Office of the Historian

268. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0

Moscow, November 27, 1962, 2 p.m.

1362. I. During course my recent calls on high-ranking officials both in and outside MFA, Soviet side has sung chorus on theme of need for settling problems by “compromise” and mutual concessions”. Officials have invariably suggested time propitious to move ahead toward resolution outstanding problems, generally with specific reference disarmament and to Europe.

Similar line has been followed by East European diplomats. There has been little real evidence of just what this means in terms of Sovietsʼ intentions or even hopes. Elements which must be affecting current reconsideration of scenario, however, clearly include:

1.
Effect of Cuban crisis on previous idea of Soviet leadership as to U.S. determination, firmness of Western alliances and support of Soviet people for adventures abroad.
2.
Complications which denouement of crisis has introduced into already difficult intra-bloc conflict.
3.
Obviously uncoordination ChiCom action on Indian border.
4.
Domestic problems, notably question of optimum allocation of resources and shortage of foreign exchange.

II. Presumably, first concrete indications of genuineness of Soviet readiness to reach agreements would manifest themselves in nuclear test talks at Geneva and in disarmament negotiations where Soviets likely willing discuss and possibly even accept first step measures which could reduce likelihood surprise attack and war by miscalculations; there have been hints this might include very slight compromise on test inspection and revival of Soviet proposals of 1955 for reciprocal stationing military observers at chosen points in NATO-Warsaw Pact areas.

On Germany and Berlin, there have been only straws in wind, notably:

1.
Relative restraint in Berlin itself and on autobahn.
2.
Recision of military alert and readiness measures following Cuban crisis.
3.
Aquiescence in press treatment and public statements, including speeches at East European conferences, notable as regards threat of separate peace treaty.
4.
In contrast, increased stress on arrangements “regulating the relations between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries”, starting with Khrushchevʼs published letters to President and then taken up by press.
5.
Hints by Soviet officials of some let-up in Soviet insistence on troops question if change in status West Berlin could be achieved.
6.
Indications Soviets have had little favorable reaction from uncommitted governments to separate peace treaty.

III. It seems possible to us, in light these rather flimsy indicators, that Soviet leadership may well be thinking along following lines:

1.
Attempts to apply “consequences” of separate peace treaty too dangerous and gesture of having such document signed only by bloc and left unimplemented evidence more of weakness than of strength.
2.
No package deal on Germany and Berlin now obtainable which does not leave impression Soviet set-back in at least tacitly giving blessing “occupation status” West Berlin and continued presence Western forces.
3.
In circumstances, best bet for Soviets lies in conclusion non-aggression arrangements between NATO and Warsaw Pact, coupled with some related “surprise attack” and “nuclear non-diffusion” measures. This would be in keeping with present posture of Khrushchev as “man of peace”, improve atmosphere and possibly lead to some relaxation within NATO. At same time, this would inevitably enhance status Ulbricht regime and constitute at least tacit recognition GDR borders, thus giving impetus to Western publicʼs acceptance of division of Germany.

While change in status West Berlin desirable to Soviets also, this not essential at this stage. Status quo could be maintained as regards Western forces and access for time being, but Soviets would not be deprived of possibility subjecting West Berlin to current pressures and squeezes.

Obviously such approach would have its dangers for West, along with possible advantages in securing some blessing of status quo. In any case, we consider real enough as possibility to warrant careful study by Dept and then perhaps quadripartitely.

Kohler
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/11-2762. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Paris, and London.↩