148. Editorial Note
On January 28, 1962, Assistant Secretary of State Harriman called in Soviet Charge Smirnovsky. Talking informally from an oral statement, Harriman informed him that the United States supported the agreement reached in Geneva on January 19 among the three Laotian factions and [Page 355] hoped the upcoming meeting of the three factions in Laos would enable them to form a government and send a united delegation to the conference in Geneva. Harriman then noted that the United States might be forced to increase pressure on Royal Lao Government leaders to “induce them to negotiate in good faith and not to obstruct settlement by unreasonable demands.” Since such pressures might include withholding aid, which could weaken the Royal Lao Government politically and militarily, the United States would “need assurances from Soviet Govʼt that they will see to it that P[athet] L[ao] do not take advantage of the situation.” For text of Harrimanʼs oral statement transmitted to Moscow in telegram 1758, January 28, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XXIV, pages 601–603.
On February 1 the Department of State instructed Ambassador Thompson to take up the matter of Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese attacks on Royal Lao Government forces in the provincial capital city of Nam Tha, stressing that the United States could not be expected to pressure the Royal Lao Government when it was under leftist military attack. (Ibid., page 611, footnote 1) In telegram 2109 to the Department, February 3, Thompson reported that Georgi Pushkin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister for Southeast Asian Affairs, took the message but made no commitment on a Soviet response. For text, see ibid., pages 611–612.