136. Current Intelligence Weekly Review0
Nuclear Test Ban Talks
The new Soviet proposal for a simple four-point test ban agreement,1 containing provisions which the Soviets have long known were unacceptable to the West, underscores the USSRʼs intention to use the Geneva talks as a propaganda forum for denouncing the continuation of Western testing, particularly any US decision to undertake atmospheric tests. Moscow hopes to use the talks to repair the damage done to its image abroad by the long Soviet test series. The USSRʼs “new approach” is also intended to divert the discussions from previous Soviet obstructive demands such as the “troika” scheme in the control system and to exploit the US-UK rejection of a new uncontrolled moratorium on testing during the negotiations.
In a move designed to appear responsive to the Western position, the Soviet statement of 27 November2 recalled the 3 September proposal by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan for a ban on atmospheric testing, relying on existing means of detection, and proposed that this ban be extended to include outer space and underwater tests. On the crucial and unresolved issue of underground tests, Moscow proposed a moratorium pending agreement on a control system which would be a “composite part” of an international system to supervise a general disarmament agreement.
This new approach raised the possibility that the Soviet Union, despite Khrushchevʼs 10 September rejection of the US-UK proposal when the Soviet test series was just getting under way, may eventually propose that this Western proposal be adopted as the basis for an immediate agreement banning atmospheric tests. The Soviets may calculate that such a maneuver could inhibit the US from undertaking atmospheric tests and place the US and UK on the defensive in the talks.
A member of the Soviet delegation, in a conversation with a US delegate on 28 November, feigned surprise over the negative Western reaction to the new Soviet proposal and argued that the Soviet plan in essence went no further than the Western offer to ban atmospheric tests with monitoring left to existing national detection systems. The Soviet representative said theUSSR would “emphasize” that the Westʼs negative reaction represents a retreat from the 3 September proposal and insisted that world opinion would not understand this “switch” in position.
[Page 337]A TASS report on the 28 November session of the test ban talks said that the Soviet proposals were rejected by the Western representatives “without even bothering to study them.” The report claimed that from the start the Western delegates displayed intractability and insisted on their old positions, while US delegate Dean said that the Western powers would not halt nuclear tests. Soviet delegate Tsarapkin told newsmen after the session that he was “not very happy” about the Western reaction to the Soviet proposals but commented that “after careful study of our proposals, after consideration of our new approach, the West could easily come to an agreement on this basis.” Tsarapkin also said that the Soviet Union would not negotiate on the basis of “the ancient treaty proposed by the West.”
Moscowʼs current proposal for the first time includes a demand for French participation in the talks and adherence to the agreement, although Moscow began warning last March that French testing while the talks were in progress could make the talks pointless. One of reasons Khrushchev advanced for his 10 September rejection of the US-UK proposal to ban atmospheric tests was its failure to include France. Khrushchev said the USSR would not tolerate such an “impermissible situation.”
During the 28 November session Tsarapkin repeated the call for French participation but without making continuation of the talks dependent on fulfillment of this demand. His failure to do so and his mild comment that a pledge to refrain from testing would “facilitate” negotiations suggest that the Soviets are preparing for a long stay at Geneva and will try to place the onus for any breakoff of the talks on the Western powers. A Soviet delegate has already expressed “hope” that the Western delegations would follow the custom of proposing a Christmas recess.
By coming out in favor of an immediate ban on all tests, the Soviet leaders probably hope to convince neutral opinion that the Western desire for further tests is the main obstacle to an early agreement. In this connection Khrushchev explicitly stated in a recent letter to the president of the World Peace Council that if the Western powers conduct tests, “we too shall be obliged to return to them in order to keep our armed forces at the modern level.” In an obvious attempt to attract neutralist support for the “new approach,” the Soviet Foreign Ministry immediately passed copies of its latest proposals to the ambassadors of neutral countries. The 21 November Soviet note3 agreeing to return to the Geneva talks had similarly been distributed promptly to neutralist representatives.
The draft treaty was released by the Soviets on 27 November, the day before the Geneva test ban talks resumed after a recess of almost [Page 338] three months. It marks a further shift from the position taken by Moscow that a test ban agreement could be considered only as part of an agreement on complete and general disarmament. Whereas last spring and summer the Soviet delegation in Geneva insisted that a ban on tests apart from general disarmament would be unacceptable unless the Western powers accepted the “troika” principle for controlling a test agreement, the new Soviet proposal avoids the controversial control issues and pays only lip service to a general disarmament agreement.
The plan in effect calls for a separate, uncontrolled ban on all tests and is a reversion to the position taken in early 1960, when the USSR made a similar proposal for a permanent ban on all tests except small underground explosions, which would have been covered by a voluntary moratorium. That proposal was eventually modified to link the duration of the moratorium to a research program to improve detection and identification techniques; the current plan, however, would extend the moratorium on underground tests until agreement could be reached on a system of controls for such tests, which would form part of an international control system for general disarmament. In this way Moscow would avoid submitting to a system of foreign inspection, which it had earlier claimed was far too extensive for an agreement limited in scope. Moscow would also avoid having to defend the “troika” plan, which it contends would not be necessary under general disarmament.
The Soviet statement accompanying the new draft treaty asserts that it represents a “new approach” and is intended to “direct” the Geneva talks into a “practical current” in order to exclude the “difficulties and obstacles which stood in the way of an agreement in the past.” This line suggests that in the face of widespread criticism of Soviet testing, the Soviet leaders probably felt they could not afford to stand on either of their previous positions of linking a test treaty to agreement on general and complete disarmament, or demanding a “troika” system for controls. The proposal indicates, however, that no international controls over a test ban agreement would be implemented until a disarmament agreement was reached. (Concurred in by OSI)
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Confidential. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence and concurred in by the Office of Scientific Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 1-3 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.↩
- November 28; for text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 664.↩
- For text, see ibid., pp. 659-663.↩
- For text, see ibid., pp. 635-636.↩