144. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State0

2657. Press reports of what Secretary is alleged to have said to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Kremlin developments have aroused considerable interest in FonOff.1 These reports plus Molotov muddle2 have also given rise to considerable speculation in British press as to Khrushchevʼs current power position, andFonOff has been under some pressure to respond to press inquiries as to how it views present situation in light of recent developments. Accordingly FonOff (Northern Dept) has worked out following preliminary assessment, sanitized version of which is being used as basis for backgrounders to local press (note, for example, Middletonʼs New York Times despatch Jan 18).

1.
Foreign observers in Moscow have been struck by rather peculiar atmosphere of uncertainty there since New Year.
2.
While no real evidence to support idea that there is serious split within Kremlin or that radical change of policy imminent, FonOff has [Page 350] been impressed by possible significance of number of recent rather surprising developments, including (a) confused handling of Molotovʼs return to Vienna, (b) Khrushchevʼs silence on foreign affairs since December 9 WFTU speech,3 (c) absence of bloc New Year messages to Ulbricht and omission Ulbrichtʼs New Year speech of any mention of deadline for Berlin settlement, (d) unusual form of Soviet approach to West Germans over Berlin,4 (e) shift to harder line in Gromykoʼs second talk with Amb Thompson.5
3.
In FonOff view these developments should be assessed against the following problems currently confronting Khrushchev: (a) delay in effecting Berlin settlement in accordance with his November 1958 ultimatum; (b) his difficulties with China and Albania and consequent repercussions in bloc; (c) his recognition of growing Western confidence in USA in light of U.S. reappraisal of military balance between East and West.
4.
FonOff assumes that Soviets are in process of reconsideration their policies with regard to three issues cited above. Although it points out Soviet leaders give no impression of being in state of crisis with Khrushchev travelling around Byelorussia and Mikoyan off in Africa.
5.
As to effect of such re-examination on Soviet actions and implications it may hold for West, FonOffʼs crystal ball is somewhat cloudy. In FonOff view, it is difficult to see what easy solutions Khrushchev can find on either Berlin or his difficulties with Albania or China. He may even contemplate stalling on these while focusing on this third problem—the military balance. He may contemplate distractions elsewhere making the most of opportunities such as exploiting the anti-colonial gale blowing through the UN and coming forward with plausible schemes of disengagement and international security. While Berlin may be put on back burner, FonOff continues believe that Khrushchev will use any suitable occasion for harassments over access to Berlin although avoiding action which might risk hostilities however limited.

In discussing above assessment with Embassy FonOff stressed preliminary and informal nature of its views and expressed interest in being informed of Deptʼs current appraisal of recent rather puzzling developments and particularly if appropriate of substance of Secretaryʼs remarks [Page 351] to Senate Foreign Relations Committee which had been widely reported in local press.6

Bruce
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/1-1862. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow and Paris.
  2. For a transcript of Ruskʼs January 15 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the world situation, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1962, pp. 65-109.
  3. Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Soviet representative on the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission in Vienna, had been called back to Moscow in November 1961, and then in January spokesmen for the Foreign Ministry and Soviet press failed to coordinate announcements about his future after he was barred from returning.
  4. Khrushchevʼs address to the Trade Union Congress was printed in Pravda, December 10, 1961.
  5. For text of the Soviet memorandum on Berlin and Germany, December 27, 1961, see Moskau Bonn, pp. 876-887.
  6. Regarding Thompsonʼs meeting with Gromyko, January 12, see Document 140.
  7. On January 22 Thompson reported that the British analysis seemed “generally sound,” but added that the Soviets had exchanged New Yearʼs messages with Ulbricht (paragraph 2c) and the problems of agriculture and dimmer prospects in Africa might be added to paragraph 3. He concluded that while there were “undoubtedly disputes within Soviet leadership over several current policies, I do not see in this any indication of a real power struggle for leadership within Soviet party itself.” (Telegram 2008 from Moscow; Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/1-2262)