368. Editorial Note
On November 4, 1963, Secretary of State Rusk called in Soviet Charge Kornienko to protest Soviet detention of another U.S. military convoy at the Marienborn checkpoint even though the convoy had followed U.S. procedures, about which, Rusk noted, the Soviet Government had been fully informed. In a discussion with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on November 5, Rusk “expressed astonishment at Soviet action,” but Dobrynin “disclaimed any knowledge of incident.” The convoy was released about the same time the Rusk-Dobrynin discussion occurred. For text of telegrams 1344 and 1364 to Bonn, November 4 and 7, in which the Department of State reported on Ruskʼs two meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XV, pages 620–621 and 623–624.
In a meeting with U.S. businessmen in Moscow on November 6, Chairman Khrushchev claimed that the Unites States had yielded to Soviet procedures and intimated that the incident might have led to nuclear war. For extracts from Khrushchevʼs comments, see The New York Times, November 7, 1963. In telegram 1735 from Bonn to the Department, November 7, Ambassador to Germany McGhee stated that Khrushchevʼs comments made “unmistakably clear that Autobahn convoy harassments receiving highest level attention in Moscow.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XV, pages 624–626. In a memorandum to the President, November 7, Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara [Page 804] recommended “preparatory actions” that would permit retaliation by delaying transit of Soviet vessels through the Panama Canal. The memorandum noted, however, that the Department of State believed such a countermeasure had disadvantages, among them the fact that “the action involved is so far removed from the autobahn that it might be regarded by the Soviets as a sign of weakness.” For text, see ibid., pages 627–630.