316. Editorial Note
In an April 11, 1963, letter to Chairman Khrushchev, President Kennedy addressed the issue of a test ban. Trying to resolve the continuing disagreement over whether Arthur Dean had told a Soviet representative that the United States could accept as few as two to four on-site inspections per year in the Soviet Union (see Document 274), he assured Khrushchev that no U.S. representative had made any such statement. At the same time, however, he said that he had “respect for your representatives, too, and so believe that there was an honest misunderstanding on this point.” He once again tried to convince Khrushchev that the multilateral nuclear force being considered by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would not be a violation of the principle of nonproliferation, for “no such force could ever be used without the [Page 668] consent of the United States. The concept of this force is therefore exactly opposite to that of independent national nuclear forces.” Kennedy also offered to send a senior personal representative to discuss these and other matters with Khrushchev. “The object would not be formal negotiations, but a fully frank, informal exchange of views, arranged in such a way as to receive as little attention as possible.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VI, pages 265–268.
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan conveyed their views on the test ban issue to Khrushchev in a joint letter dated April 15. The letter reviewed problems and progress in the negotiations, concluded that “we have reached an impasse,” and proposed “private tripartite discussions in whatever seemed the most practical way,” for example through “our chief representatives at Geneva” or through “very senior representatives who would be empowered to speak for us and talk in Moscow directly with you.” On April 24 Ambassador Kohler reported to the Department in telegram 2719 that he had presented the Kennedy-Macmillan letter to Khrushchev. “Khrushchevʼs reception was almost one of disinterest.” He said it contained “nothing new,” reiterated “that Germany was the key to everything and that the nuclear test ban really had no importance,” and expressed regret “for having made mistake of offering three inspections.” For text of the Kennedy-Macmillan letter and Kohlerʼs telegram, see ibid., volume VII, pages 676–678 and 685–686.
Khrushchev replied to Kennedyʼs April 11 letter on April 29 in a long message that concluded by accepting Kennedyʼs offer to send a senior personal representative to Moscow for informal discussions. Khrushchev answered the Kennedy-Macmillan letter on May 8, expanding on his initial reaction to Kohler. He claimed again that the German peace settlement, not the test ban, was the key to “lessening international tension” and repeated the usual arguments for Soviet opposition to on-site inspections. He characterized the Kennedy-Macmillan proposal to send high-level representatives to Moscow as a “proposal to continue haggling over inspections, but at a higher level,” but he nevertheless agreed to receive them. For text of both letters, see ibid., volume VI, pages 271–286.