175. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk0
I believe we should work toward another meeting between the President and Mr. Khrushchev, either in connection with a summit or bilaterally for the following reasons:1
Our two principal problems with the Soviets are Berlin and disarmament. I believe these are somewhat connected in Soviet thinking. A Berlin settlement would facilitate progress in disarmament and one of the reasons Khrushchev may be holding off on Berlin is to see whether or not there is any real prospect of meaningful disarmament measures. In any event progress in disarmament would also facilitate a Berlin settlement. While I continue to believe that a real settlement of the Berlin question is not now possible I think that if Khrushchev thought the prospects in the field of disarmament were good, we could reach agreement with him on some kind of modus vivendi for Berlin. It seems to me that continuance of the present situation of Soviet harassment and attempts to erode our position in Berlin is very dangerous and could easily lead to a situation where communication between us would become impossible. If the Soviets proceed with the signature of their separate peace treaty without a prior understanding with us the situation will become even more dangerous. I believe therefore that we should proceed promptly to get out of the present impasse.
Given the situation within the Soviet Union Khrushchev should want—rather desperately—to at least stop the increase in arms expenditure and if possible to reduce this burden drastically. It is clear that he is in deep trouble with the Soviet agricultural situation and will need to make heavy direct investments in this area as well as to increase production of consumers goods to provide needed incentives both in agriculture and industry. The problem is from what area can he take these measures. Housing is already behind plan and the pressure is already strong in this field. A cutback in heavy industry would encounter strong internal opposition and would mean giving up the goals of the seven-year plan. Foreign [Page 398] aid and space programs would be difficult to cut back and would probably not be sufficient. The only area where the cuts could be made without causing serious internal difficulties is that of military expenditures.
I believe that when they have seriously considered our proposal of a 30% cut combined with a sampling technique, the Soviets will be very much attracted to the possibilities it offers toward the solution of their problems. The greatest opposition would come from the Soviet military and their strongest argument is probably that even with sampling we would uncover their weaknesses and be able to fix targets with sufficient accuracy that we would be tempted either to launch a first strike or make political demands based upon a “position of strength.”
In these circumstances I believe that the disclosure to Khrushchev of our present intelligence capability could be the item which could tip the scale both in disarmament and Berlin. The pros and cons of this action would have to be carefully examined. I understand that the military and CIA are strongly opposed particularly to revealing the extent of resolution of our photography but I do not believe this would be necessary. I suggest that the President should see Khrushchev with only an interpreter present and should relate the disclosure solely to disarmament and not to the Berlin question. He could pick an area where the Soviets would know there had been no U-2 flights or visits from our attaches. He could produce maps showing targets in that area and drawings of military and particularly of missile installations. An alternative might be to show Khrushchev similar information about Communist Chinese atomic and missile developments. It would be helpful if in the conversation it could be brought out that our decision to stand firm on Berlin antedated this intelligence capability.
I have an appointment to see the President on Friday at 10:30 and if you agree I would propose to talk to him along these lines.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-362. Top Secret. Drafted by Thompson and sent to Rusk through Kohler. On April 3 Thompson, who was in Washington for consultations, also briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on recent developments in the Soviet Union. Although stating that any predictions about the Soviets were dangerous, he expressed personal optimism about relations between the two countries, leaving aside only the Berlin question. The Ambassador added that the two most difficult problems for Khrushchev were agriculture and the dispute with the Chinese, which he believed was deepening. For text of his briefing and replies to questions from the committee, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1962, pp. 359-380.↩
- Next to this paragraph in the source text Rusk wrote “if some prospect of success.”↩
- The source text bears an “OK DR”, but other than an entry in the Presidentʼs log, no record of his meeting with Thompson at 10:30 a.m., April 6, has been found.↩