275. Memorandum of Conversation0
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Dobrynin, USSR
- W. Averell Harriman
Marie and I were asked to dinner December 28 with Ambassador Dobrynin. We found it was a party of six—his wife, and Mr. and Mrs. Alexander Zinchuk (Counselor).
Dobrynin was obviously engaged in a fishing expedition. With a none too well concealed interest, he asked me leading questions, such as “Didnʼt I agree that the Administration was divided between those who wanted to make progress after Cuba in U.S.-Soviet relations, and those who wanted to wait and see what develops. Which of these courses is the President likely to follow?” I countered by telling him a few things which I thought would be useful, one, I felt sure that the President had been shocked by Mr. Khrushchevʼs abuse of the term “defensive weapons.” He caught my point without my having to drive it home. I said that he should not try to guess what was in the Presidentʼs mind by whom he heard was seeing him or attending meetings. The President asked people [Page 598] to attend meetings (outside the normal State and Defense officials) not only to get their advice, but also to make certain groups feel that they were being consulted. There was only one exception to this, an individual whose advice I could assure him the President was always ready to listen to, and that was Mr. Robert Kennedy. He commented that Robert Kennedy was always blunt and direct (obviously indicating respect).
He asked me about different people, Adlai Stevenson among others. I assured him that Adlai Stevenson would remain at the United Nations as long as he wished. He was of great value to the President, would always loyally carry out the Presidentʼs decisions. In reply to his question as to how the Saturday Evening Post article could have happened, I said I knew that such a thing couldnʼt happen in the Soviet Union, but it was not unusual in the United States for newspapermen, even friends of the President, to speculate inaccurately. Dobrynin said that he had noticed the emphasis the President placed in his press conference1 on his intention to keep his friends.
He asked whether McCloy represented the business and banking group and I said I considered McCloy represented no one but himself. However, he had the respect of a great many people, Democrats as well as Republicans, businessmen and bankers. He then commented “We find him frank, objective and have confidence in his statements.”
He appeared surprised when I told him things werenʼt going very well in Laos, and contended that we should give more time for the three groups to get together. I told him that was all very well, but when the North Vietnamese didnʼt live up to the Agreement, action must be taken, and he could be sure that before long we would be asking the Soviet Government and Mr. Khrushchev specifically to make good their promise to police the “socialist” Geneva participants.
He asked me a number of questions about my experiences with Stalin, and what I thought of him. These I answered quite frankly. In this, he gave me the feeling that he was sincerely interested or at least curious. He commented that I was the only one in the U.S. Government who had had close contact with Stalin and now with Khrushchev. He said that Stalin had grown more and more suspicious in the last years of his life even of his close associates.
He asked whether we agreed to the neutrality of Cambodia. I replied “of course” but explained details of Sihanoukʼs proposals were beyond our power to guarantee (the unsettled border of Cambodia with Thailand and South Vietnam).3 Also our constitution didnʼt permit the [Page 599] President to give such sweeping guarantees. I told him we would consider the matter and comment shortly. He said Soviets had reservations also and pointed out Khrushchevʼs reply “agreed in principle.”
He then asked me why I had changed my position in my talks with Pushkin4 about South Vietnam. I said it wasnʼt I who had changed—it was Pushkin. As I recalled it, in August 1961 Pushkin had indicated to me his interest in stopping the fighting in Viet Nam. When, however, I discussed it with him again in October or November of ʼ61, he had changed his tune. Both Dobrynin and Zinchuk said, “Oh, but it was in January ʼ62 when he raised the question again and you had showed no interest.” I said I didnʼt recall Mr. Pushkin giving me any indication that the Soviet Union was prepared to arrive at a practical solution. Dobrynin said, “But of course, Diem would have to go.” I said, “Well who is better than Diem?”, and I added that when Pushkin had made the same statement, I had suggested Ulbricht ought to be replaced; that ended that aspect of the talk.
Dobrynin asked whether we were imposing any conditions on Nehru. I said if he meant alignment the answer was “no.” In fact we were not imposing any conditions on our military aid. Nehru and all of India understand the danger coming from Peiping, but we had no objection to Nehru and the Indian Government maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union. I said, “If you are a friend of India, why didnʼt you try to stop Chinese aggression by threatening to end shipments of POL?” He rather slyly intimated that they had used their influence and this had something to do with the Chinese withdrawing their troops.
He wouldnʼt be led into any informative comment on the row between Moscow and Peiping. I told him that we obviously thought that it was important for India and Pakistan to make up their differences in order to live as friendly neighbors. It was obvious Peiping was opposed to this and I assumed Moscow wouldnʼt be any more cooperative. He denied this.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.6111/12-2862. Confidential.↩
- For a transcript of the Presidentʼs press conference on December 12, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 866-874.↩
- For text of Prince Sihanoukʼs letter to President Kennedy, August 20, requesting a U.S. guarantee of Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1002-1003.↩
- Georgi M. Pushkin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister.↩