Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, September 7, 1963—12:43 p.m.

353. For Lodge and Country Team. Deptel 349.² Herewith set of questions to which answers desired here soonest. Request all assets mission participate as required with Krulak and Mendenhall in providing coordinated answers, reflecting your concerted judgment.

General Krulak is carrying list of questions prepared by Defense, bearing generally on attitudes in Viet-Nam armed forces toward regime and progress of war as result present crisis. In providing answers to questions below you should be guided by fact our main concern here is determine extent to which current political crisis has already eroded, or is likely erode, will and determination of upper, middle and lower echelon Vietnamese bureaucracy and military to wage successful fight against VIET Cong.

A. Following is list of groups whose attitudes we seek determine. Endeavor so far as possible distinguish target groups and give relevant answers for each:

1. Top Echelons GVN Govt.

2. Civilian Bureaucracy Saigon.

3. Province and District Bureaucracy.

4. Top level GVN military.

5. Division commanders; officers and noncoms in troop and combat units.

6. Police and Security officials.

7. Urban professionals, intellectuals, students.

8. Labor.

9. Organized religious groups including Buddhists.

B. Following are broad categories of questions which represent optimum. Realize however that in time available impossible cover all questions for each target group. These should therefore be considered guidelines.

1. Attitudes toward top GVN leadership:

a) To what extent has confidence in Diem and Nhu been impaired by recent events?

b) How is Diem regarded? Has he escaped most of opprobrium for recent actions? How is Nhu regarded? Is he acceptable as dominant force? Are Diem and Nhu regarded predominantly as separate or as Siamese twins?

c) What are attitudes toward Vice President? Key cabinet ministers? Other top leaders?

d) To what extent are GVN handling of Buddhist crisis and present policies martial law and suppression regarded as excessively oppressive?

e) Has discontent crystallized into disaffection? If so, how determined and militant is disaffection? At what levels in bureaucracy and military is disaffection most serious and explosive? How serious is impact on efficiency and morale?

f) Does each target group have feeling of stake and participation in govt policies and programs?

g) Do target groups believe situation will now stabilize under Diem-Nhu leadership or that significant political challenge by opposition to regime will occur?

h) What if any alternative political leadership is mentioned by groups?

2. Attitudes toward top military leadership.

How are generals regarded now? Are their actions viewed as having supported regime, and how is their failure move against regime appraised? Are generals viewed as strong, weak, or irrelevant factor in political situation?

3. Attitudes toward VC and war:

a) To what extent have developments last few weeks significantly affected war effort against VC?

b) Is feeling now that war can be continued with reasonable prospect of success? Will Diem and Nhu be able to regain momentum and progress in the war?

c) How has govt handling of Buddhist crisis affected attitudes toward VC? Is VC now increasingly regarded as only opposition to regime which has chance of success?

d) Is there more thinking now than before about rapprochement with Hanoi?

4. Attitudes toward external forces:

a) What are current attitudes in target groups toward US, US policies and US advisors?

b) Toward France and General De Gaulle’s viewpoint?

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 S VIET-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kattenburg, cleared with Sarris in draft, and approved by Hilsman. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Document 71.