Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

358. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, December 10, 1963—6:39 p.m.

922. Embtel 1135.² You may categorically, and in a manner most likely to convince them, say to the Generals that USG in no way favors neutral solution for SVN. As you know, powerful voices such as NY Times³ and Lippmann have been advocating some sort of neutral solution but this in no wise reflects US Government policy which has consistently been a win the war policy. As you know from recent messages, this is US policy from the top down. You may further tell the Generals that Secretary McNamara’s trip is further evidence of our determined effort to accelerate our joint effort to defeat VC and not to let a single detail escape us that might contribute to this goal.

As for Sihanouk’s conference proposal, you may say we are not going to participate in any conference under circumstances or conditions which would jeopardize SVN interests or our mutual objectives. Latest developments in Cambodia make it unlikely that a conference could be held under conditions which would be acceptable to us as well as to Thais and Vietnamese.

FYI. Only conceivable reason for US to attend conference would be possibility of positive gains resulting. We have in mind, for example, provisions making it impossible for Sihanouk to abandon neutrality and throw in completely with Chicoms and a mechanism that would be effective in sealing the border. Neither looks at all possible at the moment. End FYI.

You may say we are consulting with our other allies and we will continue in close consultation with GVN. French asked for three-way talks with UK and us and we are going to have them in Paris this week.⁴ You can tell Generals that this is part of consultation process and we are not going there to barter away our own stake in SEA or Vietnamese and Thai interests.

FYI only. UK and France apparently still favor conference. There is little disposition here to attend a conference, particularly in light of latest Cambodian outburst⁵ and we are going to try to persuade UK and French of the dangers inherent in conference and the impracticality of trying to force Vietnamese and Thais to attend willy-nilly.

Please repeat to Paris for Koren report of meeting.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 S VIET. Secret; Flash; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, Paris, London, and CINCPAC. Drafted by Koren; cleared by Hilsman in draft, by Forrestal, and by Harriman; and approved by Ball. Forrestal sent the following memorandum to Bundy, December 10, describing this telegram:

   “I have cleared an unnecessarily lengthy telegram from the Department to Lodge telling him we are against neutralism and want to win the war, and that is why McNamara is coming out. Any conference we might agree to about Cambodia would have nothing to do with neutralism in South Vietnam, and we are now inclined to doubt that circumstances make any conference on Cambodia possible. We are still consulting our allies and will keep in touch with the GVN.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vietnam Cables)

   Bundy wrote “O.K.” on the text of the memorandum.

2. Telegram 1135, December 10, reads as follows:

   “I have been asked to meet at 10 am tomorrow morning with Generals Minh and Don, Prime Minister Tho and Foreign Minister Lam. Subject is Sihanouk’s neutrality proposal. It would be most helpful if I could be authorized to say at this meeting that US has decided to oppose conference and, in any event, not to participate itself. We have reports that some of Generals are seriously concerned that US secretly favors neutral solution for South Viet Nam and that there is even suspicion that my stop-over in Paris on the way back to Saigon was for the purpose of talks with French in this vein. At this critical juncture I should like to be in a position to lay their fears to rest definitively.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 S VIET)

3. See the editorial in The New York Times, entitled “Cambodia and Vietnam,” December 12, 1963.
4. This working-level meeting in Paris eventually resulted in a proposal for a declaration by the Cochairmen of Geneva Conference of 1954, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, on Cambodian neutrality, and a protocol for a potential conference. Differences between the United States and Cambodia prevented acceptance of the proposals.
5. On December 8, Thai Prime Minister Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat died and the Cambodian Government declared a national holiday. During the celebrations, Sihanouk supposedly stated that the enemies of Kampuchea, Ngo Dinh Diem, Ngo Dinh Nhu, Sarit Thanarat, and “the great boss of these aggressors,” presumably a reference to President Kennedy, had all died recently. (Memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, December 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Cambodian Country Series)