Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

240. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)⁰

Washington, September 19, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Comments on Secretary Udallʼs Memorandum to the President¹

We are in general agreement with the tentative conclusions which Secretary Udall reached after 11 days in the Soviet Union as to the direction Soviet society is taking. With regard to specific points made by the Secretary we have the following observations. The stressing of economic incentives and awards has been a growing practice. However, with reference to the specific examples cited by Secretary Udall, premium wages for priority work in Siberia and other “frontier areas” was standard practice even under Stalin. As for 10-year loans for private homes and the growing attachment of the elite for dacha-living, recent Government pressures have been in the opposite direction, i.e., loans for private homes and dacha construction are now much more difficult to obtain than just a few months ago.

It is true that the Soviets see benefits in the exchanges program with the U.S. and are as a result compelled to pursue a limited “open window” policy. It should be noted, however, that the Soviets have very clear objectives in the exchanges program, utilizing exchanges primarily for the purpose of obtaining as much technical and technological information as possible from the U.S. while giving as little as possible in return. They are also interested in prestigious exchanges, such as performing arts. However, where the exchanges deal with subjects such as exhibits, dissemination of information, etc., which have an obvious impact on Soviet citizenry, and in which we have greater interest than the Soviets, we find the going very heavy indeed. We have recently concluded time-consuming negotiations to arrive at the present exchanges agreement and have the problem of how to utilize these exchanges to our best overall advantage constantly under review. Thus, we do not feel that a fresh study of the problem is called for at this time.

Finally, as a general proposition we recognize that there is a liberalization process taking place within the Soviet Union. In our view, however, this is bound to be an extremely slow process with a dynamic of its own and while we should of course do whatever is possible to further this development, it would be a mistake to believe that we can exert undue influence on it through such actions as high-level exchanges.

With regard to increased high-level exchanges, Secretary Udallʼs trip was of course arranged under the Exchanges Program. It should be noted, however, that the Soviets, in welcoming such exchanges, attach considerable political significance to them and expect the high-level visitor to have a similar political motivation. For this reason we believe that we should reserve high-level visits for times when we have something important to convey to the Soviets. A visit to the USSR by the Attorney General would have inescapable overtones which may or may not be desirable at any given time. In this connection, the Soviet Government utilizes such exchanges to purvey to the Soviet people and the world a sense of normalcy in U.S.-USSR relations which does not in fact exist. We do not, for example, believe that the current time of increasing tensions between the U.S. and the USSR is a propitious one for high-level visits with accompanying atmospherics. Lastly, the only visit to the Soviet Union which would have a real and deep impact on both Soviet leaders and people at large would in our estimation be a visit by the President. Obviously the current state of U.S. and USSR relations and the international situation are not propitious for such a visit.

As regards the prospect of return visits by men in high places such as Frol Kozlov, we understand that Secretary Udallʼs suggestion is in part motivated by his belief that Kozlov is a likely successor to Khrushchev. Indeed, Secretary Udall has asked that the Department give him its consensus on Khrushchevʼs probable successor. A paper addressed to this problem is attached and you may wish to give it to Secretary Udall when you see him. In this connection it should be pointed out that Kozlov visited the U.S. only two years ago when he was a First Deputy Premier. At the present moment, while he holds high offices in the Communist Party, he does not hold an important position in the Soviet Government which might provide a convenient pretext for an invitation. In summary, we believe that high-level visits either way between the U.S. and the USSR should have greater motivation than the belief that they will serve to educate Soviet leadership or open up Soviet society.

Attachment²

PROBABLE SUCCESSION TO PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP FOLLOWING DEATH OR RETIREMENT OF N.S. KHRUSHCHEV

It generally is estimated that the departure of Khrushchev from the top leadership scene will pose less of an immediate problem in the transfer of authority and the maintenance of stable control channels than did the death of Stalin. The top group around Khrushchev, more accustomed to the exercise of both individual and collective responsibility, should be able to retain authority as a leadership “collective” for a more or less extended interregnum period. Some members of this leadership collective are expected to exercise relatively more authority and leadership initiative than others, and it seems inevitable that even initially some focus of authority will be evident. By general consensus, this initial focus most likely will be on the personages of Party Second Secretary F.R. Kozlov, Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman L.I. Brezhnev, First Deputy Premiers A.N. Kosygin and A.I. Mikoyan and Party Secretary M.A. Suslov, all members of the Party Presidium and Khrushchevʼs leading lieutenants. For the sake of displaying continuity with the past older but lesser figures like N.M. Shvernik and O.V. Kuusinen initially may be given prestige attention without, however, responsibility permitting the exercise of added influence.

There is less of a consensus concerning possible later shifts in the top leadership structure although some of the more dynamic members of the lesser leadership are expected to rise in authority and importance. Of those already on the Party Presidium, A.P. Kirilenko and G.I. Voronov (First Deputy Chairmen of the Central Committeeʼs Bureau for the RSFSR), D. Polyansky (RSFSR Premier) and N.V. Podgorny (First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party) may fall in this category.

Although Kozlov stands high on the list of possible successors to Khrushchev and not infrequently is termed the heir apparent, there can be no assurance that he will emerge sooner or later as the “most equal of equals” in the top leadership. His position as Khrushchevʼs next-in-command in the Central Committee Secretariat both provides him with the opportunity to consolidate his personal position and identifies him to Presidium associates as a person whose authority may need to be “contained” if their own relative positions are not to suffer.

Ambassador Thompson recently has expressed views similar to those outlined above. Somewhat more specifically, he feels that if Khrushchev should depart from the scene now Kozlov and Kosygin might well assume the major Party and Government responsibilities, respectively. As power relationships within the leading group are at best unstable and shift with different times and pressures, however, the Ambassador feels that should Khrushchev remain at the helm the chances are good that in time neither Kozlov nor Kosygin will figure as an heir apparent.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-UD/9-1962. Confidential. Drafted by Guthrie, initialed by Tyler, and sent throughS/S to Ball who also initialed it.
1. Document 238.
2. Confidential.