112. Editorial Note
On August 13, 1961, the German Democratic Republic introduced control measures that effectively prevented residents of the Soviet Zone and East Berlin from entering West Berlin. At the same time barbed wire and other physical barriers, which eventually became “The Berlin Wall,” were erected to restrict crossings into the Western sectors of the city. Secretary of State Rusk responded on August 13 with a statement calling the restrictions a violation of the Four-Power status of Berlin. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, page 776.
At its meeting on August 15 the Berlin Steering Group, according to the minutes, “agreed that the closing of the border was not a shooting issue” but instead “was essentially one of propaganda,” providing an opportunity to “reap a large harvest.” At the groupʼs meeting 2 days later, President Kennedy decided that the United States would reinforce the West Berlin garrison with one battle group (1,500-1,800 men). Secretary of Defense McNamara suggested that the border closing “might portend a speed-up of Khrushchevʼs schedule” and therefore “our own military preparations should be hastened accordingly. There was some disagreement with his diagnosis, but none with his prescription.” For records of [Page 280] both meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XIV, pages 333–334 and 347–349.
In an August 18 letter to Governing Mayor Willy Brandt, President Kennedy stated that “there are, as you say, no steps available to us which can force a significant material change in this present situation. Since it represents a resounding confession of failure and of political weakness, this brutal border closing evidently represents a basic Soviet decision which only war could reverse.” In an August 21 memorandum to Rusk, the President indicated that he wanted to “take a stronger lead on Berlin negotiations.” President De Gaulle wrote Kennedy in a letter of August 26 that he believed “that the opening of negotiations in the present circumstances would be considered immediately as a prelude to the abandonment, at least gradually, of Berlin and as a sort of notice of our surrender.” Nevertheless, in telegram 660 to Moscow, September 3, Rusk instructed Ambassador Thompson to approach Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in anticipation “that there will be discussion with Soviet representatives in regard to future negotiations” on Berlin. “If Gromyko seems willing to discuss negotiations you might endeavor to ascertain from him what the Soviets envisage as a basis for negotiation.” For text of the four documents, see ibid., pages 352–353, 359–360, 377–378, and 388–389.