On September 26 a letter was sent from Mr. Foster to the Secretary of Defense, summarizing
developments to date regarding a possible international agreement on the
non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, and giving this agency’s
recommendations on such an agreement.
A copy of this letter is attached for the Secretary’s information.
Attachment
September 26,
1962
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Dear Bob:
As you know, there have been recently several informal discussions
and exchanges of memoranda regarding a possible international
agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. Specifically,
within the past two weeks we have sent to the Department of Defense
the following papers: 1) a copy of a memorandum to the Secretary of
State from me, dated September 13, 1962, enclosing a draft
memorandum to the President, draft letters to the heads of the
Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic
of Germany, and a draft declaration on non-diffusion; 2) a
memorandum for the Committee of Principals, dated September 18,
1962, containing revised versions of some of the above-mentioned
documents sent to Defense on September 13; 3) a draft Minute, which
might be transmitted to the Soviet Foreign Minister, further
clarifying the United States view on a multinational nuclear force,
sent to Defense on September 19, 1962; and 4) copies of a memorandum
from the Secretary of State to the President outlining a course of
action for the United States to follow in attempting to negotiate a
non-diffusion agreement, dated September 21, 1962, and which was
sent to Defense on September 22, 1962.
The purpose of this letter is to request that the Department of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to give active
consideration to the various papers mentioned above, particularly
the memorandum to the President of September 21, 1962. The course of
action outlined in the memorandum, including three attachments, is
directed toward the formal submission
[Facsimile Page 3]
to the Soviet Union and other
countries by the United States of a declaration on the non-transfer
of nuclear weapons.
[Typeset Page 387]
The prevention of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons among
individual nations has been a national security and foreign policy
goal of the United States for some time. It is incorporated in the
United States disarmament proposals of September 25, 1961, and of
April 18, 1962. The United States voted for the Irish Resolution,
passed unanimously by the 1961 session of the United Nations General
Assembly, which called upon all states to secure an international
agreement on the non-transfer and non-acquisition of nuclear
weapons.
As a result of recent conversations between the Secretary of State
and the Soviet Foreign Minister and Soviet Ambassador, the United
States should consider pursuing an agreement with the Soviet Union
and other countries on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons which
would not preclude the possibility of international nuclear weapons
arrangements of a truly multinational nature of the type which might
be developed within the NATO
framework. A non-transfer agreement which would not preclude the
possible development of a NATO
multinational nuclear force and which would not in any way call into
question existing custodial arrangements for the storage and
deployment of United States nuclear weapons would be in the interest
of the NATO alliance as well as in
the national interest of the United States. It would be in the
interest of NATO with respect to
the defense of the countries in the alliance, with respect to the
maintenance of international peace and security generally, and with
respect to the strengthening of countries in the West and elsewhere
believing in free and democratic institutions and individual
liberty. In negotiating a non-transfer agreement with the Soviet
Union and other Communist states, the United States would seek the
active participation and support of the NATO countries, especially the United Kingdom, France,
and the Federal Republic of Germany.
To my knowledge, the Department of Defense has no planned
arrangements for the deployment or transfer of
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nuclear weapons which a
non-transfer agreement of the type proposed in the memorandum to the
President would preclude. If any such arrangements are being
considered it would be important to have them discussed at this
time, before negotiations for a non-transfer agreement proceed
further.
The draft declaration on non-transfer is one which would not require
any special international verification machinery. There would be
little incentive for the Soviet Union to want to violate
clandestinely the terms of a non-transfer declaration. If a
violation occurred, it would be more likely to be done openly than
not. The United States can have a high degree of confidence that the
Soviet Union would comply with a non-transfer agreement because it
is in Soviet self-interest not to spread nuclear weapons
capabilities among other states, including states allied with
it.
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It would be helpful if I could receive by the close of business on
Wednesday, October 3, comments of the Department of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on the memorandum and enclosures sent to the
President on September 21, 1962. No meeting on this is planned at
the present time, but I shall keep you informed of any
developments.
Sincerely,
