Office of the Historian

58. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

Saigon, September 4, 1963è8 p.m.

412. CINCPAC for POLAD. Eyes only for Secretary. CINCPAC exclusive for Admiral Felt. Deptel 317.2

1.
If I correctly understand instructions, they are based on a very different reading of the situation here and the possibilities than my own and my colleagues. Reftel states that “everything depends on there being real substance in Nhu’s various proposals and change in GVN policies and actions.” In fact, Nhu’s proposals, insofar as they related to what he is offering us, have very little substance, and I did not mean to suggest in my 4033 that they did have, they are largely scenery. Nhu is certainly not contemplating a change in GVN policies and actions. On contrary, he feels in a stronger position than ever before domestically and he no doubt feels reassured from President’s excellent TV conference that we are not planning to pull out, which has surely been his assumption right along.
2.
Our leverage is therefore very slight, and the question whether Washington would like to see an agreement between US and GVN along lines of my 403, in an effort to clear the air and then get on with the war (and wait for appearance of individual or group with iron and will to take over government). If answer is in the affirmative, then I would propose to proceed as follows:
a.
Believe it would be unwise to talk to Diem until we have reacted to Nhu’s offer. Do not think this would give Nhu any greater ascendancy than he has already. Nhu’s so-called retirement and Madame Nhu’s departure can only be worked out directly through Nhu.
b.
Meeting to be held with Nhu [2 lines not declassified]. Aim at this meeting would be to spell out details of Nhu’s change of status; length of time of Madame Nhu’s absence. I assume three months would have value to us in broadening of Cabinet membership; release of students and bonzes still in prison; and repair of pagodas. Am advised [less than 1 1ine not declassified] that repeal of Decree Law No. 10 is no longer relevant. However, it would no doubt have value in UN and I would try for this too. Release of bonzes in Embassy not yet requested. When it is asked for, we can stipulate safety guarantee. [Page 108] Possibly best solution would be for GVN to agree Quang can leave country. As for negotiating outstanding issues with “true Buddhist leadership,” this is out of the question if we mean pre-May 21 leadership.
c.
Once these matters are settled with Nhu, I would see Diem, as a gesture of ratification.
d.
If I see Diem now with all of Nhu’s proposals hanging fire, I will get nothing but a two-hour filibuster and a mouthful of generalities and run risk of losing whatever progress has been made.
e.
President’s broadcast is excellent in underscoring serious view we take of situation. I have already at great length dwelt on the importance of improving GVN posture and will do so again.
3.
If something like this is not satisfactory and we must have a change in GVN policies and actions, then we must have leverage. Nothing better has occurred to me on this score than previous suggestion of arranging for House or House Committee to cut our aid for Vietnam. I could then demand concessions on ground they necessary to get Congressional action reversed.
4.
Other devices may occur to Washington, but we must be clear as to our objectives. I regret that none of alternatives is inviting. Do not want to bother you with details, but the question of whether we will be satisfied with agreement on points in my 403 or whether we insist on far-reaching policy changes (which cannot be had with existing leverage) is so fundamental that I ask guidance.
Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 S VIET. Top Secret; Immediate. Received at 11:10 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC. Passed to the White House, CIA, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.↩
  2. Document 56.↩
  3. Document 44.↩