Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

334. Current Intelligence Weekly Review⁰

Washington, June 21, 1963.

Sino-Soviet Gulf Widens as “Unity” Talks Near

Recent declarations and actions by both the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties reinforce the conclusion that there is virtually no prospect of resolving any of their substantive differences in their bilateral talks opening on 5 July. The Chinese in their belated reply to Moscowʼs 30 March letter,¹ again forcefully demonstrated that they are not coming to the meeting in a spirit of compromise. The Soviets, more in deeds than in words, have indicated that there is no give in their position either.

New Attacks From Peiping

On 15 June, the Chinese delivered to the Soviets what will probably be the last in the exchange of letters between them before the “unity” meeting convenes in Moscow. The timing of the letter² and some of its statements suggest that it was planned to coincide with the opening of the Soviet central committee plenum opening on 18 June. However, its content over-all—a long, intransigent position paper, insulting in tone and bristling with unconcealed attacks on the Soviet party—seems intended more for the international Communist movement than for Moscow. The letter not only was printed in Peopleʼs Daily on 17 June, but was immediately broadcast around the world and has been published, along with the other letters in the series, in a pamphlet which will undoubtedly be widely distributed wherever Peiping feels it can exert an influence.

This last letter was an attempt by the Chinese to define more sharply the differences between themselves and the “modern revisionists” over 25 points of “principle” which they feel should be discussed at the Moscow meeting. The issues range widely, from the mistaken view of general policy the Chinese profess to see in Soviet words and actions; through the USSRʼs incorrect tactics in foreign policy, its mishandling of problems in the international Communist movement, and its exercise of “great-nation chauvinism” in respect to other Communist regimes; to the degeneration of Marxism-Leninism in Soviet domestic doctrine and society.

Peipingʼs decision to set forth in so stark a fashion its rigid, fundamentalist views in opposition to the somewhat more liberal, pragmatic Soviet approach reflects its arrogant confidence, perhaps over-confidence, that in the contest the tide of opinion within the movement is flowing in the direction of China. The Chinese methodology resembles Leninʼs constant insistence on clearly marking the boundaries between himself and the Menshiviks in their earlier disruptive no-holds-barred ideological battle.

This approach entails some danger for the Chinese. Earlier in the dispute, they generated a great deal of sympathy for their views when they concentrated on fewer issues and presented them in a more generalized fashion. Now that the range has been extended to Soviet practices and views, the possibility of equivocation on the part of other Communist parties has been narrowed.

Moscowʼs Restrained Reply

The Soviet party apparently continues to believe that it can best prevent the Chinese from adding to their past successes in the international Communist movement by maintaining its righteous pose as the champion of courtesy and “unity.” On 18 June, the Soviets published a statement³ noting receipt of the letter, regretting its tone and distortions, and expressing the hope that the Chinese, like the Soviet Union, would “concentrate their efforts on what unites” the two parties rather than on what separates them. The statement also explained that the USSR at this time would not publish the letter—which, like earlier Chinese communications, taunted the Soviets for their failure to publish Peipingʼs views as the Chinese publish attacks on themselves—since it would only lead to a renewal of bitter polemical exchanges, which have aided in Chinese efforts to undermine Soviet leadership.

In fact, for the most part, the USSR has lived up to its self-proclaimed ban on polemical attacks. While firmly maintaining its well-known positions, so contrary to what the Chinese preach, and continuing its efforts, as in its extravagant wooing of Castro last month, to solidify support from others, it has not returned to the peak pitch reached just before the East German party congress in January. Its actions, however, or in some cases its refusal to act, have proved that it remains as intransigent as the Chinese and consequently have infuriated Peiping.

Soviet Foreign Policy Moves

The Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, one of the key exhibits in the Chinese case for Soviet revisionism, has continued to prosper, with Moscow even praising Yugoslaviaʼs new and controversial “socialist” constitution. A recent report from a diplomat in Belgrade states that a Yugoslav delegation will be in Moscow around 1 July to negotiate a role for Yugoslavia as observer in the bloc economic organization CEMA.

Soviet actions with respect to India also continue to contain a heavy anti-Chinese flavor. In addition to its un-Marxist “neutrality” in the Sino-Indian border question and its continuing deliveries of aircraft to the Indians, Moscow now has reportedly offered them new military equipment, which they would put to use in any future skirmishes with the Chinese on the border. The Indians plan to send a technical mission to Moscow on 1 July, as suggested by the Soviets, and plan, for their own purposes, to ensure that the Chinese know of their visit.

In agreeing to meetings with US high-level negotiators in Moscow on 15 July for further discussion of a nuclear test ban, the USSR has shown in another field that it will pursue its own policies with little regard for Chinese feelings or views. Although prospects are slim for any better results in these than in earlier talks, Peiping views with deep disapproval any Soviet negotiations with the West on this and related subjects.

All these delegations to discuss agreements with the USSR, which the Chinese view as inimical to their own interests, will be in Moscow at approximately the same time as the two Communist regimes face each other across their negotiating table. Such a juxtaposition does not appear at all accidental and certainly will not appear so to the Chinese.

Some of the Soviet actions have been met by the Chinese with an eloquent silence. Although the final Soviet-Cuban communiqué was printed by Peopleʼs Daily there was no comment by Peiping on Castroʼs month-long trip in the Soviet Union. Prior to that trip, Castroʼs activities had been widely publicized by the Chinese. The forthcoming East-West negotiations in Moscow were dismissed by China with a two-line announcement.

Peipingʼs Unrestrained Restrictions

The Chinese are coldly vituperative about other matters, however. They have issued a constant stream of protests alleging Indian violations of Chinese territory, apparently building up a case of innocent injured party, and they have again accused a “certain socialist country” of failing to support a socialist ally when attacked by a bourgeois country. On 16 June, they editorialized on the failure of the Geneva Conference co-chairmen (theUSSR and the UK) to condemn alleged Western and US violations of the agreements on Laos. The editorial was obviously intended to demonstrate for other Communist parties the sharp contrast between the proper Chinese support for militancy in a revolutionary situation and the improper Soviet caution.

It is on the question of Yugoslavia that the Chinese have vented their full anger. After republishing an earlier Tito speech which had set forth Yugoslaviaʼs views of Chinese errors, Peopleʼs Daily on 15 June savagely attacked Yugoslav revisionism, carefully tarring the Soviet Union with the same brush by implication. The Chinese proclaimed that Titoʼs views were but “spittle collected from the cuspidors of the imperialists and other revisionists”—an obvious reference to Khrushchev.

Both sides nevertheless continue to pay lip service to the need for “unity” and proclaim loudly that they each are working to that end. Both are apparently still ready to meet on 5 July as if that meeting could be meaningful in terms of unity. The Chinese were the more honest, however, in their editorial on Tito when they boldly said that their dispute with the revisionists was “irreconcilable.”⁴

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 2-4 of the issue.
1. For text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XV, No. 14, May 1, 1963, pp. 3-9.
2. For text, see ibid., No. 28, August 7, 1963, pp. 3-15.
3. For text, see ibid., No. 23, July 3, 1963, p. 4.
4. In the July 26 issue, the Current Intelligence Weekly Review reported that “after two weeks of futile and probably acrimonious meetings in Moscow, the Chinese Communists have returned home clearly determined to carry on with the war. The Russians, no less determined, have acted quickly to tighten their lines in preparation for continued conflict.” (Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A)