Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

75. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, May 25, 1961.

SUBJECT

• United States Travel Restrictions

Problem

To determine whether we should revise our present restrictions on the travel of Soviet citizens in this country.

Background

In 1952, the United States retaliated against long-standing Soviet restrictions on the travel of American citizens in the USSR by requiring that Soviet officials in the United States give advance notification of travel outside the immediate area of New York and Washington. If the Department denied permission, the trip had to be cancelled. In 1955, the requirement was extended to all Soviet citizens other than those who were members of the UN Secretariat. Closed zones, modeled on those in existence in the USSR, were also established. This followed adoption by the NSC of NSC 5427 (Tab E)¹ which provided that “restrictions should be placed upon diplomatic and official representatives of Soviet bloc countries in the United States on the basis of strict reciprocity for restrictions placed upon U.S. representatives in each Soviet bloc country.”

On November 11, 1957, the United States proposed to the Soviet Government that closed zones be abolished on the basis of reciprocity.² Subsequently, we have repeated that proposal several times and have also suggested partial elimination, again on a reciprocal basis. The United States last repeated these offers in a note of January 6, 1961³ which made a number of changes in the American closed zones in response to the Soviet changes announced in August 1959.

The Soviet Government has never replied officially to these proposals although there have been unofficial intimations from Soviet officials that the question was being studied. Ambassador Menshikovʼs statement to you on February 3⁴ that his government has tried several times to approach the matter of lessening travel restrictions but had been prevented by unfavorable developments in its foreign relations is consistent with these earlier intimations. A summary statement concerning the history of the restrictions is attached (Tab B).

Discussion

From time to time the Department has been under public pressure to abolish or reduce travel restrictions. The principal thrust of this pressure has been against individual restrictions which have prevented Soviet citizens from traveling to a particular area. The sources of the pressure have usually been American citizens who were inconvenienced by the inability of Soviet citizens to travel to their areas. There has also been a certain amount of pressure from individuals and groups which feel as a matter of principle that travel restrictions are alien to our way of life and should be abolished entirely.

The restrictions have on occasion been the source of difficulties for us by complicating the administration of the East-West Exchanges Program. Our attempts to cope with the situation have bred numerous exceptions, some of which we have been able to employ to gain reciprocal exemptions from the Soviet side. With regard to the Soviet restrictions on our Embassy staff in Moscow, however, the restrictions have been of only limited utility as a bargaining tool.

It should be noted here that the Soviet authorities sometimes exercise a certain amount of flexibility in permitting American exchange visitors and tourists to visit areas that are formally closed. As a consequence, these American visitors receive the impression that the Soviet restrictions are less onerous than they actually are. Also, the recent abandonment of advance censorship of the dispatches of foreign correspondents in the USSR indicates some sensitivity to our complaints over this practice and may presage similar steps in the field of travel.

Ambassador Thompson has previously opposed elimination of travel restrictions for exchange visitors because of his belief that important Soviet visitors are probably those most annoyed by the limitations. Such visitors, he has pointed out, are in all likelihood raising their influential voices against restrictions in the USSR. The Ambassador has now stated, however, that while up to now he has not advocated an exemption for Soviet exchange visitors, he would not oppose such action and believes it might enhance our overall position on exchanges with the Soviet Union.

Substantial easing of our travel restrictions at this time may call forth strong protests from some parts of Congress and public opinion which may express concern for its effect on security. The FBI may also oppose any significant lessening of the restrictions on the grounds that this would make their counterintelligence task more difficult.

On balance, it appears that we might gain some advantages if we could advance a sufficiently dramatic proposal for reduction of restrictions that would, simultaneously, protect our security interests. It is even conceivable that such a proposal could prod the Soviet Government into some easing of its restrictions on American travel in the USSR. In any case, it must be admitted that our efforts over the course of the past six years to use our travel restrictions as an instrument with which to exert pressure for a lessening of Soviet restrictions have been largely ineffective. Moreover, the passage of time has resulted in a blurred impression abroad of the responsibility for the initial imposition of travel restrictions. This has tended to remove any incentive the Soviet Government might once have had to consider a reciprocal reduction of restrictions. While we would weaken somewhat our ability to get reciprocal treatment in the negotiation of exchange itineraries, this disadvantage seems outweighed by the advantages.

If we should decide to withdraw some or all of our travel restrictions, there are three general possibilities to be considered.

1. We could withdraw the restrictions entirely, abolishing the closed zones as well as the notification requirement for Soviet officials. While this would undoubtedly have the greatest advantage from the propaganda standpoint, we do not believe it would succeed in inducing the Soviets reciprocally to lift their restrictions and we would have lost all of our leverage for protecting the ability of our officials to travel in the Soviet Union. Further, we would lose all control over the travel activities of the Soviet Embassy and UN Mission officials.

2. We could abolish closed zones for all but retain the notification requirement for permanently assigned officials. This would have nearly as much propaganda advantage as would lifting the restrictions altogether (since it is the closed zone concept which is the most controversial aspect of our travel regulations) and yet would enable us to retain effective control over Soviet travel through our ability to deny any given travel request under the notification system. While there would be a very slight security disadvantage from the fact that there would no longer be specified closed zones, it should be noted that the closed zone system offers very little real security in any event as the Soviets are able to obtain information through many sources, including other bloc travelers not subject to closed zone regulations and from American Communist agents.

3. We could abolish the closed zones for exchange visitors and tourists but retain them for officials, who would, in addition, continue to be subject to the notification procedure. This would also bring some propaganda benefit, and would largely remove the present friction with university and exchange-minded groups. (It is true that some friction may continue in those cases in which the Department decides to control the itineraries of visiting Soviet nationals for security or other reasons, but this should be manageable.) At the same time, it would enable us to retain our present controls over the most important categories of Soviets, the officials permanently assigned here, and would also probably retain for us some leverage in protecting the travel of our own officials in the Soviet Union. Since exchange groups travel on the basis of mutually agreed itineraries, control of such travel would remain in our hands and access to any part of the country could be denied if this were thought desirable for security reasons. As the itineraries of Soviet tourists in the United States are arranged by American travel agencies, we would also maintain effective control over such travel. Soviet buyers and other “businessmen” would continue to be controlled, as they are now, via the advance itineraries they are required to submit.

For travel control purposes we regard Soviet correspondents, Intourist and Amtorg representatives, whether or not permanently assigned, as officials. They are subject to the same notification requirements as Soviet Embassy andUN Mission personnel. This category also includes Soviet citizens who apply for visas in order to visit Soviet officials on a “personal” basis. This corresponds to the position in theUSSR of American correspondents, American Express Company representatives and personal guests of American officials.

It has been suggested that, if we decide to reduce our restrictions, we do so only for a stipulated period of perhaps one year, with the understanding that they would be resumed if the Soviet Government failed to respond to our initiative. This appears to us seriously to reduce the impact we might achieve with such an overture by casting doubt on our sincerity. At the same time, it seems unlikely that it would appreciably strengthen our bargaining position. Were the Soviet Government to fail to ease its own restrictions, we should have to reinstitute our own with the negative political effect this would have. It would seem preferable not to lift the restrictions at all rather than to go through this procedure.)

Conclusion

We believe that the third alternative is the most advantageous of the three and recommend your approval of it. We would retain virtually the same degree of effective control over Soviet travel as we do now, while removing the greatest source of friction with American groups. This alternative also preserves our bargaining position on strictly official travel which may be of assistance in attempting to ensure reciprocity for our officials in theUSSR while, at the same time, enabling us to gain an important propaganda advantage. We could announce such a decision as another modest but forward-looking step in the direction of more normal relations with the Soviet Government and invite it to respond to our initiative.

Recommendations

1. That you approve our recommendation that we abolish our system of closed zones for Soviet exchange visitors and tourists.⁵

2. That you sign the attached letters to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of Justice and Defense requesting their comments on our suggested memorandum to the President (Tab A).⁶

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.6111/5-2561. Secret. Drafted by Edward I. Killham (SOV); concurred in by Bohlen, Tubby, Coombs, Whitman, Chayes, H, SCA, and S/EWC; and transmitted through and initialed by Bowles. None of the tabs is printed.
1. Not printed, but see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, footnote 9, p. 1246.
2. For text of this note, see Department of State Bulletin, December 9, 1957, pp. 934-935.
3. For text of this note, see ibid., January 23, 1961, pp. 119-120.
4. See Document 21.
5. According to a note attached to the source text, Rusk neither approved nor disapproved this recommendation, presumably because his approval was not necessary until it was concurred in by other agencies.
6. None of these letters, which were transmitted on June 9, is printed, but see footnote 2, Document 184.