388. Memorandum for the Record0
SUBJECT
- Lunch with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, December 18, 1963
I had a very agreeable two hours today with Ambassador Dobrynin. His first and dominant interest was to learn of the points of view and the [Page 846] process of action of the new Administration. I told him that the Presidentʼs first object was to strengthen the peace, and that he could rely on the depth and sincerity of the comments in this direction expressed by the President to Mr. Mikoyan1 and on a number of other occasions in recent weeks. I also told him that we were appreciative of the restraint and good will shown by the Soviet Government toward President Johnson.
The Ambassador seemed to accept these assurances, but said that he was concerned about one area—Cuba. He called attention to press reports of a re-examination of our Cuban policy and was at some pains to emphasize that such press reports always created concern in Moscow. I told him that any new American President would necessarily have to ask for a re-examination of the Cuban situation, since that situation was unsatisfactory to us both on the merits and in political terms. But I said that he could rely on the Presidentʼs assurance to Mikoyan that we did not intend to invade Cuba, and I told him that while we would continue to seek ways and means of strengthening our position toward the Castro regime, we had no intention of provoking a war in that area. I said that our position toward Cuba was not very different from what I understood to be the position of his government toward Berlin; I assumed that the leaders of the Soviet Government were dissatisfied with the situation in Berlin, but did not wish a war there, and that they might well be asking their staffs continuously what could be done to improve the situation in Berlin without provoking a war.
In response to his more general question about the new Administration, I told the Ambassador in a general way about the continuation in office of the principal officers of the Kennedy Administration. I described briefly the high quality and the good sense of the principal new staff officers at the White House. I told the Ambassador that he could continue to rely on the Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and myself with respect to the most private communications. And when he suggested that the Attorney General might be less engaged in these problems, I told him not to be so sure—that the Attorney General was a very important member of this Administration, too, and continued to have a deep interest in foreign affairs. But later in the conversation when the Ambassador asked in the most explicit way where he should go with his most private messages, I told him that I thought his best bet was Ambassador Thompson.
The Ambassador and I had quite an exchange on Germany in which for a minute or two I thought he was going to talk quite informally about the importance of reaching a solution that would be more secure than the existing situation. I told him quite bluntly that the key to a more forthcoming position on our side was the possibility of self-determination for [Page 847] the East Germans, and said that it seemed to me that much could be done in the real interest of our two countries if the Soviets could accept the prospect of a change here.
In this connection the Ambassador gave me a long and emotional account of Soviet opinion of the Germans, pointing out the depth and strength of the emotional deposit of the two World Wars. I told him that we understand this feeling and respect it and that our own German policy was designed with this concern in mind. We discussed the MLF in the usual terms, but I think I made some slight progress in persuading him that our German policy, including our proposal for an MLF took account of the German right in a way in which his governmentʼs policy did not. At least he failed to answer my questions about the consequences for the German right of the standard Soviet policies which he was urging. The Ambassador, as on previous occasions, refused the contest when I made uncomplimentary remarks about Ulbricht.
We had an extended discussion of the wheat deal, in which I think we agreed that there had been an honest misunderstanding with respect to American bottoms and their prices. The Ambassador explained how he had been surprised to be instructed that he could offer to carry the wheat in American bottoms, and I explained that we had assumed that no such offer would be made except with an understanding of the costs implied. He said that, for his part, if anyone had asked him about the cost he would have been careful to reserve the Soviet position. I said that the value of the wheat deal seemed to me to be much greater than the difference in price still existing between the negotiators, and that therefore I would urge on his government an increased flexibility and responsiveness in seeking individual agreements. I said that it was very difficult for us to make a package deal but that, on the other hand, we had no desire to make profits on any small differential in price. The American bottoms were necessary to us for quite straightforward tactical reasons, relating especially to the attitude of the unions which would have to load the wheat. I had the impression that the Ambassador had only an incomplete understanding of the domestic complexities of the wheat deal from our point of view, and I think it may be useful for a more expert witness to give him another dose on this score. The Ambassador told me that his own government at the moment was quite discouraged about the wheat deal but that at least they were treating it in a low key, which he indicated had been his own urgent recommendation. I repeated that the political advantage was worth further effort, especially on the Soviet side.
The Ambassador went from this point to a discussion of the wider possibilities of trade and pointed out to me with considerable force and persuasiveness that the U.S. was at a big disadvantage with respect to trading opportunities with the Soviet Union simply because the Soviet official representing the American Division in all discussions was always [Page 848] at a disadvantage in Moscow when it came time to share out to foreign countries parts of the purchase programs authorized by higher authorities in Soviet economic planning. The official from the American Division almost always had to say that he could not guarantee delivery or terms, and under Soviet processes such uncertain bargains were seldom interesting.
The Ambassador returned at the end of the meal to the question of the new Presidentʼs personal style, and I repeated what I had said earlier about continuity and about the Presidentʼs commitment to peace. I also explained that this President, like President Kennedy, used both written papers and oral discussions, but in somewhat different proportions. I emphasized the new Presidentʼs skill in seeking and weighing the opinions of many different individuals, and the Ambassador said that the new Presidentʼs method sounded to him very much like that of Chairman Khrushchev.
We parted with a final toast to peace. On the whole this was the most searching and instructive conversation I have yet had with a Soviet diplomat. Somewhere in the middle of lunch, we switched from formal address to first names.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files. Secret.↩
- See Documents 380 and 381.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩