Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

207. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Presidentʼs Advisor on Disarmament (McCloy) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)⁰

Washington, July 3, 1962, 1 p.m.

After several invitations to confer with the Ambassador, I finally accepted a luncheon date for July 3rd. He asked me to choose the place and I suggested the Russian Embassy.

The luncheon and the after-luncheon talk lasted until about 2:30 p.m. (beginning at 1:00 p.m.).

He first spoke of a message he had from Khrushchev to me, which according to Dobrynin, was to carry his (Khrushchevʼs) good wishes to me and my family. He also said that he had been asked by Menshikov to be remembered to me.

The first thing he asked about was the economic situation. He wanted to know what I thought of consequences of the stock market collapse—its cause and effect and I told him what I thought, namely, that we were in a bear market of rather definite proportions and it would affect business. It remained to be seen I thought whether it would result in a real lack of confidence which would deeply affect the economy.

He was inquisitive about the steel price episode.¹ I told him I thought the steel action was maladroit but that the President had overreacted. This had been the immediate cause of the sharp realization that with the squeeze on profits, stock prices were far too high. He then asked about the Common Market—why had we been in favor of it and why were we still pressing for its development and Great Britainʼs entry? Did this not all tend to increase competition for us in the way of business and act also as a dilution of our power position in the world? I replied that with the continuation of the tariff barriers in Western Europe, with the foreshortening of time and travel and the great increase of speed of communication, it was anachronistic to continue with the old system. It was this realization by a number of thinking people which brought it about. We had been called on to participate in two World Wars by reason of German-French tensions and it was natural for us to seek greater stability in this part of the world. Our power might be diluted and the competition might be severe but we were not disposed to keep others weak in order to maintain our position. He indicated that they were puzzled by our attitude in this respect and had a hard time to find an explanation. I told him I did not think they need seek for any other explanation than what I had indicated.

Next he asked about tax reduction—How was it possible with all the threat of a deficit? He was aware of the talk about the beneficial aspects of a deficit but this was hard to believe and particularly difficult to accept in the light of the balance of payments position of the United States. I told him that I thought he had asked a good question. We were in a tight position with the squeeze on profits, with ever-increasing labor costs and our rather savage income tax on both corporations and individuals. It was complicated by the balance of payments problem but the theory was that a reduction of taxes would release money for investment and expansion, introduce more flexibility in our economic system, etc. This stimulation would, in the end, result in just as substantial government revenues and would result in a return to confidence that other governmental measures might fail to produce. I told him I felt our taxes were too high, interfered with incentives and produced all manner of anomalies in commercial transactions. A tax reduction might have a real stimulus but the danger of a larger deficit and its threat to the dollar was in my judgment very real. He then asked about the attitude I had in regard to the extension of nuclear power to other countries. This, said he, troubled them greatly—would this not certainly increase the danger of nuclear war? I said I thought it would and, as I understood it, so did the United States Government. He indicated that he sensed some relaxation of our opposition to such a trend. I said I could only refer him to the Government for the answer to this question. I knew of no such “relaxation.”

At this point I said I wanted to ask him some questions but he said he had one more before I began and that was regarding the status of the Disarmament Advisory Committee. What power did it have, whom did it advise and how many times did it meet? I told him all the answers as I saw them, emphasizing its purely advisory capacity, the character of its advice, its composition, etc.

My first question was as to Mr. Khrushchevʼs recent statements in regard to China. They were rather rasping and I wondered what they really implied. We had made it clear that we were not going to support any adventures on the part of Chiang on the Mainland. Both Rusk and the President had indicated that and if Mr. Khrushchev was really trying to reduce dangerous tensions, why did he not indicate the same thing in regard to his support of Red Chinaʼs incursions against Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu? He replied that it was known that Chiang had real ambitions in regard to the Mainland but they were wholly fanciful as far as Chiang was concerned. They were only serious if the United States supported his ambitions and it was necessary for Mr. Khrushchev to emphasize Soviet support of their alliance with Red China, if any such attempt was made on the Mainland. This, I said, was understandable but the real question was whether the Soviet Union really would support Red China if it sought to mount a military effort against Formosa or the islands. He said that Mr. Khrushchev had to support Maoʼs claims to Formosa. It was to be given to China—even the United States had declared this. I said Mr. Khrushchev could continue to support Red Chinaʼs claims but not by means of force, and he ought to state this renunciation if he wanted really to reduce tensions. Mr. Dobrynin said he got the point and I said the failure of Mr. Khrushchev to give any such indication along these lines made the United States wonder just what the extent of the Soviet Unionʼs commitments were in regard to Formosa and the islands. The President had made the United Statesʼ position clear and if Mr. Khrushchev was serious about relieving tensions here was a point at which to begin. Beyond acknowledging that I had made the point clear to him, he did not volunteer anything more.

Another discussion took place in regard to Berlin. I said I was gaining the impression that Mr. Khrushchev was digging himself in deeper and deeper on the removal of United States troops in Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev must know how important a factor this was in our position and the position of all the Allies. To keep emphasizing this point was endangering a real settlement on Berlin which could be part of a package which might include a number of points of real advantage in the relief of tensions.

If Mr. Khrushchev wanted to diminish the prestige of the United States by demanding the withdrawal of United States troops and the insertion of other troops in West Berlin with no penetration of East Berlin by any foreign troops we would not be getting anywhere according to my view. This is not the time to crystallize positions on this important issue. Mr. Dobrynin must remember we did not throw the challenge to Mr. Khrushchev on Berlin. He did, and he heated it up so much we felt impelled to build up our military position. This annoyed Mr. Khrushchev very much and he stepped up his armament and all this leads us nowhere. There is a real opportunity to work out a solution on Berlin which may not suit Ulbricht but which would relieve tensions but they canʼt be relieved if Mr. Khrushchev is really trying to get us to back down in Berlin which we will not do. I said this was a matter on which I certainly felt very deeply and I felt the American people did. There was, in my judgment, real danger of war over Berlin if it were not handled temperately and there should never be an effort to force the issue. It carried a terrible danger everytime it was attempted. Mr. Dobrynin said he knew this was a sensitive element in our position over Berlin but he did not see why it was that we objected to neutral occupation of West Berlin. The United Nations could do this as it had in the case of the Suez, for example. The danger in Berlin was the confrontation of our two forces. It was the only place in the world where this was so. The necessity was to remove this danger. The fact that Berlin was surrounded by East Germany did not mean that they would ever be disposed to attempt to overrun the United Nations forces in Berlin. They could never agree to any presence of foreign troops in East Berlin because such a repudiation of the Communist regime by the Soviet Union makes it impracticable.

Then, I said, leave the situation as it is with no further attempts to maneuver us out of position. It was not “intolerable.” It was not challenging; people could very well get on in Berlin if it were not for the new challenge. It was, of course, annoying to Ulbricht but who was Ulbricht to allow him to play with fire. If Ulbricht could be gotten rid of, I had the idea the whole situation would be improved greatly.

The West Germans would be much more forthcoming in regard to East Germany, etc. He suggested we get rid of Adenauer. I said this might be possible if we had controlled the elections in West Germany as they did in East Germany.

I referred to the Wall as a terrible acknowledgment of weakness. This symbol of war and concentration camps was sinister, out of place and a dreadful admission of weakness in that people had to be locked in their own home country to keep them there.

He said that it was only natural to erect such a Wall—there were barriers at every border crossing. I said I knew of only one such penitentiary wall on any boundary. He said a number of people in the United States Government had indicated to him that the Wall was a welcome stabilizing factor.

I said I did not agree. It was just too unnatural and sinister. It induced violence and hatred. It should be disposed of soon.

I then talked to him about disarmament. I said I had come reluctantly to the conclusion that the Soviet was interested in disarmament only as a propaganda weapon. He asked me why I thought this because he thought they had made it clear they were the worldʼs foremost advocate in urging disarmament. I said they had urged it all right but all last summer while they were talking test ban, they were intensively preparing for tests and had not the slightest intention of reaching any agreement on a ban at all. He must understand what distrust this sowed. Mr. Khrushchev, at the Black Sea, during my visit with him,² had accused the United States of secretly preparing for tests while we were negotiating. I had then told Mr. Khrushchev that if he cared to, he could send experts over to our proving grounds to examine into just what we were doing, provided we could do the same with our experts on their side. Mr. Khrushchev said this was not “practicable.” It is now apparent why it was not “practicable” and I did not feel that on this matter Mr. Khrushchev had been frank with me. The Soviet antipathy to a reasonable form of inspection and verification likewise impelled me to believe that the Soviets only wanted the sound of disarmament and not the reality because anyone really desirous of true disarmament must accept as a logical concomitant of it a system of inspection and verification based on something more than faith. It also implied acceptance of some international arbitraments, of which the Soviet representatives all fought shy. Furthermore, I said, I had never talked with any national leader who talked so much about his weapons as did Mr. Khrushchev. He seemed enamored of them; it was like a farmer with a new set of tractors or farm implements. These were my reasons for disillusionment regarding the true intent of Soviet disarmament proposals.

He said he had to admit the testing last summer did cast doubts on Soviet intentions regarding the test ban negotiations but they did wish disarmament and perhaps the best thing to do now was reach an agreement on disarmament in space. It was a field not yet preempted and though it might not have great immediate military implications, it might be something definite and helpful toward other agreements. I said I felt it was a thing which we ought to attempt and accomplish quickly and decisively.

He said it might also lead to fruitful cooperation in the space field and I said I thought this would be highly desirable. He then talked of a test ban agreement indicating he thought the general and complete disarmament plan carried implications that neither side might want to adopt for the time being. Why did we not agree to a ban in all elements relying on national detection systems only but doing what we wished to do by way of preparation?

We might not detect all underground explosions. He thought it could be done. His scientists thought they knew about all United States underground tests and he felt sure we could detect any they exploded. I said our experts vigorously disagreed; that with our type of society the Soviet Union could rely on getting information of such testing much more readily than we could from the Soviet Union. Why this pathology regarding inspection? Why is it so bad? Why is it that this is such a stumbling block to actual accomplishments? He did not answer these questions directly but always stressed Soviet proposals for reliance on national observance systems as the best method of attack leaving it to each government to use as much effort as it wanted to in the way of preparation for tests in case of a breach by the other side. I said this was playing in the dark which always gave rise to suspicion and it did not appeal to me as being constructive. Throughout our talk on disarmament I gained the impression he believed in tackling some things that could be done rather promptly leaving the general and complete disarmament and all its ramifications to a later stage.

I said that this was just what we were advocating but the Russians at Geneva seemed to be taking the position through Zorin that it was all or nothing. If this was a change in the Soviet position, I thought the United States would be glad to respond.

I asked whether it made sense to continue to go on talking at Geneva going round and round the mulberry bush. Was it too much to ask whether there was any present desire for a disarmament program on the part of the Soviet Union which would not significantly increase Russian strength in relation to ours?

Why I asked did the reversal on war propaganda take place at Geneva? What harm could have come from agreeing to a ban on it? Was this Chinese pressure? Was it because Red China decried the abandonment of the doctrine that war was inevitable between the Communist and the Free World? Iʼd like to know and I’m sure the world would like to know. He indicated he did not know the answers to these questions and I did not press.

He then asked me why there seemed to be such deep hostility to the United Nations among the Congress and the people. He had the feeling as did most members of the Soviet Union that the United Nations was controlled by the United States, so why get mad at it. It had stood in the way of innumerable Soviet policies yet it had become an institution of great distrust in the United States.

Why was this? Why was it that the Southwest seemed to be particularly hostile? Why does the Birch Society have such strength in that area? I told him not to mistake some senatorial and extreme right criticism of the United Nations as representative of general feeling. I had heard that the Gallup polls had indicated a very wide support of the United Nations in the United States. I thought the criticism of the United Nations came largely from the frequent use of the Soviet veto and the fear that irresponsible and immature nations may form blocs or groups which would induce irresponsible and perhaps dangerous action but the general support of the United Nations in spite of frustrations was still deep-seated in the United States.

Throughout the visit, Mr. Dobrynin was affable, courteous and gave the impression of being rather frank and forthcoming. The text will show, however, that he did not open the door to any major developments in our relations with his country. He indicated he would like to call on me in New York. He also asked my advice as to where he could go in the summer relatively nearby “but where it was a little cooler than Virginia.”

JMc

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/7-362. No classification marking.
1. On April 10 Roger Blough, Chairman of the Board of U.S. Steel, had announced a raise in steel prices of $6 per ton. The President regarded this as inflationary and in 3 days convinced Blough to rescind the price raise.
2. See Document 109.