Office of the Historian

306. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk0

Washington, March 21, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • CIA memorandum dated March 18, 1963, OCI No. 1096/631

The CIA paper entitled “Soviet Policies: The Next Phase,” states, in summary form, some of the problems and appraisals which an interagency [Page 651] group, under the leadership of S/P, has been working on for some time, in a more extended treatment. The CIA paper is a useful one, and I have only a few comments, as follows:

While there are many signs that the Soviets have decided to maintain, and possibly increase, the heavy allocation of resources to the military sector, I believe we should keep a sharp eye out to see whether this does in fact prove to be the case. The Soviets are quite capable of deliberate deception on this point.

Paragraph 10, which deals with Berlin, appears to ignore the fact that the Soviets have reopened this question, and it is too early to conclude that this is merely an effort to keep the question alive.

The statement in paragraph 11 that “There is not likely to be a great Soviet interest in serious dealing on disarmament” may be true in the sense that the Soviets do not consider the time propitious, or the West sufficiently interested to make meaningful agreement possible, but everything in the Soviet situation points to the fact that they should have a genuine interest in real disarmament, and I believe that this is the case.

In paragraph 7, it is stated “There is the recognition that a pause is required in international affairs, while the Soviets attempt to repair their position.” While Soviet foreign policy does seem to be on dead center, I suspect this pause is due more to Khrushchevʼs internal situation, and the influence of foreign developments on that internal situation, than to the foreign developments themselves, or to the military situation.

In general, I am inclined to question the implication of the paper that the Soviets are going to stand still in foreign affairs while they build up their military strength. Apart from the fact that by hardening bases and building more atomic submarines the Soviets can increase their second strike capability, I doubt very much that they anticipate changing the correlation of military forces to their advantage to a degree which would enable them to undertake adventures in the foreign affairs field which they cannot do now. On the other side of the coin, I think that whenever Khrushchevʼs internal situation is improved we can expect further Soviet moves, and possibly radical ones, in the field of foreign affairs.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 USSR. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Thompson; copies were sent to Kaysen and Cline. According to another copy this memorandum was included in the Presidentʼs weekend reading for March 23-24. ( Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR)↩
  2. Document 305.↩