Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

190. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, May 7, 1962, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Memorandum of Meeting with The President, 5:30—Monday—May 7, 1962

The meeting consumed an hour and 15 minutes, attended by the President, McCone and General Maxwell Taylor, the latter being present at McConeʼs request.

[Here follows unrelated material.]

5. McCone reported on the fact that further study of most recent Corona mission which was basis of briefing of Macmillan, the President, and McNamara on April 28th,¹ had disclosed that additional Soviet ICBMs which now total 81 in being or under construction and MRBMs which now total 440 located sites in being or under construction. We are not raising our mid-62 estimate but the President was told that the matter was under review and that we will probably raise our mid-63 estimate of Soviet capabilities. McCone furthermore reported that after one more Corona shot scheduled for May, the National Board would review all available data.² Furthermore, 10 additional Corona shots are scheduled for the summer and upon conclusion of this series, the National Board would make another review and possibly a new estimate which would be ready in October or November. McCone reported that most recent Corona failed because the parachute did not open and the most recent Samos was lost. The President was further advised that Discoverer units were being purchased in sufficient number to carry on the program through ʼ62 and into ʼ63, if trouble developed with Samos.

McCone reviewed the attached memorandum³ on the number of operational U.S. ICBMs and Polaris missiles, stating that the figures were approximate but representative of the order of magnitude of our own situation. He advised the President that on the basis of these figures and known Soviet effort, there would not be a “missile gap” in the future. However, there is a wide disparity between the Soviet MRBM capability and that of the West. The question of the ʼ58, ʼ59, ʼ60 estimates which created the illusion of the missile gap was raised with the President. General Taylor defended the estimates for those years on the basis of conclusions drawn from all intelligence which was then available to the Intelligence Community and to the military.

[Here follows unrelated material.]

John A. McCone⁴
Director

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on May 8.
1. McCone summarized the April 28 briefing in a memorandum of discussion, April 30. McCone noted that, following the briefing, “the President asked whether our recent photography caused a change in our estimates. McNamara answered no, that our ʼ62 and ʼ63 estimates remain. I however took a different position. I stated there were now 76 ICBM launching pads located and there were probably some which we had not located. Some were completed, the majority apparently under construction. I pointed out our mid-62 estimate was 35 to 50 ICBMs on pads and ready to go. I now felt we have to accept the higher figure as the minimum.” (Ibid.)
2. On July 6 the intelligence community issued NIE 11-8-62, “Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, pages 332–342.
3. Not printed.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.