318. Editorial Note
In a meeting with his advisers on April 19, 1963, the President “indicated his belief that Soviet activities in Cuba should be considered as an element of the problem in Laos,” according to an undated memorandum prepared by one of the participants, William Colby. “He [Kennedy] recognized [Page 671] that action against the Soviets in Cuba would not affect Laos directly but he did feel that the Soviets were continuing the type of harassment effort in Laos that we had stopped by the Cuban exiles and that the Soviets were not moving out of Cuba as we wished. He believed that there were perhaps direct steps we could take in Cuba, such as resumption of low-level reconnaissance, which would place pressure on the Soviets at a place where they were somewhat weaker as a concomitant action to pressures we might impose in the area of Laos.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XXIV, pages 974–975.
In a National Security Council meeting the following day, the President again linked Laos and Cuba. According to the summary record of the meeting, Kennedy “commented that with the [U.S.] prisoners out of Cuba, we might be in a position to act against Cuba if Khrushchev made no move to halt the deterioration in Laos. He asked what action we could take against Cuba. Director McCone said we should fly low-level reconnaissance missions which were necessary no matter what happens in Laos.” Ambassador Thompson “pointed out that a U.S. bombing raid on Pathet Lao forces in Laos would be easier for Khrushchev to accept than U.S. action against Cuba.” For text, see ibid., pages 976–980.