290. Editorial Note
On February 8, 1963, President Kennedy met with key advisers on U.S. test ban policy. According to Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Seaborgʼs record of the meeting, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Foster stated that “the key to any test ban is underground tests because the detection of the other types is easy and not at issue.” Further, he “said he would like to have authority to go eventually to six on-site inspections as a fall-back position.” Commenting that he thought six on-site inspections “the rock-bottom position,” President Kennedy “said we should proceed on the assumption that the USSR will cheat, and then work out the advantages, that is, compare what they might gain by cheating with the advantages that banning tests would have with respect to the Chinese situation.” Kennedy added that “the whole reason for having a test ban is related to the Chinese situation. Otherwise, it wouldnʼt be worth the disruption and fighting with Congress, etc.” For text of Seaborgʼs record of the meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, pages 644–646.
On February 17 the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency circulated a paper recommending U.S. positions at the test ban talks in Geneva. The next day the President discussed the paper with the Committee of Principals, and inspection procedures were agreed on. For more information and text ofACDAʼs memorandum to President Kennedy summarizing the recommendations in its February 17 paper, see ibid., pages 648–650. [Page 625] On April 1 the United States and United Kingdom submitted a memorandum to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee that proposed an annual quota of seven reciprocal, on-site inspections, with each side inspecting the other rather than relying on an international commission, and seven automatic seismic stations in both the Soviet Union and the United States. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pages 141-145.