112. Letter from Amb. Ormsby
Gore to Bundy,
March 241
The Prime Minister has had a talk today with the Foreign Secretary about
the latest position on nuclear tests, and he has asked me to let the
President know of the following.
He quite agrees that no statement should be issued for the moment. He
has, however, asked me to let you see the attached draft of his idea of
the sort of statement which will have to be made at some point,
preferably jointly but, if necessary, separately.
The Prime Minister is, however, concerned about the proposed timing of
the warning to mariners. He accepts that the warning itself is not an
order to test, but it is of course generally assumed that the warning
will not be issued unless tests will definitely take place. If a further
postponement of this warning is impossible, the Prime Minister would
certainly have to make a statement in the House of Commons. There is
therefore a strong diplomatic argument for postponing the warnings until
the last possible date, which I think everyone agrees to be two weeks
before tests take place. There is also a very strong practical argument
against giving more than the minimum warning. Our experience has been
that the longer the warning the more chance that individual pacifists
and neighbouring governments (Japan and New Zealand, for example) will
organise demonstrations, send protests and generally create a most
awkward local situation. Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign
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Secretary
feel strongly that the warning to mariners ought not to be issued more
than the minimum two weeks before tests are resumed and certainly not in
the course of next week.
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I need hardly say that the Prime Minister realises that the text of the
enclosed draft would almost certainly have to be modified to take
account of developments.
Yours sincerely,
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Attachment
Text of Draft
Mr. Rusk and Lord Home have
now reported about their conversations with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva during the first
two weeks of the meetings of the Disarmament Committee. They have
informed us that in discussions about a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Tests
the Soviet representatives have rejected any form of international
inspection or verification inside the Soviet Union, whether by
static posts or by visits by international teams to verify
unexplained events which would otherwise be assumed to be nuclear
tests.
This is a point of cardinal importance to the United States and the
United Kingdom. From the very beginning of the negotiations on a
nuclear Test Ban Treaty, they have made it clear that an essential
element of such a treaty is an objective international system for
assuring that a ban on nuclear tests is being observed by all
parties. The need for such a system was clearly recognised in the
report of the scientific experts which was the foundation of the
Geneva negotiations. For nearly three years this was accepted by the
Soviet delegation at Geneva. There was disagreement about details,
but the principle of objective international verification was
accepted. It was embodied in the Treaty tabled by the United States
and the United Kingdom on April 18, 1961, which provided for such a
system. Since the current disarmament meetings began in Geneva, the
United States and the United Kingdom have made further efforts to
meet Soviet objections to the April 18 treaty. These efforts have
met with no success as is clearly shown by the recent statements
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of the
Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, who has repeatedly rejected
the very concept of international verification. There has been no
negotiation on this point in Geneva; the Soviet Union has flatly
refused to change its position.
The ground given seems to be that existing national detection systems
can give adequate protection against clandestine tests. But whether
or not the present state of scientific instrumentation has reached
sufficient perfection as to distinguish between natural and
artificial seismic disturbances—and we do not think that it yet
has—the Treaty cannot be made effective unless at least verification
by visit
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is
included in it. For otherwise there would be no alternative, if an
instrument reported an unexplained seismic occurrence on either
side, between accepting the possibility of an evasion of the Treaty
or its immediate denunciation. Verification in some form or another
is of the very essence of mutual confidence.
This principle has so far been rejected by the Foreign Minister of
the Soviet Union, and there is no indication that he has not spoken
with the full approval of his Government. If Chairman Khrushchev were to give any clear
indication that he had reconsidered the position and was ready to
accept the principle of international verification, then it is hard
to believe that agreement could not be reached about its application
in practice. This in turn could lead to the
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rapid conclusion of a Treaty
to ban all nuclear tests. The President and the Prime Minister
therefore earnestly hope that Chairman Khrushchev will send the necessary instructions to
Mr. Gromyko in Geneva. If,
however, the U.S.S.R. cannot accept any form of international
verification on Soviet territory in any circumstances then it is
hard to see how tests can be effectively banned. The Governments of
the United States and United Kingdom would in this case have no
alternative but to conclude, with sincere regret, that their most
recent efforts to obtain a workable Treaty to ban nuclear tests have
failed, and accordingly to carry on with the final stages of
preparation for the test series scheduled for the latter part of
April.
