133. Editorial Note
In a November 22, 1961, memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk, Arthur Dean reported that earlier that day the President had called him [Page 319] and expressed concern that “public opinion might believe that we did not have complete freedom of action to test in all environments while negotiations were going on in Geneva. He suggested that I should make this absolutely clear at the opening of negotiations.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, pages 235–236. In the course of his opening statement to the conference on November 28, Dean emphasized that because of the Soviet Unionʼs “unwarranted attempt to gain for itself a unilateral advantage in the nuclear field,” there was “naturally no chance whatsoever—and I want to make this very clear—of any pre-treaty commitment by the United States not to conduct any nuclear tests of any character in any environment which it deems essential for the national security of itself and its associates.” For text of Deanʼs statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pages 665-673.
In a letter to President Kennedy, November 22, Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy, stated that for a major portion of nuclear weapons technology, above-ground testing was “essential to any substantial future progress” and that urgency had been “added to the need for progress by the substantial advances made by the USSR.” He recommended implementation of a program to consist of a minimum of 27 test shots in the atmosphere over a period of approximately 3 months beginning in the spring of 1962. In National Security Action Memorandum 116, December 1, the President approved Seaborgʼs list of 27 atmospheric tests “for the purpose of proceeding with preparations,” subject to several provisos, including a review of the list “with a view to reduction in the numbers of atmospheric tests, in the length of time of the test series, and in the resulting radioactive fall-out.” The President also “reserved judgment on the final decision for or against resumption of atmospheric testing.” For text of Seaborgʼs letter and NSAM 116, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, pages 241–248 and 252–253.