Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

93. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts⁰

Washington, June 8, 1961, 2:32 p.m.

1972. In discussing Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting with local officials and diplomatic colleagues, US officials should draw on Presidentʼs radio and TV address June 6, stressing particularly following points:

Presidentʼs Assessment of Meeting

Talks somber but useful. No advantage or concession gained or given. No major decisions taken. Views two leaders contrasted sharply. However, channels of communication between governments opened more fully. Chances of dangerous misjudgment on either side should now be less.

Future US-Soviet Contacts

a. Joint communiqué June 4 noted agreement “maintain contact on all questions of interest to two countries and for whole world.”

b. Khrushchev did not, however, extend formal invitation to President to visit USSR. While he did say President “would be very welcome” to come to Moscow he did not place invitation in time context. USG, therefore, does not regard this as invitation and no plans exist for such visit.

c. US expects contacts will continue through normal diplomatic channels, including, from time to time, Rusk-Gromyko meetings like that of March 18,¹ but two parties did not attempt schedule specific future meetings.

Germany-Berlin

Both sides restated their positions on Germany and Berlin, without narrowing differences. In particular, President made clear US determination uphold all Western rights, including that of access, in Berlin. President emphasized rights Western powers in Berlin not exercised on sufferance USSR and could not be terminated unilaterally. Interference with access would be belligerent act. Security Western Europe and of US deeply involved.

Geneva Test-Ban Negotiations and Disarmament

Hopes for end to nuclear testing, spreading of nuclear weapons, and slowing down arms race “struck a serious blow” by Vienna discussions. Although President strongly pressed case for concluding nuclear test ban treaty both for its own sake and as important contribution to future progress in broader areas of disarmament, Khrushchev made it clear present test-ban talks appeared futile and showed no interest in responding to initiatives taken by US since these talks resumed in March.

Khrushchev indicated Soviet “three-headed monster” concept basic element of Soviet policy. This raises fundamental questions as to feasibility reliable control measures in disarmament field, whether test ban or general disarmament. From discussions evident secrecy continues to be of strategic importance to Soviets. Khrushchev made it clear that until there is sweeping general disarmament, he regards our insistence on far-reaching control provisions pretext for espionage.

President did not encourage Soviet suggestion that testing problem be merged with general disarmament negotiations due begin July.

Laos

Soviets concurred in joint communiqué reaffirming two partiesʼ support “of neutral and independent Laos under Government chosen by Laotians themselves, and of international agreements for insuring that neutrality and independence,” and reluctantly agreed to recognize “importance of effective cease-fire.” While these statements commit Soviets publicly, they do not guarantee change in Soviet policy or mean Soviet influence will be used energetically with Pathet Lao to bring about genuine cease-fire. US watching Soviet and Pathet Lao actions closely and will shape policy and actions in light actual conduct Soviets and Communist forces Laos.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6-861. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Davies et al.; cleared withP, AF,SOV, and S; and approved by Kohler. Not sent to Libreville.
1. See Document 47.