114. Editorial Note
In a memorandum to the Presidentʼs senior advisers on disarmament, August 29, 1961, McGeorge Bundy stated that the President had directed him, in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, to “recommend the appropriate time for the AEC to make an announcement about the resumption of contingent preparations for nuclear testing and for the President to issue a statement that this does not mean we were resuming tests at any given time.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, page 148. The next day the Soviet Union announced that it was resuming nuclear testing. In response, the United States issued a statement recalling Arthur Dean from the negotiations in Geneva. For text of the Soviet and U.S. statements, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pages 337-350.
Following a series of meetings and telephone consultations among President Kennedy and his advisers on September 2, the President decided to ask the British Government to join the United States in publicly proposing to the USSR a ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere. For documentation on the discussions, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, pages 158–160. For text of the ensuing proposal by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, issued jointly in Washington and London on September 3, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, page 351.
In National Security Action Memorandum No. 87, September 5, the President ordered resumption of underground weapons testing. In response to a memorandum of September 21 from McGeorge Bundy, indicating that the President wanted the schedule for resumption of nuclear testing accelerated, Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy [Page 285] Commission, stated in a letter to the President, October 7, that any acceleration would require testing in the atmosphere. For text of NSAM 87 and Seaborgʼs letter, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, pages 162 and 192–193.
At an October 10 meeting of the Committee of Principals on nuclear testing, Herbert Scoville of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency noted that the Soviets had conducted 24 nuclear tests since August 30, including 4 to 6 short-range missile launchings and one test at 100,000 to 200,000 feet. Secretary of Defense McNamara indicated that, in a memorandum to the President the previous day, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric had strongly urged making preparations for atmospheric testing. President Kennedy approved this course of action on October 11. For text of the memorandum of the Committeeʼs conversation, see ibid., pages 197–202. Kennedyʼs approval is noted in a letter from McNamara to the President, October 31. (Ibid., page 215)