Office of the Historian

99. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (McGhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler)0

Washington, June 21, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • US-Soviet Direct Telephone
1.
This year a Berlin crisis will create heightened tensions and possibly some violence in the heart of Europe. At the height of this crisis, the [Page 260] US and USSR will each be seeking to judge the likelihood of a pre-emptive strike by the opposing side. If either country judges that a strike by the other has become a probability, it may well hit first.
2.
It is in the US interest to minimize the risk of such a miscalculation. This purpose might be served by certain consensual arrangements, which might be taken beforehand by the Soviets and ourselves. Secure facilities for direct telephone communication between the heads of the US and Soviet governments would be one such measure. This was proposed to Mr. McCloy by a panel which he assembled under Professor Schelling1 to study the problem of war by miscalculation. Mr. McCloy proposed it to the Secretary, who approved it and suggested to the President that he raise the matter at Vienna. I am told the Presidentʼs failure to do so was due to nothing more than the press of other matters—although you would know more about this than I.
3.
I would think it useful to press ahead urgently with this direct telephone facility. If and when violence short of general war occurs over Berlin, the ability of the US and Soviet heads of government to communicate rapidly, surely, and directly may be essential to maintenance of peace.
4.

I wonder if it would not be useful for Ambassador Thompson to put this proposal directly to Khrushchev, while we are staffing out in the Department the technical steps that would be necessary to install a direct telephone line between the Department and the Embassy which could be used for conversation between the two heads of government.

If Khrushchev approved the proposal, as his past statements suggest that he would, then some US experts could be despatched to Moscow who have studied the problem of war by miscalculation, such as those who have served on Mr. McCloyʼs panel. These experts could discuss with the Soviets measures that would be needed to make the phone of optimum usefulness.

5.
Not the last advantage of raising this matter with the Soviets now would be in indicating to them our expectation that there will be grave risk of a Berlin crisis escalating into general nuclear war, if they precipitate such a crisis. This might give the Kremlin food for thought.
  1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, HO Chron. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information but was initialed by both McGhee and Kohler.↩
  2. Thomas C. Schelling, Professor at Harvard University and member of the U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board.↩