Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

142. Letter From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Thompson) to the Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Kennan)⁰

Moscow, January 5, 1962.

Dear George: Your letter of December 26¹ just arrived and I am very glad to have your views. Actually I do not think that our opinions are very far apart. I was somewhat concerned at some of the statements in your telegram² for the effect they might have on policy. Although your telegram was presumably marked Eyes Only I would assume it was read by at least the top Pentagon officials and I note that the President in a recent conversation, I think with Adenauer, said that you thought the Soviets were preparing to go to war while I disagreed. What disturbed me was the possibility that this might encourage advocates of surprise attack, particularly if and when we have a trial of nerves over the Berlin question as seems almost inevitable. As you will note from my telegram, I do think the Soviets will bring us very close to war and in fact have already done so. It is therefore natural that the Soviet military would insist upon having the resources they consider necessary if anything should go wrong. There are a good many signs that the military do exercise influence on the leadership, although I think this is confined to purely military matters. I think the Soviet military must have told Khrushchev that policy on the Berlin question was up to the Presidium but that since this involved a real risk of military conflict and since it had already generated extensive military measures on the part ofNATO and particularly the U.S., they must insist upon adequate steps being taken to enable them to carry out their responsibilities. I think this was the primary reason for the resumption of testing although I suspect another factor was Soviet realization that the Chinese Communists would not in any case go along with a controlled test ban. I also think that there is a division of opinion within the Soviet military establishment. I do not have much to base this on, but whenever there has been a real crisis in relations with us, including the U-2, some of the Soviet Marshals have gone out of their way conspicuously to be pleasant to me. As you know, actions of this kind are seldom coincidence here.

I quite agree that on the German problem we have at the moment little to offer and I suspect that in the end the best we will get is some arrangement after their signature of a separate treaty to keep East German interference within the limits of our tolerance, but this will be a most unsatisfactory situation. This seems a pity since after the Berlin wall was built it should have been possible for us to have produced a proposal which would have provided the Soviets with a real alternative to the risky course they will probably follow. The situation is not, however, quite as bad as it appears because if we find that the Soviets would give us some real improvement on access which would have a genuine promise of durability we could go much further with our allies than we have been able to do on an abstract basis. The difficulty here of course is that the Soviets will almost never reveal their side of a bargain first. With so many strings and so many kibitzers my task appears almost hopeless but I intend to give it a real try.

This is a most interesting period here and although people are beginning to talk much more freely, it is frustrating not to know what is really going on. There is no doubt that there have been very sharp differences on policy within the leadership. Some of these are set forth in Research MemorandumRSB-35, December 11, 1961,³ of the Departmentʼs Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The FBIS made an excellent study documenting the thesis that Khrushchev was obliged to retreat from his advocacy of greater allocation to non-agricultural consumers goods. You may also have read Conquestʼs book on the leadership⁴ and his thesis (which the Department inclines to accept and which I much doubt) that Khrushchev wanted to punish the anti-Party group more than he was able to do because of opposition within the Party. While I am convinced that many of Khrushchevʼs policies meet vigorous criticism and even opposition, I do not think this takes the form of any attempt to supplant him. Another development which will bear watching is the growing influence of the new generation. Adzhubei on New Yearʼs Eve asked me to call the Presidentʼs attention to the fact that the new Soviet Ambassador to Washington was a member of “their generation.” He is, incidentally, an excellent man and I consider that his appointment and that of Soldatov to London are all to the good.

I should be more than delighted if you would visit Moscow and hope that you would bring Annelise and of course would expect you to stay with us. I expect to leave in the spring and it could be that I might leave earlier if there is some definite turn in the Berlin problem. When I asked the Secretary some months ago what my chances of getting away from here were, he replied that I was in the same category as Bizerte. I think that despite the indications from the Soviets that they would not object to a visit, it would be well either for you through the Soviet Embassy or for me here informally to sound out the Soviets before making an actual application for a visa. I think they would appreciate the courtesy of having an opportunity informally to suggest a change in timing if there should be some subject such as Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the Albanian question, or even internal policy toward Soviet intellectuals on the carpet at the time you planned your visit.

I gather that the intellectuals, along with other groups, are currently probing to see how far they can go following the 22nd Congress. Given the Russian character it is quite likely that they will go too far and have to be checkreined.

I will be most interested in your reactions to the current Soviet scene. I think you will be startled in two ways: to find how much some things are exactly the same while others have completely changed. Internally I believe the regime is approaching a crossroads and the outcome of the Berlin problem may have great influence on which path they take.

Jane joins me in best wishes to you both. We envy you the skiing which we had also planned but as usual the Department decided otherwise.

Sincerely,

Llewellyn E. Thompson⁵

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/1-561. Secret; Official-Informal.
1. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, pp. 705–708.
2. Regarding this telegram and the one referred to below, see ibid., footnote 1, p. 705.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/12-1161)
4. Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR: The Study of Soviet Dynasties, New York, 1961.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.