denuclearization proposal would be intended to reduce world tension and foster peace. However, in those areas of the world accessible to Red armies, denuclearization by limiting the tactical prowess of US forces would decrease the existing deterrent to Communist aggression and would thereby increase tension. Not only would it invite attack, but it increases the incentive for enemy use of tactical nuclear weapons against defenders unprepared to respond in kind. Thus, the proposal, if adopted, would weaken our deterrent, reduce the number of alternatives available to the United States in the event of attack, and increase the opportunities for Communist miscalculation of our intent and resolution.

8. Still another adverse effect of the establishment of a nuclear-free or missile-free zone would be a reduction in our flexibility of operations in peacetime. An important element of US strength is our ability to project our power overseas as desired and as needed. Occasional visits by US naval and air forces to allied and neutral countries are useful as a demonstration of continued US strength and purpose. The presence of such forces in an area of potential disorder can also be highly effective in stabilizing the situation. Establishment of a nuclear-free or missile-free zone would seriously inhibit such operations by US naval and air forces in the area involved. Consequently, US ability to influence the trend of events in that part of the world would be diminished.

9. Establishment of a nuclear-free zone would not have the same military impact as establishment of a missile-free zone. A nuclear-free concept would probably exclude all types of nuclear weapons: bombs, antisubmarine weapons, projectiles, demolition charges, AND missiles. (All long-range offensive missiles can be presumed to have nuclear warheads; otherwise they would be of little consequence.) On the other hand, a missile-free concept would undoubtedly exclude all offensive (nuclear) missiles and might or might not exclude nonnuclear missiles, such as surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. In any event, a nuclear-free concept would be more damaging to the US military position than a missile-free concept.

10. In conclusion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe:

a. That because of a basic difference between the US and Soviet strategic postures, application of a nuclear-free or missile-free concept in any part of the world would be far more damaging to the United States than to the Soviet Union.

b. That the principal adverse effects of a nuclear-free or missile-free concept upon the US military position would be:

(1) Severe degradation of US strategic striking power relative to that of the Soviet Union.

(2) Serious reduction in the tactical capabilities of US forces and a consequent decrease in the US deterrent to Communist aggression.

(3) Impairment of US flexibility of operations in peacetime.

c. That a nuclear-free concept would be more damaging to the US military position than a missile-free concept.

d. That the United States should oppose and certainly should not initiate any proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-free or missile-free zone in any area of the world.

e. That if forced to negotiate on this issue, the United States should agree to the establishment of a nuclear-free or missile-free zone only in the context of a broader arms control agreement in which the Soviet Union makes equivalent concessions.

11. It is recognized that this memorandum has discussed only in general terms the military impact of a nuclear-free or missile-free concept. The precise effect of a specific proposal for a nuclear-free or missile-free zone would depend upon (1) the terms of the proposal (inter alia, the area involved and the categories of nuclear weapons or missiles excluded); (2) the extent to which the nuclear-free or missile-free concept has already been applied in other parts of the world; (3) the current status of US base rights in the area involved; and (4) the extent to which current US military plans for cold, limited, and general war depend upon our ability to operate, support, or stage nuclear or missile forces in the area involved. Because of these many variables, in the absence of a specific proposal it is not possible to discuss with any exactitude the military implications of the application of a nuclear-free or missile-free concept in various areas of the world. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to provide, if and when required, their estimate of the military impact of any specific proposal.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Military impact of U.S. initiative to propose nuclear-free or missile-free zones worldwide. Secret. 5 pp. Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 926.