Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

1.

The U.S. attaches great importance to the prompt and successful conclusion of a testing agreement not only for itself but as a means of moving to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and particularly as providing evidence and precedent of U.S. and Soviet ability to reach agreement on an important issue and in the disarmament field and to create a favorable climate for moving forward in broader fields of disarmament. The consequences of failure are seriously adverse.

2.

After many months of negotiations, the U.S. undertook thorough and serious review of its position, and the U.S. delegation returned to Geneva with proposals going a considerable way to meet the Soviet position. The President expected that agreement could be promptly reached; he still hopes it can.

3.

The Soviet response has been disheartening. Not only has there been no Soviet attempt to negotiate seriously but the Soviet Union has withdrawn previous agreement on a single Administrator and has introduced a new political obstruction by its proposal for a tripartite Administrator.

4.

A tripartite Administrator is not a negotiable proposal. It is totally unacceptable as it would make a control system unworkable by introducing political differences into every administrative and operational measure.

5.

It is also wholly unnecessary. The political concerns of the parties are fully provided for in the Control Council and the United States went far to accommodate Soviet desires in its composition.

6.

If the Soviet Union continues to base its position on this principle, there seems little hope for progress in broader disarmament negotiations. The U.S. is not prepared to sign any disarmament agreement with an inoperable administration.

7.

It is just possible that Khrushchev will drop the tripartite administration proposal and propose a broad formula for settling the important [Page 144] remaining differences. Alternatively, he may ask for the Presidentʼs suggestion. The President will need to be prepared to use such an opening to discuss the major issues and hopefully to move the talks toward agreement.

8.

If Khrushchevʼs position is rigid and if—but only if—we have made a decision to resume testing in the absence of progress at the talks, the President should convey to Khrushchev, in whatever terms seem appropriate, the understanding that we regard resumption of testing as our only alternative if no agreement can now be reached.

1.

We reject the Soviet view of the world and particularly the shift of power to the bloc, and stress that for the USSR to act on it will mean an intensification of the arms race, a blow to the chances of disarmament and greater risk of the war all should seek to avoid.

2.

The system of world Communist parties—and the program for action prescribed at the Moscow conference by representatives of the Soviet and eleven other bloc governments—constitute blatant interference in the internal affairs of the 69 other countries from which Communist delegates come, and are a major deterrent to world peace. To make this point we could probe Khrushchevʼs reaction were there a similar system of democratic parties with branches in bloc countries and we might detail the subversive Communist activities in South Viet-Nam.

3.

We spell out the contradiction between Soviet national interest and the maintenance of the world Communist system, stressing our mutual paramount interest in disarmament and the economic well-being of our peoples and emphasizing in some detail how Communist China will pose this contradiction in more acute and explosive form in the not distant future. We also note the remote connection between Soviet national interest and the engagement of Soviet power in distant areas like Cuba, Laos and the Congo.

4.

The Soviets can believe Communism will be adopted throughout the world, including the U.S. We believe that democracy will emerge in more and more countries, including the USSR. The important issue is what we each do to bring the objective about and whether we can create the political machinery to accommodate the processes of peaceful change.

5.

Great restraint is required and we do not consider that the USSR has understood, appreciated or reciprocated the restraint we have shown in Eastern Europe where the political potential for our exploitation is as great as that of the colonial areas is for the Soviets.

6.

Soviet endorsement of war in colonial areas (Moscow conference) and Soviet efforts to poison and exploit relations between newly independent countries or colonial areas and the Western powers can [Page 145] only lead to more instances of violence and greater danger the hostilities will expand past control. Past Communist successes should not obscure this truth. In fact, they have made our reaction more certain.

7.

In our view the national interests of our countries are not directly involved in the character of the regimes in the newly independent countries—so long as the prospect is kept open for expression of the popular will.

8.

We have no desire to exclude the Soviet Union from normal relations with the newly independent and under-developed countries—but we can not consider those relations fully normal so long as the USSR maintains its ties with local Communist parties and groups.

9.

We detail our concept of a more stable order. Mention could be made of the broad scope for cooperative action—in outer space, in help to under-developed countries, in the fields of science and technology. If the talks have made the moment propitious, cooperative endeavor and expanded exchanges might be discussed in greater detail.

1.

In the interest of their own security, the well-being of their people and the peace of the world the U.S. and the Soviet Union have a profound common interest in disarmament.

2.

In the absence of agreements the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the greater rapidity with which delivery systems will operate, still greater risks will become probable.

3.

The U.S. is prepared to disarm all its forces except for those required for internal security and any forces required to provide authorized security forces for the UN. Disarmament, however, is only one component of a peaceful world community ruled by law and providing for orderly processes of peaceful change and progress in this field must progress in disarmament, particularly in the later stages.

4.

Given the advanced state of modern arms, disarmament is an extremely complex matter. It involves the most vital questions of national security. It is, therefore, imperative that it be carried out in a way which builds the confidence and trust of the participating parties at all stages. This is equally important for all sides; should serious doubts arise that the system was fulfilling its functions, the prospects for disarmament would be set back for a long time. Some discussion of the common interest in effective control would be in order. Some emphasis might be put on the vital necessity of the control system covering existing as well as surrendered armament and on the incompatibility of the present Soviet concept of military secrecy and a viable control system.

5.

Consequently, the provisions for implementing and controlling disarmament must be worked out with care and thoroughness. It is not too much to say that the problem of disarmament is virtually the problem [Page 146] of the provisions for its effective and safeguarded execution. We regard no disarmament proposal as really serious that does not come to grips with the control problem.

6.

We have suggested that the U.S. and the USSR exchange views prior to a resumption of negotiations. Agreement has now been reached to begin the discussion on June 19. We have made this suggestion for the purpose of attempting to arrive at an understanding on the basic framework in which disarmament negotiations should be conducted and on the negotiating forum. At the same time, we would like to discuss actions the two sides could take in order to minimize the dangers inherent in modern weapons systems. For our part, we have been seeking to introduce in our forces safety and precautionary devices aimed at reducing accidents or misinterpretation. However, there is a limit to what we can do unilaterally and we would hope to discuss what can be undertaken of a reciprocal nature.

7.

We will have proposals to make when disarmament talks are resumed. TheUSSR will also presumably have proposals. We would hope that the negotiations could proceed promptly to a serious consideration of specific disarmament measures without lengthy delay in discussing the merits of the two approaches. Perhaps examination of the means of implementing both Soviet and allied proposals could proceed simultaneously.

8.

We regard disarmament as a subject too serious to play politics with in the scheduled bilateral talks. We conceded to the Soviet position in order to get talks initiated in the Ten-Nation forum. While we regard disarmament as a concern of all powers, it is a subject for negotiation between the powers directly concerned. The commencement of negotiations should not be delayed by attempts to take them out of that context.

1.

As Khrushchev has pointed out, disarmament is the paramount question of our relations. Questions of Germany and Berlin are second-ary in comparison. They and the question of European security can be approached in a more promising context when progress is made in disarmament.

2.

Aspects of the situation in Berlin and Germany are unsatisfactory to the Western powers as well as to the Soviet Union but nothing is intolerable to either; the security interests of the Soviet Union are not threatened.

3.

The wisest course is to leave the situation alone until arms reduction makes solutions easier.

4.

The association of West Germany in NATO and other forms of European integration should alleviate instead of exacerbate Soviet concern. [Page 147] West Germany has accepted significant limitations on its sovereignty and institutionalized the defensive nature of its armament.

5.

Khrushchev may recall that by his menacing policy Stalin was primarily responsible for creating what he least desired, a coalition of Western European powers and the United States.

6.

Khrushchev might seriously ponder the effect that unilateral Soviet moves in Germany might have. The restraints which Chancellor Adenauer has exercised in his conduct of German affairs should not be taken for granted—nor could the Soviet Union assume that Adenauer or his successors would be able to exercise them regardless of Soviet actions. Soviet moves might well make such policies untenable in Germany and might bring about the developments in Germany theUSSR seeks most to avoid.

7.

In Berlin the U.S. has undertaken firm commitments and obligations together with its allies. It must and will honor its commitments regardless of the cost.

8.

If Khrushchev defends the “free city” proposal, the President might state that the U.S. is not prepared to make the fulfillment of its commitments dependent solely on the will of the Soviet Union.

9.

As Khrushchev will doubtless press the matter, we should be prepared to say that we will undertake negotiation of the problems of Berlin and Germany at a suitable time, but only as part of a broader discussion of problems of concern to both of us.

1.

There are a few reports intimating that the USSR intends to protract the Geneva Conference on Laos in order that Premier Khrushchev may seek to “settle” basic issues bilaterally in his talks with the President, despite the mutual understanding that these talks are only exchanges of views. Whether there is any real basis for such reports is unclear. However, it is probable that (a) a violent, military scuttling of [Page 148] the cease-fire by the Communists will not occur prior to June 3, (b) Premier Khrushchev will raise the problem of Laos in such a manner as to seek some U.S. “agreement” on ways to settle this problem, (c) the present Royal Lao Government under Prime Minister Boun Oum will still be in office, and (d) the Geneva Conference will still be under way.

2.

The President might welcome both statements that the USSR, like the U.S., seeks a truly neutral Laos and USSR moves, in the capacity of co-Chairman, to seek a peaceful settlement through the present Conference. Since that Conference is in session for the expressed purpose of resolving the Laotian problem, it would be inappropriate to attempt to shift negotiations to the Vienna meeting. However, the President might note that the co-Chairmenʼs instructions to the ICC, which led to its recent return to Laos, stated the ICCʼs basic tasks would be, first, “fixing the cease-fire” and, secondly, exercising control over the execution of an agreement to be negotiated among the belligerent parties on questions related to the cease-fire. Despite these instructions, Pathet Lao represent-atives, in talks convened to discuss “questions connected with the cease-fire,” insist that arrangements for a coalition government must be negotiated before cease-fire questions can be resolved. In the U.S. view, the USSR is in a key position, both by virtue of its contacts with the Pathet Lao and in its capacity as a co-Chairman, to persuade the Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma2 elements to negotiate agreements on questions related to the cease-fire promptly in order that the ICC may properly discharge the co-Chairmenʼs instructions.

3.

The U.S. agreed to attend the Geneva Conference on the express understanding that a properly verified cease-fire existed before the Conference was convened, and it was the assumption of the United States that the ICC would be able to carry out its continuing verification functions during the Conference in accordance with the instructions of the Geneva co-Chairmen to the ICC. The attempt of the Pathet Lao and Souvanna group negotiators at Ban Namone to introduce substantive discussions into the talks there as a precondition to negotiations on matters pertaining to the cease-fire is preventing theICC from operating in the manner contemplated.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

73. Paper Prepared in the Department of State0