Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

258. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Press Secretary (Salinger) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, October 31, 1962.

Following is a report of a conversation I had today with Yuri Zhukov, Foreign Editor of Pravda; Georgi Bolshikov, Editor of USSR Magazine; Mr. Boglov of Novosty.

Mr. Zhukov opened the conversation by saying that he would be most interested in my giving my observations of the past 10 days. I told Mr. Zhukov I would have to speak to him personally and with that proviso I gave him an historical review of US-Soviet relations since January 1961 during the Kennedy Administration.

I said the release of the RB-47 pilots by Chairman Khrushchev right after inauguration had been looked upon as a hopeful sign and could lead to the opening of Soviet-US relations. The Vienna meeting, while it produced an impasse on Berlin, had been significant for its agreement on Laos which both the President and the Chairman carried out following their meeting in Vienna. I said that I felt that the Laos agreement had been taken as an indication that the United States and the USSR could reach agreements and could be carried out; that they could strengthen the integrity of contacts between the two countries. I went on to say that in subsequent discussions on Berlin and nuclear testing, while they produced no satisfactory solutions, there was a feeling of integrity of communication and particularly private communication.

I then said I would like to review the Cuban situation. The developments of the Cuban situation were highlighted by the fact that in May 1962 when I met with Mr. Khrushchev¹ there had been no discussion of this subject. They had become an issue following the start by the USSR of sending military materials to Cuba. This, I said, placed an immediate and heavy pressure on the President to do something about this situation. But, I said, the President had withstood this pressure and had made the September statement² which clearly outlined what the United States considered to be the difference between “defensive” and “offensive” weapons. I said I was not interested in getting to a semantical discussion on this subject but that there was no question that the Presidentʼs speech should have served as an international warning as to what we considered to be dangerous to our national interest. I pointed out that the political pressure increased after the speech but that the President had still refused to be pushed into any precipitous action regarding Cuba. During this period, I pointed out, theTASS statement was put out in which it was stated that the Soviet Union has sufficient offensive weapons in its own territory so that it would not be required to put offensive weapons on any other land. I said we had received a number of private assurances that the Soviet Union would not place offensive weapons in Cuba. I said the President, in the face of political pressure, maintained his own position and even spoke out against those who urged a harsher policy against Cuba. I said the President was therefore astonished when the evidence was presented to him which showed that missiles had been placed in Cuba by the Soviet government. I said I did not need to review the events between 22 October to the present time because they were well known.

I said there should be no illusion however in anyoneʼs mind that we had not reached a point when we were on the brink of the deadliest of dangers. I said the situation now is very clear. The commitments made by Chairman Khrushchev should be carried out swiftly and demonstrably. It was not possible that the United States and the Soviet Union would allow Castro to prevent this. Anything short of swift and demonstrable dismantling of the missile sites in Cuba would let the situation slip back and I further said I didnʼt think that either the United States or the Soviet Union wanted that to happen.

Mr. Zhukov then reviewed the situation. He said he could not agree with me more when I said that the situation should not be allowed to slip back. At the Presidentʼs press conference tomorrow,³ he said, there should be no back-down on the Presidentʼs position on Cuba. He said if the President backed down on this matter, Khrushchev would be in a very difficult position. He said the President and Chairman Khrushchev were both in difficult positions. “It is most important to repeat again what has been agreed to,” he said. Zhukov said it is all very well for newsmen to get involved in details and interpretation but “the skill of the statesman is not to be involved in details.”

Zhukov then asked “how do we proceed from here? At Andover our American friends discussed the possibility of a Summit Meeting. Mr. Cousins⁴ talked to me and suggested several alternatives. I donʼt know if these statements represented any official view of the government but this is what Cousins suggested: (1) the possibility of a meeting of the Security Council attended only by heads of state; (2) a meeting between President Kennedy, Chairman Khrushchev, Castro, U Thant⁵ and a representative of the OAS.” Zhukov expressed the view that neither of these suggestions would be very effective. Zhukov said that Cousins then suggested a Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting followed by a meeting with Castro, U Thant and an OAS representative. Zhukov said he would like to know what our views were on this subject. Would such a meeting be helpful? What subjects could be discussed? “I do not exclude the possibility of such a meeting to finalize the present agreements.”

Mr. Zhukov said he thought the solution to the Cuban problem would open “the way for settlement of other wider ranging problems.” He said that yesterday he met with Scotty Reston,⁶ who said that he thought such a meeting would not be particularly useful at this time and would not yield results; that it might first be better to seek a solution through the Disarmament Committee or perhaps agreement of the NATO and Warsaw Pact groups.

I told Mr. Zhukov that I was not in a position to discuss with him our governmentʼs feeling on a Summit at this time; I had not had a chance to discuss it during the past week; that I could not tell him anything other than my personal feeling prior to the Cuban outbreak and that was that during discussions of Chairman Khrushchevʼs possible visit to the United Nations, I had gotten the feeling around Washington that such a meeting between the President and the Chairman would not be particularly useful at that time for it would put us in a difficult position if they were unable to come to any agreement. This, I pointed out, had been Mr. Khrushchevʼs own view when I talked with him in Moscow in May. Mr. Zhukov then dropped the subject of the United Nations and the agenda and said he would take it up with Ambassador Thompson who he was seeing next.

He made the following additional points:

(1) He was concerned about reports circulated, he said, by the State Department that Castro had sent a message to Communists in Latin America to begin acts of sabotage. He said he was concerned about the implication that the blowing up of oil fields in Venezuela had resulted from such a message. He said he was certain that Castro had not sent out such a message and further he wanted to point out that Castro was not the boss of Communists in Latin America and would not give such orders. He said he feared that such talk would again start Latin American countries into taking such actions against Cuba. He said this would be very unfortunate: “the fate of the world is in question here.” He said “let U Thant settle these problems.” He said the solution of the Cuban problem must be “the test of sincerity of both sides.”

(2) Zhukov wanted to know if the President would find it useful to meet with Anastas Mikoyan. If so, Mikoyan could stop in Washington on his way to Havana.

(3) He complained bitterly about a movie called Weʼll Bury You released by Columbia Pictures. He said it was a terribly distorted view of Khrushchev and an insult to Lenin. He said that if the Soviet Union prepared such a film about President Kennedy the United States would pull its Ambassador out of Moscow. I pointed out to Zhukov that unlike the Soviet Union the United States Government does not control communications, i.e., films. He said he was aware of this but wanted to call it to my attention.

(4) Khrushchevʼs statements about Berlin and the United States elections⁷ did not mean that Mr. Khrushchev would sign an agreement with East Germany after the election. The Chairman, he said, does not have a desire to move on this problem unilaterally: “We do not want to solve this problem without your participation.” He said that what Mr. Khrushchev meant was that we should start active negotiations after the elections with a view of seeking an acceptable solution to the problem.

Pierre Salinger⁸

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-3162. Secret. Copies were sent to Bundy, Rusk, and Thompson.
1. See Document 195.
2. For text of the Presidentʼs September 4 statement on Cuba, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 369-370.
3. The President did not hold a press conference on November 1.
4. The Andover Conference of Soviet and American scientists and intellectuals, hosted by Phillip Mosely and Norman Cousins of the American Council on Foreign Relations, was held the last week of October. A memorandum of Moselyʼs telephone conversation with Ralph Jones (SES), October 29, about some of the activities of the conference is in Department of State, Central Files, 511.613/10-2962.
5. Acting Secretary General of the United Nations.
6. James B. Reston, chief Washington correspondent of The New York Times.
7. See Document 232.
8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.