139. Editorial Note
During the Kennedy-Macmillan summit in Bermuda on December 22, 1961, British Foreign Secretary Lord Home asked President Kennedy if he really intended to link the decision to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere to the Berlin issue. According to the memorandum of conversation, Kennedy “replied in the affirmative. If a really good settlement could be achieved on Berlin, he believed—as a private matter, not for publication—that it would be easier to make a decision not to test. The Secretary of State emphasized that these two propositions would never be linked formally with the Soviets.” For text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, pages 278–281.
On December 30 Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Bundy forwarded to Kennedy a memorandum by Presidentʼs Special Assistant Schlesinger which Bundy described in his covering memorandum as “a really powerful paper arguing for a last effort to [Page 342] avoid atmospheric testing, by announcement that we will not test in the air unless and until the Soviets do it again.” Schlesingerʼs memorandum, Bundy continued, “satisfies a feeling I have had for some time that you have a right to hear a better argument against testing now than you have yet heard from advisers nearly all of whom personally favor testing. I believe that if you personally care enough, and want to make the argument strongly enough, you can carry a decision against atmospheric testing with the Congress and the country. I also believe it is safe.” For text of Bundyʼs and Schlesingerʼs memoranda, see ibid., pages 282–287.
On January 17, 1962, Bundy forwarded to Kennedy a memorandum by his deputy, Carl Kaysen, which Bundy called in his covering memorandum “really of high importance” and capsulized as follows: “1. You can safely offer an atmospheric test-ban, because without atmospheric tests we can be sure of a nuclear stand-off, and even with them we cannot get anything better after 1963. 2. If Russians accept, you get a real step towards arms control. 3. If Russians reject, you shift much of the weight of our test series on them.” For text of Bundyʼs and Kaysenʼs memoranda, see ibid., pages 297–303 and 306.