You suggested that I record a few thoughts concerning my two most recent
trips to Viet Nam. I am attaching three memoranda. The first was a paper
I did for Mr. McNamara in
September concerning the political picture as I saw it in Viet Nam at
that time. (Tab A)2 The
second is a memorandum to Roger
Hilsman which I wrote on October 3 summing up my
conclusions from that visit. (Tab B)3 The third is a
memorandum which I dictated yesterday indicating what strikes me as the
crux of the problem now facing us in Viet Nam. (Tab C)4
Attachment
Memorandum for the Record by the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs’ Special Assistant (Sullivan)5
Washington, December 31,
1963.
SUBJECT
There is a People’s Republic of the Viet Cong existing within the
territorial limits of South Viet Nam. It sits astride the Mekong and
Bassac Rivers and extends from the Cambodian border to the China
Sea. In other words, it occupies most but not all of the territory
known as the Delta Region of Viet Nam beginning only a few miles
south of Saigon.
[Page 750]
This Viet Cong stronghold has its own governing apparatus, runs its
own military establishment, collects taxes, controls the waterways,
and in general operates all of this territory with the exception of
a few population centers and a few communication highways. It’s
fastened like an incubus on the peasantry, which in general is
passive, but from which it is able to recruit young men who staff
its militia and who serve its purposes.
During the regime of Diem and
Nhu, no serious effort
was made by the Republic of Viet Nam to challenge this Viet Cong
state on its own territory. A number of reasons can be advanced for
this situation
- 1.
- Diem and Nhu advanced the theory
that it was necessary to clean up the easier portions of the
Viet Cong threat and establish a firm base before moving on
to the more difficult areas. Hence, they concentrated on
Northern and Central sections of the Country.
- 2.
- Diem and Nhu advanced the theory
that the Viet Cong strategy was to gather strength in the
Kontum-Pleiku highland area and then drive toward the
coastal plains north of Saigon to be cutting the Country in
two.
- 3.
- Diem and Nhu and most of their
senior colleagues in their regime came from the North and
Central portions of the Country and therefore, concentrated
the bulk of their military strength in the protection of
their own home land rather than moving on toward the
South.
- 4.
- Diem and Nhu recognized the strength
and ability of the Viet Cong in their stronghold and
hesitated to challenge them directly for fear of
encountering a catastrophe which would collapse both
domestic and international confidence in their
regime.
- 5.
- Nhu eventually came
to believe that the strategic hamlet concept was the panacea
for all problems of subversion and that the application of
this concept in the Delta would permit a victory over the
Viet Cong in that area without the necessity of a military
confrontation.
The consequence is, after the overthrow of Diem and Nhu, that the Generals find
themselves faced with a military problem of vast dimensions which
they have not yet begun to tackle. It is not clear from discussions
with them whether they feel confident that they can handle the
military dimensions of this problem or whether that they hesitate to
risk a catastrophe. They say that they expect to begin their
campaign in the Southern provinces of the third corps area sometime
after the middle of January. We will presumably have to wait until
that time to see just what degree of conviction this intention
actually entails.
At the current moment the situation in these several provinces has
gone from bad to worse. Not only have the Viet Cong materially
increased the strength of their forces in this area during the
immunity allowed them during the Diem/Nhu
regime, but they have also profited
[Page 751]
from certain mistakes made by that regime.
Foremost among these mistakes has been the misapplication of the
strategic hamlet program in these provinces.
Rather than constructing a hamlet program in connection with a clear
and hold military concept, Nhu directed the rapid elaboration of hamlets in
this area in a sort of rapid sweep technique. Because of the nature
of the terrain there was a great deal of relocation among families
who lived independently near their rice fields. These families were
swept up by a rapid military policing movement, concentrated into
villages and required to construct the basic rudiments of a
fortified strategic hamlet. They were then placed under the
“protection” of Republican Youth Groups usually recruited from the
central areas of the Country loyal to Diem and Nhu
and were given to believe that they had achieved security by central
government action. In actual fact they were disgruntled because they
had been removed from their land, which they had to travel great
distances to till, and were more than a little annoyed because the
authority of their village elders and family seniors was usurped by
young Republican Youth officials for whom they had no respect.
In great many instances, therefore, the strategic hamlets were
destroyed not by action of the Viet Cong but by the inhabitants
themselves. They tore down and burned the villages in which they had
been relocated, scattered the Republican Youth and then returned to
their land holdings. These disgruntled people have in many instances
become assets to the Viet Cong. In any event, they are serious
liabilities insofar as any new central government’s policy is
concerned.
Therefore, the Generals face the task not only of undertaking a
serious military campaign for the first time in this Viet Cong
stronghold but, moreover, of attempting to build Government
confidence among a peasantry in which that confidence has been
severely and bitterly shaken.
Compounding immeasurably the complications which the Generals face in
the Delta region is the problem of the waterways. It seems clear
from all the evidence which was presented in Saigon that the
waterways served as a very significant measure of assistance to the
Viet Cong. Not only is there considerable evidence of seaborne
smuggling into the Mangrove areas at the mouth of the Delta, but
also there is evidence of waterborne contraband traffic drifting
down from Cambodia into the Viet Cong weapon caches in these
provinces. Much of this contraband probably travels legitimately up
the Mekong River from the sea in the bottoms of sea-going vessels
which have the international right to use this waterway without
submission to Vietnamese Government control. Then, however, it is
off-loaded (again legitimately) in Phnom Penh from which it is
scattered into
[Page 752]
country
boats which then move down the major waterways (illegally this time)
bringing the contraband back into Viet Nam without adequate
surveillance or control.
Moreover, the waterways seem to serve as the traffic arteries for
movements of the Viet Cong formations in the paddy country. In many
areas, particularly in the Plain of Reeds, the waterways are well
overgrown and afford considerable camouflage for protection either
from the air or from the lowlands. Again, through control of the
waterways, the Viet Cong are able to exact taxes upon the movement
of such commodities as rice, fish and charcoal. Vietnamese
Government officials themselves ascertain that the Viet Cong
extracts as much taxes on these three commodities in that area as
does the Vietnamese Government on the same commodities.
Therefore, this People’s Republic of Viet Cong is a well-established
subsisting entity which probably pays its own way, even with regard
to the war material which it imports from the outside world. Overlay
maps showing the areas which the Viet Cong control in these
provinces bear out the statement repeatedly made by General
Don, Commander-in-Chief
of the GVN forces, when he said that
“We are like an expeditionary force in a hostile territory, holding
only a few strong points and maintaining only a few main roads of
communication”.
This is the challenge which the Generals face in the new year and it
is the problem upon which the prestige of the US will stand or fall
not only in Viet Nam but in all Southeast Asia. I am convinced that
Sihanouk’s basic activation in his current frenetic phase derives
from his conviction that the Viet Cong are winning in South Viet
Nam. I am equally convinced that the Thai, the Burmese, the
Indonesians, and others who are nervously awaiting the outcome of
the forthcoming military action between the Government of Viet Nam
and the People’s Republic of Viet Cong will shape much of their
future policy on the basis of this battle’s outcome. I think we
should in no way divert ourselves from the central significance of
this one area and this one problem as the key to the entire future
of the US position in Southeast Asia.
