The paper immediately following on “Weapons Custody and Use” is a brief
version of the longer paper sent to you by Mr. Seaborg. The paper is primarily a
chronological history of the subject. The AEC appears to believe that it should continue to have
custody of nuclear weapons and has chosen this rather poor way of saying
it. The President should be briefed on this subject soon, but I should
hope that someone would present the issues to him in a clearer way than
does this paper. Is this a subject for the morning meeting?
Attachment
WEAPONS CUSTODY AND USE
Maintaining Civilian Control
Legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was the question
of civilian versus military control of atomic energy. The Act
authorized the President to deliver fissionable materials or weapons
to the armed services and to authorize the armed forces to produce
weapons. Under peacetime conditions the development, production, and
custody of nuclear weapons would remain with the AEC. In August 1950, however, some
non-nuclear components were transferred to bases in the UK and in the next two years more were
moved to U.S. vessels and overseas bases under DOD custody. On April 6, 1951,
President Truman authorized the transfer of [text
not declassified]. AEC
Chairman Dean considered this
as the “end of the Commission’s civilian responsibility over a
portion of our war reserve of atomic weapons.”
Breakdown of AEC Custody
By the spring of 1953, AEC had
transferred [text not declassified] to
military custody. Since these non-nuclear components would be of no
use if nuclear components were not readily available, President
[Typeset Page 70]
Eisenhower, on June 20,
1953, on the recommendation of the National Security Council,
authorized transfer of nuclear components equal in number. Requests
from DOD up to October 1954 would
have employed about 45 percent of the stockpile, and as a result
DOD would control approximately
half of the national stockpile. Therefore, in December 1954, Mr.
Strauss recommended to the President that, rather than transfer
custody from AEC to DOD, AEC retain “custody” of the dispersed weapons. However,
the Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that custody
should be transferred to DOD, and
the President authorized the transfer not only of atomic but also
thermonuclear weapons. The Commission opposed the transfer of
thermonuclear weapons and on August 20, 1955 the President directed
that AEC retain custody of all
dispersed weapons with a yield of [text not
declassified]. Transfers were made under a set of Interim
Principles jointly approved by AEC
and DOD, but problems arose
frequently regarding (1) assignment of AEC “custodians” and (2) the necessity for loading
complete atomic weapons in aircraft. Final agreement on procedures,
June 4, 1956, permitted AEC-designated military “custodians” and the loading of
“complete” atomic weapons in aircraft.
[Facsimile Page 3]
Emergency Transfer and Use
The issue of automatic transfer of the entire stockpile to military
units under emergency conditions was settled by a Presidential
directive of April 4, 1956 authorizing such transfer, and
implemented by a Memo of Understanding developed by AEC and DOD, effective June 1, 1956. This transfer policy
raised more sharply than ever before the importance of defining
national policy on their employment.
NSC policy provided that in event of
hostilities the U.S. would consider nuclear weapons as available for
use as other munitions, and that the U.S. could not afford to
preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local
situation.
[text not declassified]
Peacetime Operations Involving Atomic
Weapons
Although AEC recognized the
necessity for use of war-reserve weapons for operational readiness
it was concerned about an inadvertent atomic explosion and
recommended using training shapes for exercises and maneuvers.
JCS study of the matter
concluded that the use of war-reserve weapons was essential to the
maintenance of acceptable readiness standards; that safety
[Facsimile Page 4]
features
were adequate; and large-scale procurement and use of trainers and
shapes was unnecessary and undesirable. AEC finally recommended that the problem be presented
to the President for decision; i.e. the problem of the degree to
which war-reserve weapons might be used in exercises not directly
related to operational readiness. The President approved the
original DOD
[Typeset Page 71]
proposal on
November 26, 1960, which included a reporting procedure to the
AEC.
Transfer and Dispersal: The Last Stage
The decision in the spring of 1956 marked the end of any concerted
effort on the part of the Commission to invoke the principle of
civilian control. Increasing requests from DOD for relaxing control on nuclear weapons, resulted
in changes in the existing dispersal agreement, and a revised
Presidential directive reduced the JCS reserve stockpile in AEC custody to such a low level that it was necessary
to revise the emergency transfer agreement of 1956. The revised
memorandum, approved by the President on February 3, 1960,
eliminated the requirement for automatic transfer and assigned
responsibility for such transfers to the JCS or higher authority. The Presidential directive
setting the number of weapons to be transferred in fiscal year 1960
and fiscal year 1961 left less than 10 percent of the national
stockpile in AEC control.
