Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

228. Highlights of Discussion at Secretary of State Ruskʼs Policy Planning Meeting⁰

Washington, August 28, 1962.

SUBJECT

• “Khrushchev at Bay”

At the Secretaryʼs Planning Meeting on August 28, 1962, Mr. Rostow presented thoughts he had developed regarding where the Soviets currently stand in their prosecution of the cold war. He explained that in the planning process it is desirable on occasion to apply the long view, to look at an existing situation against the backdrop of what has gone before and of alternatives that seem open for the future.

Mr. Rostow saw the post-war Soviet offensive as falling into two distinct phases. The first—Stalinʼs—had been marked by a direct thrust riding on the momentum of the war. In the West it involved the reannexation of the Baltic States and Bessarabia, subjugation of the countries of Eastern Europe, the military threat against Iran and Turkey, the guerrilla campaign in Greece, attempted exploitation of communist strength in the countries of Western Europe, and various moves, including the Berlin Blockade, to achieve Soviet dominance within the whole of Germany. This drive in the West was brought to a halt by the success of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and finally the Berlin airlift. In the East, Stalin capitalized on the communist victory in China, encouraged dangerous guerrilla campaigns in South Korea, Malaya, Indo-China and the Philippines, and finally fostered a direct military attack on South Korea. The thrust in the East was brought to a halt by the decisive defeat of the Chinese Communist armies at the 38th parallel in Korea in April-June, 1951, although guerrilla operations continued in Indo-China.

During Stalinʼs last years an interlude occurred in Soviet active prosecution of the cold war. This continued after Stalinʼs death, his successors seeming uncertain as to how, or perhaps whether, to proceed. Only after Khrushchev firmly established himself in power in 1957 was a systematic new offensive launched.

Inauguration of this second offensive coincided with the tremendous psychological boost given the Soviets by Sputnik I and the presumably parallel advances in military rocketry. Looking back at it, this offensive appears definitely as a “Post-Sputnik Offensive.” The starkest manifestation of the new drive was Khrushchevʼs commitment to do something about Berlin. Elsewhere its main thrust was directed toward the underdeveloped countries and included renewed guerrilla warfare in Laos and South Viet-Nam, attempted exploitation of turbulence and confusion in the Congo, efforts to capitalize on the windfall victory in Cuba, and serious—and costly—engagement of the United States in the trade and aid field. The Soviets gave every evidence of being genuinely confident over their prospects in this offensive. They seemed really to believe that they were riding an irresistible wave of history.

Today this second offensive is in disarray. Efforts in the Congo have been checkmated; Berlin had yielded no easy dividends; Cuba has proved less of a springboard than a trough draining Soviet resources. Meanwhile, and completely contrary to doctrinal concepts, the economic progress and growing unity of Western Europe have reached a stage where they can no longer be written off as artificial developments dependent on the US. Within the communist world itself a strong backwash of the wave of history has set in. The Chinese Communists have failed dismally in their program to transform China. The ChiCom revolt against Moscowʼs authority has rent the monolithic character of the socialist camp and has diluted Soviet control of the world communist movement as a whole. The Soviet Union and the European satellites show unmistakable signs of resources strains. Khrushchev has had to preside over the liquidation or indefinite postponement of internal goals to which he was personally strongly committed. Worldwide, the communist image stands tarnished and few appear overly impressed by the irresistibleness of the communist cause.

Viewed in the perspective furnished by the foregoing, Mr. Rostow said, the present situation leads to two general conclusions:

• First, we have reason for real hope. Assuming continued alertness and required performance on our part, we have it in our grasp to frustrate Soviet aims in regard to world communism and perhaps to achieve a set of inter-state relationships that will conform more nearly to our long term security interests.
• Second, before things get better they may get worse. We must view the present and immediate future as a time of special danger. Khrushchev may seek to break out of his frustrations. Three areas appear to merit special watchfulness:
  • —The arms race: Khrushchev may stake heavily on an important breakthrough that would furnish a hard military base for a renewed offensive.
  • —Berlin: Khrushchev may feel under strong compulsion to achieve at least one success to which he can point, and may be prepared to step up the risk rate over Berlin.
  • —Cuba: Khrushchev may be unwilling to accept as final the failure of Cuba to produce automatic gains in Latin America and may decide to increase substantially Soviet outlays and risks to secure a payoff from Cuba.

Mr. Rostow called attention to an exchange of memoranda between INR and S/P¹ on the thesis he had presented and noted that despite certain divergencies both papers underscored an evident trend on Moscowʼs part to reduce commitments to world communism in favor of Russian state interests. This trend, if it should continue, would be of central importance. We should watch it with care.

There appeared to be general agreement within the group that the Soviets may have to undertake reappraisal of their policies. It was noted that when Khrushchev started his special drive, he committed himself to “peaceful coexistence” as the best means of getting on with world revolution. If he is dissatisfied with the results, as the morningʼs presentation would indicate, he faces the necessity of choosing between hard alternatives. He may have to decide whether to elevate doctrine to “pure doctrine” and concentrate on Soviet interests as state interests, or to thrust forward again with stops out.

Several aspects of current Soviet conduct were seen as suggestive in this connection. Why is Moscow restraining Red China in Southeast Asia? On the basis of an objective appraisal, Khrushchev might well conclude that the communists could afford to take greater risks there and reap worthwhile dividends. It might be, of course, that irrespective of surface appearances he does not feel sure of the US, of what the US would actually do in a pinch, and hence sees less opportunity than one might suppose. But other factors—factors related to Soviet state interests—could be at play.

The latest Soviet position on the nuclear diffusion problem was also thought to be of significance. For the first time, the Soviets had moved away from concentration on Germany. They proposed a simple one-two approach that would affect all nations equally: We agree with each other not to share nuclear weapons with anybody; then we agree to try to persuade others not to receive or to make nuclear weapons. This is very interesting from the standpoint of Soviet relations with China. Are the Soviets prepared to take on China on this issue? It may be that they are attempting a gimmick, that they calculate that after Peiping refuses to be bound they can induce the US to go ahead and force West German agreement. On the other hand, they may be reflecting old-fashioned state interests. They have a nuclear capability and we have a nuclear capability. Perhaps they have decided that it is to their national interest that no one else have it and are prepared to act accordingly.

Several in the group thought the Soviets because of strictly state interests are indeed concerned to forestall an independent ChiCom nuclear capability. An agreement with us would make it easier for Moscow to refuse any aid to China in the nuclear weapons field. Moscow might have in mind forcing a multilateral military arrangement on China, under which the Soviets would actually retain all nuclear capability in their own hands. The reason that Moscow has chosen this particular time to move may be that, contrary to our own current estimates, they see the Chinese as close to detonating a device. They may feel under some urgency to head off the Chinese.

Others doubted that Moscow could realistically hope that China can be headed off by any Soviet maneuver. Almost certainly Peiping poses to Moscow a de Gaulle problem magnified many times. Moreover, the Chinese Communists have already shown that they have no intention of permitting Soviet-controlled forces on their territory. It is also questionable that Moscow needs an excuse to refuse aid to Chinaʼs nuclear development program. They evidently have been refusing such aid all along.

With respect to the question of Soviet restraints on China in Southeast Asia, it was suggested that Moscow is concerned that Peiping not be given an opportunity to control Soviet foreign policy. The Soviets have a publicized commitment to back China in difficulties involving the US. They almost certainly at this stage do not wish to get into a situation that would require them to honor those commitments. However, their prestige is involved in the commitments and they doubtless wish to avoid the necessity of openly reneging on them. Hence the best policy is to keep China quiet. Also, Moscow hardly has great interest in any aggrandizement of Chinese power and influence in Southeast Asia or anywhere else at this time. After all, two cold wars are currently under way.

Reverting to the overall situation existing at present, the point was made that the altered Soviet outlook underscored the desirability of a US policy that concentrates on getting on with our own job. The best way to deal with the communists is to take initiatives related to putting the free worldʼs own house in order. The problem for us is to determine and to make the most of initiatives that are open to us. Important possibilities already exist in connection with the development of the European and Atlantic community, the Alliance for Progress, and augmenting western influence in the UN. We should search for other areas, ones wherein it will not be necessary to secure Soviet agreement.

An exercise that might be instructive and helpful would be to run over the postwar period and to make a check list of critical decisions that were or were not made that had a bearing on our capability for initiatives, for our capability to keep control over events. Certain decisions that had had a significant negative effect readily came to mind:

• —The decision to demobilize after the war. This served to tie our hands at a critical time. For example it forced the decision not to take action in China in 1946-47. Six or seven US divisions in China might have made the difference, but we simply did not have the divisions.
• —The withdrawal of the last US combat unit from Korea in 1949. This may have been the decisive step that triggered the Soviet decision for the invasion of South Korea.
• —The failure to take direct action in North Viet-Nam in 1952. The Red River Valley had been long looked upon as the key to all Indo-China and even Southeast Asia. Yet we failed to take the military steps necessary to tip the scales.

There are others of similar import—other instances of critically important negative decisions, positive decisions, and decisions by failure to take decision. It would be fruitful, it was thought, to review these.

As a caveat in regard to initiatives, the suggestion was made that we concentrate on operations that do not require acceptance of our own ideas, institutions, and practices by others. The Soviet failures that had been noted in the morningʼs discussion related in almost every instance to efforts on the part of Moscow to impose something alien on one or another people. Castroʼs influence in Latin America had waned, for example, because he represented an alien force. The Latin Americans do not want to be dominated by anybody but themselves.

A specific initiative proposed was that we see the contest in South Viet-Nam through to a fully successful conclusion. The stakes involved in South Viet-Nam are much larger than South Viet-Nam itself. At issue there is whether communist sponsored insurgency in the guise of a war of liberation can pay off. This is a matter of great doctrinal importance to the communists and one that looms large in the Sino-Soviet dispute. If we can thoroughly disabuse those who see indirect aggression as a plausible way, we will have scored heavily.

Achievement of a more rapid US rate of growth was viewed as another area where we have a real job to do. The relative lag of the past several years must have encouraged the communists. It doubtless contributed to the optimism that underlay the Khrushchev offensive. In the present situation it is doubly important that we push forward.

The Kremlin was seen as also probably searching for “new initiatives”. This would be particularly true if they read the balance sheet as it is being read here. For this reason, it would perhaps be better for us if Moscow remained more optimistic than we feel they should be.

What we should hope for, it was suggested, is that the Soviets will seek compensation in activities and accomplishments related to the enhancement of Russian national prestige. It would be to our interest if they had a golden bridge to a retreat along this particular road. With this in mind, such successes as the recent spectacular in space might in the long run not be too bad.

We should give thought to moves on our part that might contribute to a rechanneling of Soviet energies and ambitions into national pride and prestige areas. We need, perhaps, a “Department of Weird Ideas” that would have as its task uninhibitedly exploring the whole range of possibilities lying before us. Challenges in the battle against nature might lend themselves to this. As an example, we might seize upon general concern over bacteriological warfare, and propose to the Russians a two-fold attack: one, a declaration against the use of bacteriological weapons; and two, a pooling of our respective knowledge of esoteric bacteria and germs to advance world capability in the health field. Some years back when a new strain of the black plague virus was brought into India by birds from the Soviet Union and was producing alarming results, the Russians cooperated with the Indians and with us to lick the problem. They did this quietly and without attempting to make propaganda gains. A number of means may be open to us to encourage and capitalize on a “Russian spirit”, as against a “Communist spirit”.

In this connection, it was noted that we should keep in mind that there will be, before too long, a post-Khrushchev period in the Soviet Union. The climate then may be quite different. We should lay as extensive a foundation as possible for utilizing any opportunities that may then arise.

It was generally agreed that it is indeed important that we give thought to the “post-Khrushchev” problem. We should also look at post-situations around the world, wherever there is a dominant figure in control and particularly where means for an orderly succession are lacking.

Action Requirements:

In the course of the discussion, the following specific undertakings were suggested:

1. An evaluation of the implications of the Soviet response on non-diffusion. (INR with EUR)

2. A check list of critical US decisions during the post-war period that affected our “initiative” capability. (INR)

3. Development of proposals for broad US initiatives that would not require Soviet agreement but would affect relative prospects of the two sides in the cold war. (General with S/P coordination)

4. Exploration of possible US moves designed to channel Soviet energies and activities away from world communist aspirations and into building Soviet national pride and prestige. (S/P)

5. Examination of the implications for US policy of the post-Khrushchev problem in the USSR. (Underway as part ofBNSP “Task Assignments.”)

6. Check list of significant “post” problems in other parts of the world and examination of implications for US policy. (INR and S/P)

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but it is dated August 31. The meeting was held at 10 a.m. and was attended by Rusk. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books)
1. For the meeting Rostow had circulated copies of his speech at the National War College on August 20 ( Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR); an August 21 INR memorandum entitled “Khrushchev at Bay, in the Light of NIE 11-9” (ibid.); and an August 23 S/P memorandum to INR commenting on the INR memorandum. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, USSR) NIE 11-9-62 is printed as Document 187.