Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

96. Current Intelligence Weekly Review⁰

Washington, June 15, 1961.

Nuclear Test Talks

Soviet delegate Tsarapkin at the Geneva test talks has dropped all pretense of serious interest in concluding an agreement and is seeking to induce the US and Britain to take the initiative in terminating the negotiations. He charged on 12 June that the West now is interested only in ending the talks and placing the blame on the USSR.

At the same session Tsarapkin formally introduced the Soviet aide-memoire of 4 June on nuclear testing which was handed to the US at the conclusion of the Presidentʼs talks with Khrushchev in Vienna.¹ This memorandum proposed that, in view of the failure to reach an agreement on a test ban, the powers take up the “cardinal question” of general and complete disarmament and settle the disarmament and nuclear test problems interdependently.

The Soviet memorandum stated that the USSR would agree to sign a general disarmament treaty including Western proposals on the cessation of nuclear testing and implied that a test ban could be part of the first stage of such a treaty. Tsarapkin contended that these proposals demonstrated the USSRʼs flexibility and “constructive approach” and denied any intention of issuing an ultimatum. He stressed, however, that the West has the choice of either signing a test ban treaty on Soviet terms or merging these talks with negotiations on general disarmament.

The Soviet proposal is clearly aimed at prolonging the present uncontrolled moratorium on testing. Moscow probably also calculates that the opening of bilateral Soviet-US disarmament talks on 19 June and the international conference on general disarmament scheduled to begin on 31 July in Geneva will act as a brake on any US move to resume nuclear weapons tests this summer.

The Soviet move to terminate separate negotiations on the nuclear test issue by submerging them in the complex subject of general disarmament probably springs from two main considerations. Now that Khrushchev has restored top-level contact with the US by his meeting with the President, which he believes will open the way for negotiations on the key political issues of Berlin and Germany, he has no further interest in keeping the test talks alive as a means of promoting an accommodation with Washington.

Another and probably more important motivating factor is Communist Chinaʼs long-standing opposition to a test ban without the complete destruction of all existing nuclear weapon stockpiles—a condition which Peiping insists on in order to preclude a test ban agreement. [Here follows further discussion of the nuclear test talks.]

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Secret; Noforn. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence. Concurred in by CIAʼs Office of Scientific Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 7-8 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.
1. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 162-166.