Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

91. Memorandum Prepared by Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, September 11, 1963.

SUBJECT

• South Vietnam

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to analyze some of the favorable and adverse consequences of a U.S. policy toward South Vietnam which would involve the minimum of change in our current relationships with the GVN. It is assumed that under such an approach we would continue to press the GVN, both publicly and privately, for the kinds of changes in policy which we have already recommended to them. We would attempt to maintain and improve our normal contacts with the GVN at all levels and avoid taking any “incorrect” actions. We would not make any significant changes in our aid policy. We would try to maintain a balance in our public posture between expressions of disapproval of specific repressive actions of the GVN and support for Vietnam in its struggle against the Communists.

2. The following are some of the principal arguments in favor of such a policy:

(a) There is a possibility that a hands-off approach by the United States to the internal politics of South Vietnam would permit the natural political forces within the country to achieve their own solution. The United States would not be involved in the replacement of the present government nor in the selection of a new one, with the result that a new government would not be stigmatized as a U.S. puppet. It is also possible that once it became clear that the United States would not involve itself, local leaders (both civilian and military), who up to now have been unwilling or unable to act, would accept the fact that initiative for change would have to come from themselves. If it is true that the political situation in Saigon will continue to deteriorate, the pressures for such local action should build up.

(b) A decision not to use economic sanctions would, of course, avoid the disruptive effects of a suspension of U.S. aid. The war effort in the countryside, at least, in its material aspects, would not be disturbed; and we would not add to the confusion in the cities by triggering a possible runaway inflation.

(c) Although we have already discovered that there is a disinclination among senior military leaders to take any action in the present circumstance, it would seem likely that as conditions within the country became more chaotic, they would be forced to take collective action. It has been suggested that since the military stand the most to lose in the event of a Communist take-over, their self-interest will eventually force them to work for a change in the government. To the extent that military aid continues uninterrupted, they will not be denied the resources to effect a change, and their attitude toward the United States should not worsen.

(d) Despite the voices in the United States which would be critical of such a policy, a recent analysis by the Department of State of editorial opinion in the newspapers² suggests that—at present at least—there is a fairly even division over the question of whether we should get tough or ride it out. In any event, the suggested policy will be justified by whether or not it succeeds in producing the desired changes in GVN policy and personnel. Thus, the real question is whether U.S. domestic opinion will allow us sufficient time to determine whether the Vietnamese can solve their own problems. On this question we are in the best position to make a sound judgment.

(e) The same comment would presumably apply to world opinion; and to the extent that the pressure of domestic U.S. and world opinion can be brought to bear on the GVN, U.S. interests would seem to be furthered. Reiteration of our disapproval of the repressive actions of the Diem Government would, for a time at least, preserve the U.S. from complete identification with the unpopular acts of the GVN.

(f) One of the most attractive factors in the suggested policy is that it tends to preserve a wider range of options open to us. If our objectives are not achieved after a reasonable period of time, or if the situation deteriorates to a point where hard evidence indicates that an eventual collapse of the war effort is certain, we should still be able to move up the scale and adopt more aggressive tactics. On the other hand, once we embark on a program of graduated sanctions, turning back would not seem feasible.

3. Some of the adverse consequences of the suggested policy can be summarized as follows:

(a) A fundamental assumption has to be made that there is sufficient time to permit all of the internal and external pressures upon the GVN to change its policies and personnel to crystallize and produce remedial action. We do not have the kind of hard evidence that enables us to predict with any accuracy whether there is enough time. We do not know whether the structure of the civilian government and the military in South Vietnam would hold together long enough while local initiative for change takes effect.

(b) We also do not know what the alternatives are as they appear to the Vietnamese themselves. It is possible that instead of reacting to continued political deterioration in a positive manner, the educated civilian segment of the society might relapse into complete apathy, or worse, turn secretly in the direction of the Viet Cong. As for the military, there also is a lack of information on their physical ability to pull themselves together in the midst of the disintegrating situation. Can, for example, commanders outside of Saigon communicate independently and effectively with each other?

(c) Another obvious problem would be the degree of influence, if any, which the U.S. could have in the formation of a new government should a local initiative crystallize. Despite our public condemnation of repression, there might remain sufficient hostility to the United States among Vietnamese leaders to make it difficult for us to communicate effectively with them. Some of this disadvantage might be avoided if we were to maintain covert contact with the leaders of local coup groups. This would probably be easier to do in the case of military leaders than in the case of civilians, although we have some evidence that even the former are becoming less willing to talk with us.

(d) Although we are probably on reasonably sure ground in assessing our ability to weather domestic U.S. criticism of the suggested policy, we may not be able to assess foreign reaction with the same certainty. It is possible, for example, that a number of Governments, including some friendly ones, would begin pressuring for a Laotian-type solution in Vietnam. Our ability to maintain the American presence there might be seriously compromised if international pressures for the neutralization of South Vietnam got out of hand.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Memos and Miscellaneous, Part 1. Secret. There is no drafting information on the source text, but this is apparently the paper Bundy asked Forrestal to prepare; see Document 85.
2. American Opinion Summary, prepared by the Public Opinion Studies Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, dated September 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59: Office of Public Opinion Studies, “U.S. Policy on S. Vietnam, April-Dec. 1963”)