Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

82. Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (Krulak)¹

En route to Washington, September 10, 1963.

VISIT TO VIETNAM

6-10 September 1963

The trip developed from a White House meeting on 6 September,² when it was concluded that among the factors required to support basic policy decisions is a knowledge of the effect of recent events upon the attitudes of the Vietnamese in general, and upon the war effort against the Viet Cong.

One means of acquiring this knowledge is through the day-to-day observations of U.S. military advisors. It was the purpose of the trip to obtain a first-hand sampling of the observations of U.S. military personnel who are in contact with the working Vietnamese military.

The horizons of the average U.S. advisor, except for those very near the top, are limited. Their attention, and thus their direct knowledge, are confined largely to the Vietnamese unit with whose fortunes they are identified. In terms of what they actually see, hear and interpret daily in this environment, their views have strong credibility. To the extent possible, this report derives from discussion oriented upon such matters of fact or of direct observation.

All Corps were visited. Substantive conversations were held with 87 members of the advisory system, from enlisted men of relatively low rank to senior officers. They included advisors to commanders and staff officers at levels from corps to company, and advisors to province chiefs. Most conversations were held in the individual’s daily surroundings, either in the headquarters or in the field during operations.

Occasionally, in the interest of saving time, several advisors were assembled in a single place. The map³ facing page 1 shows the place visited.

There is no way of knowing how many Vietnamese officer views are reflected in these 87 interviews. Certainly, the number is great, and the sampling thus has a reasonably broad base.

The principal effort was addressed to procuring views of the advisors on:

The progress of the war; changes in the past few weeks; prospects for the future.

Relations with their Vietnamese counterparts; changes since the emergence of the crisis.

Attitudes of counterparts regarding the political problem, the Buddhist issue, the national leadership and pursuit of the war.

Attitudes of the Vietnamese people—observed or reported by counterparts—regarding the critical points mentioned above.

Complementary to the above, discussions were held with the Ambassador, General Harkins and his staff, as well as with 22 Vietnamese officers, whose views were sought on the critical issues wherever it was practicable to do so.

As a supplement to all the foregoing, key advisors were asked, through General Harkins, to put their views in writing. They will be found at Tab A.⁴

General conclusions reached were these

The shooting war is still going ahead at an impressive pace. It has been affected adversely by the political crisis, but the impact is not great.

There is a lot of war left to fight, particularly in the Delta, where the Viet Cong remain strong.

Vietnamese officers of all ranks are well aware of the Buddhist issue. Most have viewed it in detachment and have not permitted religious differences significantly to affect their internal military relationship.

Vietnamese military commanders, at the various echelons, are obedient and could be expected to execute any order they view as lawful.

The U.S./Vietnamese military relationship has not been damaged by the political crisis, in any significant degree.

There is some dissatisfaction, among Vietnamese officers, with the national administration. It is focused far more on Ngo Dinh Nhu than on President Diem. Nhu’s departure would be hailed, but few officers would extend their necks to bring it about.

Excluding the very serious political and military factors external to Vietnam, the Viet Cong war will be won if the current U.S. military and sociological programs are pursued, irrespective of the grave defects in the ruling regime.

Improvements in the quality of the Vietnamese Government are not going to be brought about by leverage applied through the military. They do not have much, and will probably not use what they have.

Field Visits

1. IV Corps.

Thirty-five U.S. military persons were interviewed, varying in rank from colonel to sergeant. They were cheerful, enthusiastic and readily prepared to discuss the key subjects. Obviously, they had been thinking about them.

a. Specifics:

(1) 33 of the 35 asserted that their advisory relationships had not been changed in any way by the political crisis.

(2) All 35 were enthusiastic about the progress of the war and were emphatic that their counterparts were laboring at the war and not at politics.

(3) The Corps Advisor asserted that he was certain the Corps Commander had been ordered to intensify operations against the Viet Cong

(4) 10 of the 35 had had limited discussion of political subjects with their counterpart; 3 had gone into the matter deeply.

(5) 2 stated that their advisory relationship had degraded; one whose counterpart asserted that there are too many Americans in Vietnam, and another who detected an unwillingness to pass on combat intelligence.

(6) One of the 35 reported hearing unfavorable comments regarding the Saigon Government—addressed to Ngo Dinh Nhu and his wife.

(7) None had discussed coup rumors with their counterparts.

(8) 4 of the 35 reported hearing apprehensive comments regarding possible suspension of U.S. aid.

b. In addition to the discussions with advisors, conversations were held with 9 Vietnamese officers, from major general to captain. It was not easy to break the ice with them on the sensitive issues. It was evident, however, that they were genuinely intent on their combatant activities, so much so as to give the impression that they could have little time left for plotting and politicking.

c. Specifics:

(1) General Cao, the IV Corps Commander, was willing to talk about martial law or Buddhists, but not politics. He stated that there was no martial law in his Corps area (this was confirmed separately by both divisions); that there had never been any curfew restrictions (likewise confirmed); that imposition of curfew would halt Saigon’s fish supply.

(2) General Nhon, CG of the 21st Division, stated that his troops had no concern over the Buddhist question; that they were too busy fighting; Christians and Buddhists, side by side.

(3) The Corps G-3 (a major) stated that he is a Buddhist, and that his wife, a Catholic, complains that Madame Nhu talks too much.

(4) A major, Province Chief, stated that he (a Catholic) and his deputy (a Buddhist) took early steps to ensure tranquillity by conferring with bonzes and assuring them of support for free religious practice. He said that the big Buddhist issue is for President Diem and President Kennedy to solve.

d. Combat Effort

Incident to the visit, a helicopter-borne attack against a suspected Viet Cong concentration was observed. It involved two Vietnamese battalions, a Civil Guard Company, a River Force section, and 29 helicopters and supporting tactical aircraft. It was professionally planned, well coordinated and efficiently executed.

Contact was actually made with the Viet Cong. In the face of it, troops were aggressive and well-led. When time limitations required that I leave the scene of action, I took away two strong impressions; we could not have executed the complex operation any better, and any combat force that fights with the skill and energy which had been demonstrated is not spending much time in intrigue.

2. III Corps.

a. The Corps Commander, General Dinh, is the martial law commander, and his Corps—officially or not—is the martial law corps. It is still fighting against the Viet Cong, but activity is less than it was a month ago. Much of its attention is aimed at security of the Capital. Operations are now beginning to increase in intensity, and there is indication that the unfavorable preoccupation is diminishing. As would be expected, attention to Saigon diminishes rapidly as the distance from the Capital increases.

b. Advisor/counterpart relations have not degraded. There is a general reluctance to discuss politics—apparently deriving from an official Corps order. Such discussions as have been possible between advisors and their counterparts have suggested loyalty—or obedience—to the Government, concern over the need quickly to settle the Buddhist crisis and to defeat the Viet Cong. There is an undercurrent of antipathy for Mr. Nhu.

c. Specifics

Fourteen officers and one enlisted advisor were interviewed. Reactions were as follows:

(1) The Corps advisor, a two-year Vietnam veteran and a confidant of General Dinh, states that Dinh is firmly locked to the Palace, and has Diem’s confidence; is surfeited with power and will keep his Corps—and Corps area—oriented toward the Government. He is generally respected by his officers. He stated that, of 10 Vietnamese officers who were willing to discuss politics with him, only one was deeply worried about the Buddhist problem, three were vocally anti-Nhu, expressing hope that the U.S. will exert pressure to diminish Nhu’s power with Diem, whom they respect.

He stated that neither martial law nor curfew has had any significant impact on the civilians and military in the provinces, that civilians in the provinces are largely apathetic to the problem, and expressed confidence that offensive operations—impeded initially in the area near Saigon—would begin to accelerate.

(2) Of the 13 other personnel interviewed, all agreed that the attention of the 5th Division (only 20 miles from Saigon) is directed mainly at the security of the city. Only three battalions of the division are now fighting the Viet Cong, although it is planned that the number will increase to six next week.

(3) Ten of the 13 volunteered that operations elsewhere had not been impeded.

(4) All but one were firm that their counterpart relations had not changed; that one asserted that he had detected a cooling attitude.

(5) Two stated that their counterparts had advised them that political discussions with Americans were forbidden.

(6) Four of the 13 stated that their counterparts had privately expressed favorable sentiments regarding Diem, unfavorable sentiments regarding Nhu and an intense desire to get forward with the war.

3. II Corps.

a. This area exhibits its geographic remoteness from Saigon in terms of continued prosecution of the war, minimal impact of curfew (0100 to 0400 in Pleiku) and continued effective relationships between the Vietnamese military and their U.S. counterparts. Nineteen advisors were consulted. It was difficult to get them to talk about anything but the war, and the progress the Vietnamese are making.

b. Specifics:

(1) The Corps Advisor reported that General Khanh, the Corps Commander, has spent much time ensuring that his military forces and his provincial authorities are fully apprised of the facts in the situation (the party line). He states that Khanh has issued orders for an intensification of all operations against the Viet Cong, aimed at driving them into the mountains, destroying their food and harrying their movements. The advisor reports that Khanh now spends more time in Saigon, is vocal in his praise of Diem; does not mention Nhu.

(2) All nineteen officers interrogated averred that their relations with their counterparts were excellent; two stated that they were closer than before the crisis.

(3) Two reported Vietnamese inquiries, following reading Newsweek, of the possibility of losing U.S. aid. One is quoted as saying, “You are our only true friends. We cannot win without you.”

(4) Four advisors reported hearing younger officers speak adversely of Nhu; two were anxious, at the same time, to evince respect for Diem, one, in criticizing Nhu, stated that nothing could be done. “This is our country. We have nowhere else to go and no money to go with.”

(5) One advisor had been lectured by his counterpart on the heavy-handed conduct of the Government in connection with the Buddhists—with whom he had no sympathy.

(6) One advisor to a province chief stated that his counterpart was derisive of press claims of religious intolerance. The counterpart is a Montagnard (highlander) major, originally a Buddhist, converted Catholic, now a practicing Episcopalian who is actually building an Episcopal mission in Pleiku with Vietnamese engineers.

(7) Seven advisors quoted their counterparts as stating that the Corps policy was to focus on fighting the Viet Cong, to get into the field more and to stay there longer.

4. I Corps.

a. The general reaction derived from the military in this area is that, except for the fury generated in Hue by the original Buddhist troubles, it is business as usual, with the Viet Cong getting the business. The war, undeniably, is going well, and 92% of the rural population is now in strategic hamlets. Both officers and enlisted men have expressed discontent with the Buddhist problem, but their rancor seems more oriented upon Nhu and Madame Nhu than upon Diem or the Government. Twenty advisors were consulted. They represented a full cross section of the Corps area advisory contingent.

b. Specifics:

(1) All twenty told the usual story of no change in their advisory relationships. Two stated that their counterparts were even closer to them because of their intense interest in reaming the significance of the world situation.

(2) The 1st Division advisor (Hue) stated that his counterpart (General Tri) had made a definite effort to accelerate operations in the past two weeks, and that this was being felt throughout the unit. He quoted his counterpart as saying that the local area could be expected to support the Diem Government, but that “nobody loves Nhu”.

(3) The advisor to the 3d Regiment (Hue) quoted his counterpart as saying that the current crisis has meant little to the enlisted men or to the common people, that only the cities have been concerned, and that in those areas it is “more noise than anything else”.

(4) One advisor reported a conversation with a Vietnamese officer (Buddhist) who was severely critical of the handling of the Buddhist matter in Hue.

(5) Three of the 20 interrogated were highly critical either of Nhu, or of Nhu and his wife. One said they should be chased from the country. One said that Madame Nhu at the U.N. would be a tragedy for Vietnam.

(6) None of the 20 had heard any comments regarding the question of withdrawing U.S. aid.

5. The Navy.

In a discussion with the senior advisor to the Vietnamese Navy, he disclosed the following as the expressed attitudes of Navy personnel:

a. The commander of the Navy is loyal to Diem, as a person and as the head of the Government. He states that he is a military man and will support any government that is constitutionally established.

b. Four key officers in the Navy are agreed that the imposition of martial law was necessary, but that the abrasive aspects which have accompanied it are the responsibility of Nhu, who ought to leave the country.

b. Junior and mid-grade officers have made no significant statements on the subject. They, in fact, have been extremely busy with their Saigon security tasks and their routine sea and river activities.

6. The Air Force.

Conference with the senior advisor to the Air Force elicited the following:

a. There are many Air Force officers who are overly attentive to politics, including the commander.

b. On balance, their comments exhibit a loyalty to the Diem Government either out of patriotism (on the part of many, sincere younger officers who are U.S. trained), or of opportunism (on the part of the more senior officers who are French trained and who enjoy their position due to the current regime).

c. The Air Force war effort has not degraded significantly since the crisis.

d. Officers have expressed the view to the senior advisor that the Viet Cong war will be won—political vibrations notwithstanding—if the U.S. continues its aid.

7. The Marines.

The senior advisor to the Marine Brigade contributed the following:

a. The entire brigade must be accounted wholly loyal to Diem. Colonel Khang, the commander, is intensely devoted to Diem and his officers will follow him without question.

b. On the night of 30 August Khang, who is on intimate terms with his advisor, confided to him that there was probably going to be a coup that night, that he would lead the counter-coup and asked the advisor to care for his family affairs (8 children) in case he did not survive.

c. The units of the brigade are either busy fighting or anxious to do so. Their attention is on the war.

8. The Senior Advisor.

The final interview was with General Harkins. He assessed the temper of the military forces in detail, and in much the same terms as were derived from the visits described in the preceding paragraphs.

He is convinced that the programs we have under way are sufficiently matured that it would be extremely difficult to put them in serious disarray.

He believes that Diem is seeking now to get the country back to what passes for normal, and is emphatic about the relatively minor effect the Buddhist repressions and the many ineptitudes of martial law have had on the country at large.

He believes that both sentiment and reality polarize strongly and properly against the Nhus; that the country could survive—and flourish—with them gone and Diem still there.

He is pursuing the military advisory role exactly as before, and is in frequent contact with the Ambassador, who obviously seeks and respects his counsel.

9. The Ambassador.

A final interview was held with the Ambassador just before departure, and following his long meeting of 9 September with President Diem. Since it has been reported separately,⁵ his debrief will not be repeated here, beyond recounting these peripheral comments:

a. The Ambassador was impressed with the difficulty of getting Diem to contemplate the points he sought to make.

b. He felt that the greatest impact was probably made by the discussion of the grave reaction which Diem is courting in the U.S. Congress.

c. He was not sanguine concerning the success of his appeal that Nhu should depart, in the nation’s interest, but is not prepared to acknowledge this is impossible to achieve.

d. Just prior to the close of the discussion he observed that the Vietnam war is, in his view, the key to our Asian position and the controlling factor in the future of SEATO and our forward posture in the Pacific. He said that we cannot afford to lose, and that he is both resolute and confident that an effective formula can be found.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings on Vietnam. Top Secret.
2. See Document 66.
3. Not printed.
4. Tab A was not attached to the source text. It is attached to a copy of the report in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Visit to Vietnam, September 7-10.
5. Apparent reference to Document 77.