Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

129. Memorandum From the Secretary of Stateʼs Special Assistant (Bohlen) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, November 15, 1961.

Just in case you couldnʼt lay your hand on TOMMYʼs suggestions in regard to the Adzhubei interview, I am enclosing another copy.¹ I think TOMMYʼs suggestions are very good, and should be carefully considered. However, while I agree that ideological themes are nonproductive, there is a terrible temptation to have the President go into some of them. But, I imagine that for a President to get into that swamp would probably not be wise.

However, I do agree with TOMMYʼs paragraph on the subject, and I think the President should hit the history of the Soviet Union and the fact that ever since its existence in 1917, it has never had normal relations with any country; the reason being, as TOMMY points out, their adherence to a system which they claim is bound to prevail throughout the world. In this connection, I think he might dwell somewhat on the theme of “peaceful coexistence,” pointing out that its constant repetition by Soviet leaders is curious, since heretofore there had been many different systems of social organization in various countries without the problem of existing side-by-side ever having been raised.

1. Other aspects which the President might treat are those of Stalinʼs actions in foreign affairs which, at this stage, might be capable of discussion. One of these might be the Korean war and, as an offshoot thereof, the Soviet Governmentʼs sponsorship on a world-wide basis of the charge that we had used bacteriological warfare in Korea. This has since been dropped completely by Stalinʼs successors, but it might be worth bringing up as an example of why our relations have been troubled.

2. We should try and think of some news or information which is banned to the Soviet people and this brings us directly to the question of nuclear testing. As you know, while the Soviet intention to test was published in the Soviet press, there was no report on individual explosions and nothing has appeared in the Soviet Union in regard to the fifty megaton one. The President might take the theme that facts are facts, regardless of opinion or ideological coloration, and that to censor everything that goes into a country is hardly a defensible exercise in the modern world.

3. In relation to 2., the President might emphasize the role of secrecy in Soviet international dealings and its destructive effect on the development of any state of confidence with the Soviet Union, quite apart from its obvious denial of elementary freedom.

4. The President might refer to the history of our military posture since the end of the war, dwelling on the complete demobilization of the mightiest force which had ever been assembled until just prior to the Korean war; our military budget was some fourteen billion dollars (I think this is right, but I am not sure) and pointing out as a reply to customary Soviet assertions on United States militarism, that facts and their sequence would demonstrate that our present budget resulted entirely from Soviet actions.

5. The President might dwell on our view of the role and potential usefulness of the United Nations, with special reference to the troika principle, pointing out that this principle was in itself contrary to the purposes of the Charter. He could indulge in a little philosophy here by pointing out that if there is a general denial of objective individuals who could serve as international civil servants, this would reduce the world to a jungle of competing systems, and that what seemed to be at fault here was the absence in Soviet doctrine of any objective morality. Even the most elementary of games requires some rules if they are to be played by people.

The President might, as a closer, state that when the Soviet Union came to realize that Bolshevism was not the system designed for every country and has only been installed by force or conquest, and that as the leaders began to act as the head of a national state, there would then be the first beginnings of a possibility of a reasonable and normal relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. He might point out, in this connection, that it is not specific United States interests which are being served by our world-wide involvement, but that we are, in effect, a third force, helping weaker countries to resist the efforts of a great power to install its system against the will of the recipients. The President might note, in this connection, that there has never been a case in history where the people of a country have voted in the communist system in any free vote or choice.

I enclose a list of points which were drawn up by the research boys here, which you may find useful.² I also enclose a copy of Raymond Aronʼs reply to a questionnaire from the Tass agency which Arthur Schlesinger sent over to me, which you will at least find amusing, and possibly useful for this exercise.

I imagine we will be getting together on Monday and Tuesday at some time to go over these various points.

CEB

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, USSR, Adzhubei Interview. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. Printed as Document 128.
2. Not found.