34. Editorial Note
On February 20, 1961, Secretary of State Rusk called in Soviet Ambassador Menshikov to inform him that the United States supported the statement issued the previous day by the King of Laos insisting on his [Page 82] nationʼs neutrality. However, the United States did not support the Kingʼs call for an international conference to work out a settlement in Laos. Menshikov replied that the Soviet Union supported Laotian neutrality, as it had since the 1954 Geneva Conference. For text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XXIV, pages 56–58.
On February 21 the United States Intelligence Board approved Special National Intelligence Estimate 58-61: “Probable Communist Reactions to Certain U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to Laos.” According to a brief of the SNIE, it expressed the Boardʼs judgment that “except possibly in the case of more extreme U.S. military measures, we believe that Soviet leaders would not match U.S.-sponsored military actions in Laos with corresponding, step-by-step, Bloc military measures. Except in the case of the most modest U.S. military measures Bloc leaders would almost certainly expect that most of world opinion would be sharply critical of the U.S., and that this fact would deter the U.S. from pressing too far.” For text, see ibid., pages 59–61.
On February 28 Menshikov informed Rusk that the Soviet Government believed that the 1954 Geneva Accords were not adequate to resolve the present situation in Laos and therefore supported the call by Prince Sihanouk for an international conference to strengthen the International Control Commission created in the 1954 agreement. For text of the memorandum of Menshikovʼs conversation with Rusk, see ibid., pages 63–66.
In telegram 2138 to the Department of State from Moscow, March 10, Ambassador Thompson reported on a meeting with Chairman Khrushchev on Laos, during which Khrushchev said theUSSR shared “the same desire as you, namely to end fighting which only sheds blood, gives neither you nor us anything, and hurts relations between us.” Khrushchev welcomed “a Laos that pursues neutral policy on model of Austria” and suggested that Rusk and Gromyko meet to discuss the matter. For text of the telegram, see ibid., pages 80–82.
In telegram 2139 to the Department of State from Moscow, March 10, Thompson reported that Khrushchev seemed convinced that the United States was “genuinely seeking” neutrality for Laos and was “intrigued by the possibility” of settling the problem. (Ibid., page 82, footnote 3) Nevertheless, a Rusk-Gromyko meeting in New York on March 18 produced little. Rusk found Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko “completely elusive,” according to a memorandum of the conversation. Gromyko refused to give substantive answers beyond a repeated insistence that discussions on Laos must begin with an international conference. (Ibid., page 93, source note)