Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

188. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, May 4, 1962, 6 p.m.

2848. Athens for Secretary. Indecision in Soviet policy, both domestic and foreign, which has been manifest for some months appears be continuing.

On internal scene delay in appointing union committee to supervise agriculture and recent appointment as its head of Ignatov, who was dropped from Presidium by 22nd Party Congress, suggests continuing differences of opinion in leadership on agricultural matters. Similarly, absence of any clear information on increased agricultural investments may be result of uncertainty on amount and source of resources to be diverted to agriculture, though it is of course possible this due to desire conceal from those affected as well as foreign observers areas from which resources will be taken. Cancellation 1967 World Fair gives good indication of extent strain on resources.

Few changes in govt and party at Supreme Soviet possibly also due reluctance force issues. We have no information on significance Kirilenkoʼs appointment.¹ While seems clear Spiridonov has been downgraded,² we have no basis for assessing significance this action. Apart from a few promotions, no changes made in top military echelons where, as embassy has pointed out, many top officers old for their jobs.

In foreign field Soviets appear content let matters drag in Laos, Congo and Viet Nam. They also clearly prepared continue talking about Berlin and desire avoid impasse at this time although yesterdayʼs Pravda “Observer” article suggests there is time limit on this policy. They have moreover shown desire lower temperature in Berlin and reduce danger of escalation in this dispute. Apart from his pronouncement on summitry K did not take advantage of Cowles interview³ to develop any new lines which unlike him. Similarly he cancelled proposed TV exchange with President.

Difficult assess significance this policy of drift. So far as Berlin concerned I believe K has been influenced by our military preparations, by fact he must know that so far as U.S. concerned we consider missile gap in our favor, and by situation in East Germany. In view Soviet internal demands it cannot have been easy for Soviets to provide credit of over 300 million dollars to East Germans and I should think Soviets would be at pains avoid allowing Berlin situation develop in such manner as to bring end to interzonal trade which would enormously increase economic burden on them quite apart from danger of uprising in East Germany as well as risk of war. (On other hand K so deeply committed to solution Berlin problem, difficult see how he can allow it to drag on until factors mentioned above have changed.) While I believe K remains firmly in control there is little doubt that there is disagreement in leadership on major policies. Among others may be mentioned following on which both logic and some evidence point to differences of opinion:

1. Extent of de-Stalinization;

2. Agricultural policy; heavy vs light industry and general problem allocation resources;

3. Basic military policy and disarmament;

4. Bloc relations;

5. Foreign policy both as to content and conduct including attitude toward relations with us and personal diplomacy;

6. Policy toward under-developed countries including role Communist parties and amount and direction Soviet aid;

7. Internal party matters such as personnel, role of party, aims, extent of democratization, control of population, handling of youth.

Given setbacks of past 6 months or so and opposition to various of his policies on foregoing problems, natural K would wish avoid initiatives at this time which might add to those who for one reason or another may be inclined question his leadership. Will be noted that many of his most serious problems such as agriculture, missile gap, and situation East Germany, not capable of quick solution and would be rational expect K to seek détente with West for period of at least couple years. This would also be consistent with his basic policy of co-existence. Key to such détente, as K himself has pointed out, is Berlin problem. Difficulty with this analysis is that Soviets not always rational by our standards and always possible K will conclude that to maintain his position at home and deal with Chinese problem abroad he should make radical change in policy. On balance however I consider this unlikely. I also think it unlikely that he will pay our price for real Berlin solution and that present “neither peace nor war” situation will continue. Likely Soviet move on Berlin is another approach to West Germans. While this would probably not succeed, would appear be some possibility of deal in which in return for West German concessions Soviets would get rid of Ulbricht and allow regime develop in East Germany along Polish lines. If some such move not tried or is unsuccessful, I continue believe K will sign his separate treaty but take steps prevent it from bringing on serious conflict with West.

Thompson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5-462. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn, and to Athens for Secretary Rusk who was attending the North Atlantic Council meeting.
1. Andrei P. Kirilenko had been appointed to the First Deputy Chairmanship of a Central Committee Bureau at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet beginning April 23.
2. Ivan V. Spiridonov had been elected President of the Supreme Soviet and removed from his post as a Party Secretary.
3. The text of Gardner Cowlesʼ interview with Khrushchev on April 20 is printed in Pravda, April 27, 1962. In commenting on the 2-hour and 40-minute interview, Thompson reported that it was notable for Khrushchevʼs “cautious attitude” on current problems. In response to Cowlesʼ question on a summit meeting, Khrushchev stated that he would be willing to meet the President either at a neutral site or in Moscow, but felt that past wounds to the Soviet Union had not sufficiently healed to make this the best time for Kennedy to visit Moscow. (Telegram 2709 from Moscow, April 20; Department of State, Central Files, 961.6211/4-2062)